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This dissertation explores the varieties of Brazilian Nikkei’s – Japanese emigrants to 
Brazil and their descendants – transnational lives throughout a century of their migration history. 
I propose an interactive process approach to migrant transnationalism to understand the 
divergence of Brazilian Nikkeis’ transnational lives between their two homelands, Japan and 
Brazil. First, I focus on the four macro-institutional contexts: 1) positions and development 
patterns of sending and receiving states within the international state system; the infrastructural 
power of states, more concretely 2) the diasporic bureaucracy of sending states and 3) the 
incorporative power of receiving states; and 4) the mobilizing capacity of migrants’ networks 
and associations. I argue that the interactions among them yield varying modes of migrants’ 
transnational ties with the homelands over time. Second, I also draw attention to the processual 
nature of migrants’ agency that produces further variations of transnational lives. I conceptualize 
migrants’ agency as the dynamic relationship between a) social belonging that represents one’s 
sense of belonging to the relevant subcultures and b) possible selves that informs future 
pathways. Interacting with meso-level institutional contexts over time, migrants’ agency can 
generate variations in transnational lives even under the same configuration of macro-
institutional contexts. In short, this dissertation shows how the interactions among the four 
macro-institutional contexts and the agentic dynamics over time produce varieties of Brazilian 
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Nikkeis’ transnational ties and lives between Japan and Brazil. I claim that the analytical 
framework developed through the case of Brazilian Nikkeis in this dissertation can be helpful to 
guide other studies on migrants’ transnationalism and assimilation. 
This dissertation employs case-oriented comparisons and focuses on three prominent 
episodes in Brazilian Nikkeis’ transnational history over a century. Chapter 1 compares Italian 
and Japanese migrants in early 20th century São Paulo and how the form and breadth of 
diasporic supports to the homelands differed between the two migrant groups. Chapter 2 
compares two Japanese migrant communities in the hinterland of São Paulo and how they 
differently reacted to Japanese defeat in World War II. Finally, Chapter 3 compares four 
Brazilian Nikkei youths in contemporary Japan and how their life trajectories diverged widely 
including both an upwardly mobile incorporation into the mainstream Japanese society and an 
upwardly mobile return to Brazil. These case-oriented comparisons across the cases and each 
case along the way enable me to carefully analyze the divergence dynamics of migrants’ 




When I read acknowledgements in other books and theses, I have often thought they were 
just hypocritical remarks. When I am finishing mine, I finally acknowledge they were not. Now I 
understand an intellectual work cannot be accomplished by alone. I am forever indebted to the 
numerous people and institutions. 
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financial supports. 
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Four Portraits of the Brazilian Nikkeis 
In 1940, Atsushi Miyao, the then vice-director of the Central Agricultural Cooperative of 
the Japanese in Brazil (Nippaku Sangyou Chuou-kai), wrote a petition to the Japanese 
government from São Paulo, requesting higher export quotas of cotton to Japan. He noted that 
80% of the Japanese in the state of São Paulo were engaged in cotton production and appealed 
for recognition of their contribution to the homeland with highly nationalistic wordings: 
The preferential quota would not only help the economic advancement of the Japanese 
cotton growers in Brazil through the collective sales of the Cooperative, but also would 
provoke their consciousness as vanguards of the national imperative of Hakko Ichiu.1 In 
turn, their strongly impressed consciousness would strengthen the unity in the 
Cooperative’s activities, and also their elevated adherence to the national imperative must 
improve the quality of their cotton production.2 
It is questionable if Miyao truly believed in his own nationalistic wordings because it was a 
petition to the homeland government. However, it seems almost certain that he and his 
agricultural colleagues relied on the transnational ties with the homeland, regardless of their own 
belief. Moreover, that he used this language to make this appeal indicates that he understood this 
was the rhetorical currency that would be heard by the Japanese government. It fit with their way 
of looking at the world. 
* 
 
1 Hakko Ichiu (八紘一宇), which literally means “eight crown cords, one roof,” was a slogan of Japanese imperialist 
expansionism. 
2 Miyao, Atsushi (宮尾厚). “On Application for Licensed Quotas of Cotton” (許可申請に関する件), October 14, 
1940, (移 1 (D3), reel no.45, MJE-NDL). 
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In the immediate aftermath of the Pacific War – a theater of World War II fought in Asia 
and the Pacific Ocean – in 1945, Hisaichi Nireki, a Japanese migrant who came to Brazil in 
1931, did not accept the Japanese defeat. He lamented other Japanese migrants’ lack of faith in 
Japanese victory: “How petty it is that too many people have concerns and worries inappropriate 
for the Japanese national. It’s no exaggeration to say that they failed to be Japanese on a daily 
basis. I am so ashamed of them.”3 In 1963, however, Nireki wrote in his diary as follows: 
I have been staying in Brazil for 33 years. These days, I end up reading and listening to 
news about Brazilian politics, economy, and society rather than news from Japan. When I 
listen to news from Japan, I feel foreign completely. Even when I find some interests in 
them, they come to me just as remote knowledge distant from my daily life. I belatedly 
came to understand that we have been transformed into Brazilians.4 
His other diary entries of the same year were occupied by his concerns about the growing 
inflation of Brazilian economy. Almost two decades after Nireki wrote down his confidence and 
determination to remain Japanese, he found that his interests and concerns had largely shifted 
towards Brazilian ones. 
* 
In early 2019, I met Flora, a third generation Nikkei, in São Paulo. She was waiting for 
her vestibular (Brazilian university exam) results. Flora graduated from a Brazilian school in 
Japan, worked in a Japanese factory as a contract worker for half a year, and came back to Brazil 
last summer. “Essa vida não era pra mim [that life was not for me],” Flora looked back on her 
factory life in Japan, “Não quero, era muito ruim [I don’t want it, it was really bad].” I asked 
Flora what she thought back on her high school days in Japan. She replied: 
 
3 Hisaichi Nireki (楡木久一). August 27, 1945. Diary no.5, VE3, MJE-NDL. 
4 Hisaichi Nireki. December 31, 1963. Diary no.17, VE3, MJE-NDL. 
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I really liked my school. Of course, I had several things that I didn’t like because school 
secretaries did not speak Japanese and they didn’t help me in that regard. […] My 
Portuguese teacher was the best thing that happened to me. I owe her a lot for what I 
learned about literature, art, and Portuguese. It was my teacher that helped me prepare for 
this [vestibular]. 
After having been in Japan for five years with her family, Flora’s fluency in Japanese was still 
limited. While she was not confident in the vestibular results, she was highly motivated to try 
them again next year if she would fail that year. Flora imagined her prospective future in the 
country of her origin, Brazil, not in the host country, Japan. 
* 
Aline, a fourth generation Nikkei, was in the final year of Brazilian high school when we 
met for the first time in summer 2016. Like Flora, Aline was not confident in speaking Japanese 
while being in Japan for almost 10 years. I asked about her plan after graduating high school. “I 
think I will work [in a factory] for some three months at least. […] I can earn a lot in the factory. 
So, if I work there, I can save more money faster. If I work in other places, it takes longer to go 
back [to Brazil].” However, unlike Flora, Aline did not quit a contract job at the factory as she 
initially planned. She has occasionally traveled around Japan for beaches and skiing when she 
could afford it. “Basically, I am willing to study. It’s okey. I’m not gonna stay at the factory 
forever.” Almost two years after her high school graduation, she did not completely abandon her 
plan to go back to Brazil but at the same time she seemed to gradually get used to Brazilian 
Nikkeis’ working-class life in Japan. 
*** 
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This dissertation is about the varying cross-border or transnational ties between Japan and 
Brazil of the Brazilian Nikkeis — Japanese emigrants to Brazil and their descendants.5 The 
portraits above exemplify four prominent, if not exhaustive, variations of transnational lives in 
the history of Brazilian Nikkeis over a century. Miyao relied on and engaged in the transnational 
ties with the homeland government. Nireki was confident to be part of the Japanese nation but 
eventually found himself losing interest in it. Flora lives in a transnational field that goes both 
ways: to a Brazilian university and another to a Japanese factory. She chose the former over the 
latter to develop her future prospects. And finally, Aline lives in the same transnational field as 
Flora does. Unlike Flora, however, Aline gravitated towards the other way around. Why and how 
did Brazilian Nikkeis in pre-WWII Brazil evolve and sustain transnational ties with Japan? Why 
and how did they fade in the post-war period? And why and how do some Brazilian Nikkeis 
once again form their ties with Brazil while others are incorporated into Japan in the process of 
ethnic return migration from Brazil to Japan started in the 1990s? More generally, what 
mechanisms shape and reshape the variations of migrants’ transnational lives? 
This dissertation offers an interactive process approach to these questions and seeks to 
understand the varieties of Brazilian Nikkeis’ transnational lives and assimilation in a coherent 
manner. It pays attention to interactions between the contexts in which migrants are embedded 
and their agency. I underscore the interactive process because both contexts and the agency 
change dynamically over time. Indeed, the variations of migrants’ transnational lives are 
 
5 Scholars have debated the conceptual stretch of the notion of transnational (Waldinger and Fitzgerald 2004). 
However, many studies use “transnational,” “cross-border,” and “diasporic” interchangeably. Even a prominent 
article that consciously advocates and employs “transborder” in lieu of “transnational” mentions “transnational” as 
one of the article’s keywords (Brubaker and Kim 2011). In any case, either by “transnational,” “cross-border,” 
“transborder,” or “diasporic,” the phenomenon at issue is identical, that is, migrants’ ties with their homelands. This 
dissertation uses transnational ties and transnational lives more than other terms. When I use transnational ties, I 
emphasize the practices and actions engaged by migrants objectively observable from researchers’ perspective 
regardless of how migrants themselves see the ties. In contrast, when I use transnational lives, I emphasize what 
meanings migrants give to the ties and how they live them (see Smith 2006: 6). 
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products of the interactions between the contexts and migrants’ agency. I argue first that varying 
configurations among the contexts affect the dominant form and breadth of migrants’ 
transnational ties with the homelands, and second that migrants’ agency itself evolves interacting 
with the relevant contexts. This interaction in turn produces more nuanced individual variations 
of transnational lives within a given contextual configuration. 
Specifically, I focus on three prominent episodes in a century-long history of Brazilian 
Nikkeis’ transnational ties between Japan and Brazil: patriotic donations to Japan made by the 
Japanese migrants in the pre-Pacific War period in Brazil; violent conflicts between Japanese 
migrants who accepted the Japanese defeat and those who did not in the aftermath of the war in 
Brazil and their local variations; and diverging life trajectories of Brazilian Nikkei youths in 
contemporary Japan. I strategically choose these episodes to further our theoretical 
understanding of migrants’ transnational ties with the homelands. Overall, the major prior studies 
of immigration and migrant transnationalism predict the gradual decline of migrants’ 
transnational ties over time. However, the three episodes do not demonstrate only a linear decline 
as predicted by most theory, but various forms of migrants’ transnational lives, including a return 
to Brazil, as in Flora’s case above. What explains the divergence between our theoretical 
expectations and the various empirical realities in my data? This dissertation seeks to explain this 
divergence and variations of Brazilian Nikkeis’ transnational ties. 
We can briefly describe how theoretical expectations of increasing assimilation and 
decreasing transnational ties do or do not fit the historical experience of Brazilian Nikkei 
migrations. The initial migration from Japan to Brazil started in 1908. Until the outbreak of the 
Pacific War in 1941, they had demonstrated a broad transnational engagement with Japan in the 
form of patriotic donations. In the post-war period, their engagement gradually declined. In this 
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respect, the prediction of prior studies describes what happened. However, the pattern of decline 
varied across local Nikkei communities in São Paulo. This was indicated by different responses 
to the Japanese defeat by the local communities of Brazilian Nikkeis: some local communities 
experienced a rapid dissolution of the diasporic social life and resulted in violent conflicts 
concerning the defeat of Japan between community members while other local communities 
underwent a gradual transition from the diasporic social life to incorporation into Brazilian social 
life and did not see such violent conflicts. The ethnic return migration of Brazilian Nikkeis to 
Japan started in the mid-1980s. This trend gained momentum especially when the Japanese 
government started issuing a special residential visa to the Japanese descendants overseas in 
1990. Instead of steady assimilation into Japanese social life as prior theory would predict, my 
data show that Brazilian Nikkei youths’ life trajectories and attachments to Japan and/or Brazil 
vary widely. Indeed, I will document various pathways into early adulthood, including a 
working-class integration into Japanese society, and a return to Brazil with prospects for upward 
social mobility, a pathway not previously documented in the literature. 
In analyzing mechanisms that produce these variations of transnational ties over the 
history of Brazilian Nikkeis, this dissertation seeks to develop an analytical framework to 
understand the various patterns of migrants’ transnational and assimilation process that could be 
useful in analyzing other cases: why and how do certain migrant groups or individuals sustain 
transnational ties while others make upwardly or downwardly mobile assimilation into the host 
societies? First, I focus on the four macro-institutional contexts: 1) positions and development 
patterns of sending and receiving states within the international state system; the infrastructural 
power of states, more concretely 2) the diasporic bureaucracy of sending states and 3) the 
incorporative power of receiving states; and 4) the mobilizing capacity of migrants’ networks 
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and associations. I argue that the interactions among them yield varying modes of migrants’ 
transnational ties with the homelands over time. Second, I also draw attention to the processual 
nature of migrants’ agency that produces further variations of transnational lives. I conceptualize 
migrants’ agency as the dynamic relationship between a) social belonging that represents one’s 
sense of belonging to the relevant subcultures and b) possible selves that informs future 
pathways. Interacting with meso-level institutional contexts over time, migrants’ agency can 
generate variations in transnational lives even under the same configuration of macro-
institutional contexts. 
 
Migrants’ Agency at the Conjuncture of International State System, Sending and Receiving 
States, and Migrants’ Networks 
1) Technology, Agency, and Institutional Contexts 
Migrant transnationalism is more an epistemic perspective than an emerging social 
phenomenon itself. It emerged in the early-1990s as a response to assimilation theories that have 
been a dominant way to understand international migration (Glick Schiller, Basch, and Blanc-
Szanton 1992, Basch, Glick Schiller, and Szanton Blanc 1994). Whereas assimilation 
perspectives focus on the process through which people are incorporated into the host society, 
migrant transnationalism pays sustained attention to the ties that migrants maintain with the 
countries of origin and people left behind. In its early formulation, coupled with the buzzword of 
the day “globalization” and chorus of influential post-national discourses (Robertson 1992, 
Bauböck 1994, Soysal 1994, Appadurai 1996, Sassen 1996), researchers pointed to the modern 
innovation of communication and transportation technologies under an increasingly 
encompassing world capitalism as the important condition for the rise of migrants’ transnational 
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ties (Glick Schiller et al. 1992, Smith and Guarnizo 1998, Smith 1998, Portes, Guarnizo, and 
Landolt 1999, Levitt and Glick Shiller 2004). However, a doubt arose almost simultaneously: 
migrants in the past also maintained multiple ties with their homelands (Foner 1997, Kivisto 
2001, Morawska 2001, Waldinger 2008). It increasingly became untenable to insist that modern 
technological innovations account for migrants’ transnational ties at least as the decisive cause. 
Aside from the early technological determinism, a notable emphasis of migrant 
transnationalism is on migrants’ agency. It underscores migrants’ voluntary actions as the 
fundamental motor of their transnational ties. Some studies point out migrants’ resources and 
interests as main fuel of the motor. They diagnose that migrants who actively commit to 
transnational practices are limited to a resourceful few and even when they engage in such 
practices, their transnational ties gradually decline as their material and ideational interests shift 
from homelands to the host countries over time (Portes et al. 1999, Portes 2001, Kasinitz et al. 
2002, Levitt and Waters 2002, Rumbaut 2002, Alba and Nee 2003, Waldinger 2015). Since it is 
migrants themselves that engage in, maintain, and disengage from transnational ties with the 
homelands, migrants’ agency must account for the development of transnational ties in the final 
analysis. However, the studies with a focus on the migrants’ agency tend to overlook the social 
contexts in which the agency is embedded. 
An emerging body of literature looks at the institutional contexts in which migrants’ 
agency is embedded and examines how these contexts affect migrants’ transnational ties. They 
shed light on the diasporic bureaucracy of sending states to reach out to emigrants, on the one 
hand (Sherman 1999, Levitt and de la Dehesa 2003, Smith 2003b, Brand 2006, Fitzgerald 2008, 
Délano 2010, Brubaker and Kim 2011, Lafleur 2013, Chin and Smith 2015, Gamlen, Cummings, 
and Vaaler 2019), incorporative power of receiving states vis-à-vis migrants, on the other 
 9 
(Torpey 2000, Koopmans et al. 2005, Bloemraad 2006), and migrants’ associations on the third 
hand (Levitt 2002, Brubaker et al. 2006, Portes, Escobar, and Redford 2007, Portes and Zhou 
2012, Sites and Vonderlack-Navarro 2012, Jones-Correa 2013, Portes 2016). Furthermore, some 
literature views migrants’ transnational ties in a triadic relationship between a sending state, a 
receiving state, and a migrant group (Brubaker 1996, Smith 2003a, Cook-Martín 2013, Mylonas 
2013, Kim 2016). In fact, the interactive process approach builds upon these state-centered 
institutional approaches especially in understanding varieties of migrants’ transnational ties in 
the light of the triadic conjuncture between sending and receiving states, and a migrant group. 
However, it must be noted that the prior state-centered institutional approaches have their own 
shortcomings. 
First, they tend to analyze a snapshot of contextual configuration and its impact on 
migrants’ transnational ties at a certain point. It is rare that they follow the way in which the 
contextual configuration shifts over time. As a result, they are not attentive enough to the 
sequential effects of contextual change. However, a context changes with its own rhythm and 
interacts with other contexts. Therefore, the configuration among the relevant contexts shifts 
sequentially. As a result, the causal meaning of an event can vary across cases, depending on the 
different contextual configuration preceding the event.6  
Second and more importantly, they tend to put migrants’ agency in brackets inasmuch as 
they address the relevant contexts. It is certainly a truism that our life unfolds as a sequence and 
our life goals change along the life. Yet, social science research has often missed to incorporate 
this common-sense wisdom and presumed rather a static agency. Ultimately, they treat agency as 
 
6 See, the analytical distinction between trajectory and turning point in Abbott 2001 (ch.8), the reactive sequence 
model in Mahoney (2000), the downstream dynamism of precedent contextual conjuncture at a critical juncture in 
Pierson 2004 (ch.2), and the notion of historical reversals (Haydu 1998, 2010). 
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a physiological “homunculus” (Abbott 2016: 246, see also Douglas and Ney 1998), equipped 
with a uniform algorithm, such as universal kind of rationality or particular but collective kind of 
cultural norms, that constantly translates a certain given configuration of contexts into one’s 
action. However, unlike a homunculus, which is fully formed from its inception, human agency 
changes over time, reflecting on the past and projecting on the future in relation to the present 
(Emirbayer and Mische 1998, Abbott 2016). As individuals’ agency evolves by interacting with 
the contexts, the meaning of contextual configuration itself varies within the same person over 
time and across persons.  
Ironically, these shortcomings are also shared by the agency-centered studies mentioned 
above. They may acknowledge the impact of contexts on migrants’ transnational lives while not 
making it explicit. For them, however, the contexts are fixed. Migrants exercise a single-step 
agency within the given contexts. They constantly gravitate towards a certain uniform direction 
to which the contexts channel their interests. The agency-centered studies predict the general 
decline of migrants’ transnational lives because they take for granted the contemporary 
institutional arrangements consistently incentivizing migrants to invest more in social relations 
within the host countries while the transnational ties with homelands wither away (Waldinger 
2015). Both agency-centered and context-centered approaches fail to acknowledge the sequential 
developments of both contexts and migrants’ agency and their varying consequences for 
migrants’ transnational lives. 
 
2) Interactive Process Approach 
Both contexts and agency are indispensable components for a framework to understand 
migrants’ transnational ties and lives. However, they matter not as static conditions but as 
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dynamic processes. Inspired by social science traditions attentive to the importance of causal 
sequences (Haydu 1998, 2010, Mahoney 2000, Abbott 2001, 2016, Pierson 2004), I propose a 
combined theoretical approach, an interactive process approach, to theorize the variations of 
migrants’ transnational lives and assimilation in an integrated manner. It sheds light on the 
processes through which a) interactions among the relevant contexts yield varying contextual 
configurations over time, and b) migrants’ agency itself evolves through interactions with the 
relevant contexts. I argue first that the varieties of migrants’ transnational ties are products of the 
sequential interactions between a sending state, a receiving state, and migrants’ networks within 
the international state system, and second that migrants’ agency that changes over time, 
interacting with meso-level contexts, generates further variations in their transnational lives even 
within a given configuration of macro-level contexts. 
For contexts, the four contexts are particularly relevant for varying migrants’ 
transnational ties: 1) positions and development patterns of sending and receiving states in the 
international state system, the infrastructural power of states, more concretely, 2) the diasporic 
bureaucracy of sending states, 3) the incorporative power of receiving states, and 4) the 
mobilizing capacity of migrants’ networks and associations.7 The positions and development 
patterns of sending and receiving states under the international state system affect their 
respective stances toward migrants, and in turn the mobilizing capacity of migrants’ networks. 
When a sending state tries to build diasporic relations with migrants or a receiving state tries to 
incorporate them, the success of their efforts depends on the configuration between the diasporic 
bureaucracy of the sending state, the incorporative power of the receiving state, and the 
 
7 See Smith 2003a for a similar contingent framework with a different set of factors: relationship of sending state to 
the global system, its domestic politics, mode of incorporation in the receiving state, and migrants’ claim-making 
ability toward sending and receiving states. 
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mobilizing capacity of migrants’ networks and associations. The variation in form and breadth of 
migrants’ transnational ties emerges from these interactions. 
In addition to various configurations among the four contexts mentioned above, the 
interactive process approach puts a great emphasis on timing and sequential dynamics that 
produce the varieties of migrants’ transnational ties. Specifically, I pay attention to two types of 
dynamism: upstream and downstream divergence dynamisms. Although they are not specific to 
migrants’ transnational ties, these two sequential dynamics generate variations in migrants’ 
transnational ties. 
First, the upstream dynamism creates branching points for the subsequent development of 
migrants’ transnational ties. For instance, which side of infrastructural power – the diasporic 
bureaucracy of sending state or the incorporative power of receiving state – reach out to a 
migrant group earlier affects the subsequent pattern of their transnational ties. This dynamism 
can be understood as a kind of critical juncture in the path-dependent models (Goldstone 1998, 
Mahoney 2000, Collier and Collier 2002 [1991]). Chapter 1 will demonstrate this type of 
upstream dynamism by comparing Italian and Japanese migrants’ cross-border commitments to 
the homelands’ war efforts in the 1930s.  
Second, the downstream dynamism points to the process in which the causal meaning of 
an event varies depending on the contextual configuration preceding the event. For instance, the 
impact of a change in the diasporic bureaucracy of sending state on the mobilizing capacity of 
migrants’ networks varies across cases, depending on the legacies of contexts preceding the 
event. The downstream dynamism is closely related to but different from the upstream 
dynamism. While the upstream dynamism concerns how a contingent switch point makes a 
difference in subsequent outcomes, the downstream dynamism concerns how preceding 
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sequences shape the switch point differently (Haydu 1998, 2010, Pierson 2004: ch.2). Chapter 2 
will examine this type of downstream dynamism by comparing the varying impact of the retreat 
of Japanese diasporic bureaucracy in two communities of Japanese migrants in rural São Paulo in 
the aftermath of World War II. 
While the dynamics of contextual configurations largely condition what form of ties can 
be dominant with what breadth, they do not determine migrants’ transnational lives. Even when a 
certain mode of transnational ties is dominant among a group of migrants, migrants within the 
group always demonstrate varied transnational lives. Importantly, the variations are not only in 
degree but in kind. For instance, even when the majority makes a downward or horizontal 
assimilation into the working class in the host society without stripping off their ethnic 
distinction, some follow an upwardly mobile pathway into the mainstream of the host society at 
the expense of transnational ties with the homeland, and others go back to the homeland 
permanently with a bright prospect. These variations emerge not just because each individual has 
different attributes and properties such as human and social capital, but also because each one 
develops his or her agency through different biographical lives, interacting with the relevant 
contexts over time. 
The emphasis on this temporal and evolving nature of human agency is especially useful 
for analyzing migrant youths’ divergent life trajectories in the developmental context because we 
rapidly develop our sense of self during the period from adolescence to early adulthood, 
interacting with changing social contexts (Rindfuss 1991, Shanahan 2000). In particular, I 
conceptualize young migrants’ agency as the dynamic relationship between one’s social 
belonging and possible self. Social belonging represents one’s sense of belonging to the relevant 
subcultures. Possible self expresses one’s multiple self-images, which inform future pathways. 
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Migrant youths develop their social belonging in relation to the meso-level contexts, especially 
the school context and the migrant bargain – that children make up parents’ sacrifice by meeting 
their expectation. In turn, their social belonging provides a decision framework for the possible 
future choices: which future pathway is desirable and navigable in light of one’s current social 
belonging. As they progress over the life course, they develop varying agencies, which primes 
different life pathways into the future, ranging from an upwardly mobile assimilation to the host 
society to a permanent return to the homeland. In this way, migrant youths’ agency 
conceptualized as the dynamic relationship between social belonging and possible selves can 
generate variations in transnational lives even under the same macro-contextual settings. Chapter 
3 will analyze how Brazilian Nikkei youths’ agency generates the divergence in their pathways 
to early adulthood in the context of contemporary Japan. 
In sum, the interactive process approach pays sustained attention to the interactions 
between the contexts and migrants’ agency over time. Both contexts and agency change as a 
result of the interactions. Varying configurations among the diasporic bureaucracy of sending 
states, the incorporative power of receiving states, and the mobilizing capacity of migrants’ 
networks under the international state system set up the dominant mode of migrants’ 
transnational ties. Moreover, migrants’ agency produces further variations at the micro 
individual level within a given configuration of contexts.  
 
Analytical Strategy and Methods 
1) Analytical Strategy: Case-oriented Comparisons 
Throughout this dissertation, I employ a case-oriented comparative strategy to analyze 
Brazilian Nikkeis’ changing transnational ties and lives. The unit of comparison moves down 
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from a group level through a sub-group level, and finally to an individual level as chapters move 
on. First, to analyze Brazilian Nikkeis’ broad cross-border commitment to the war effort of Japan 
in the pre-war period, I compare it with the case of Italian migrants in Brazil and their 
commitment to the Fascist regime. Second, I compare two Brazilian Nikkeis’ rural communities 
in the state of São Paulo and analyze how and why they showed different responses to the 
Japanese defeat in the Pacific War. Finally, I compare four different life trajectories of Brazilian 
Nikkei youths in contemporary Japan and analyze what make their life trajectories diverge. 
A lot of social scientific research makes a substantial effort to grasp the major trends of a 
certain social phenomenon and what the units of analysis — either societies, groups, or 
individuals — share in common. However, it often overlooks empirical variations of the 
phenomenon at issue. In the context of current study, we can identify two dominant inclinations 
among the existent studies. On the one hand, the studies that investigate relevant positive cases 
tend to see the sustenance of transnational ties as the central trend in the case concerned.8 On the 
other hand, the other studies with an encompassing scope doubt whether migrants’ maintenance 
of transnational ties constitute a major trend in the whole universe of international migration, 
criticizing the studies of the former kind for sampling on the dependent variable (Portes 2003). 
They rather view the persistence of migrants’ transnational ties as an outlier. Both observations 
are not wrong in their own lights. However, both of them fail to comprehend empirical variations 
of migrants’ transnational ties, including both presence and absence, and to explain why 
migrants are, or are not, engaged in transnational ties to different degrees and in different forms 
in different social and historical contexts. 
 
8 Studies of this kind are so abundant that I cannot list them all here. To name a few, Basch, et al. 1994, Jones-
Correa 1998, Itzigsohn et al. 2001, Levitt 2001, Østergaard-Nielsen 2003, Smith 2006, Smith and Bakker 2007. 
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To counter this tendency, I employ a case-oriented comparative analytical strategy with 
an emphasis on variation-finding (Skocpol 1984, Tilly 1984, Green 1994, Mahoney and 
Rueschemeyer 2003, Ragin 2014). It draws sustained attention to variations of outcome among 
cases rather than the shared pattern across cases. With this comparative strategy, I address the 
following questions: why did Japanese and Italian migrants in São Paulo demonstrate different 
degrees and breadth of cross-border engagements with the homeland politics? Why did two 
Brazilian Nikkei communities in the state of São Paulo react differently to the Japanese defeat in 
the Pacific War? And why do Brazilian Nikkei adolescents in Japan follow different life 
trajectories in the transition to early adulthood, ranging from an upwardly mobile incorporation 
into the Japanese mainstream to an upwardly mobile return to Brazil? 
Each chapter differs not only in the chronological and geographical setting but also in the 
unit of analysis. The first two chapters examine Brazilian Nikkeis’ transnational ties in pre- and 
post-Pacific War periods in Brazil and employ group and sub-group level comparisons. In 
contrast, the third chapter looks at the individual-level variation of transnational lives among 
Brazilian Nikkei youths in contemporary Japan. By switching the unit of analysis in each 
chapter, I can distinguish the effects of larger contexts and the role of agency in the varying form 
of migrants’ transnational ties and lives. In the larger framework of this dissertation, both macro 
contexts and migrants’ agency vary. For clarity, I divide the argument into two parts. When I 
examine Brazilian Nikkeis’ transnational ties in the pre- and post-war periods in Brazil, I treat 
migrants’ agency as a black box that translates the contextual effects into their action in a 
relatively constant manner. I do so not only because systematic individual-level data are not 
available in these periods but also because I can clearly identify the effect of varying 
configurations of contexts on the transnational ties. However, in reality, agency is not a 
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physiological homunculus. It varies across persons and even within the same person over time. 
When I examine Brazilian Nikkei youths’ transnational lives in contemporary Japan, I look at 
their varying agencies and divergent life trajectories within a relatively stable contextual 
configuration. This helps to analyze how their agency brings about the variation in life 
trajectories without losing sight of the larger contextual configuration that conditions migrants’ 
agency. 
 
2) Methods of Data Collection 
For data collection, I draw on archival and ethnographic data in addition to secondary 
literature in Japanese, Portuguese, and English. For archival sources, I examined government 
documents (policy reports, administrative circulars, and internal memoranda), ethnic newspaper 
articles, pamphlets, police records, memoirs, and manuscripts of local histories. I consulted the 
following archives: Diplomatic Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (DA-
MFAJ), Tokyo; Materials on Japanese Emigration, National Diet Library (MJE-NDL), Tokyo; 
National Archives of Japan (NAJ), Tokyo; Japanese Overseas Migration Museum (JOMM), 
Yokohama; Arquivo Público do Estado de São Paulo (AP-ESP), São Paulo; Museu Histórico da 
Imigração Japonesa do Brazil (MHIJB), São Paulo; and Centro de Estudos Nipo-Brasileiros 
(CENB), São Paulo. When I cite or refer to unpublished archival materials, I mention this in the 
footnotes. Some archives hold rare published materials. I show where they are available in the 
bibliography section. For Japanese and Portuguese materials, I mention bibliographical 
information in original languages along with English translation for reader’s convenience to 
locate them. 
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I intensively use ethnographic data to analyze the divergent life trajectories of Brazilian 
Nikkei youths in contemporary Japan. I collected data by two steps. First, I conducted an 
intensive field research in the Tokai region, Japan (see Appendix A) from January 2016 to 
September 2016, where a large number of Brazilian Nikkeis live. I collected Nikkei youths’ life 
trajectory data through life history interviews. During this period, I interviewed 28 Brazilian 
Nikkei youths (19 Brazilian school students and graduates and 9 Japanese school students and 
graduates, see Appendix E) and other relevant individuals such as their parents, teachers of 
Brazilian and Japanese schools, and members of migrant supporting non-profit organizations. In 
total, I interviewed 46 individuals. Second, I followed 16 informants out of the 28 Nikkei youths 
and had occasional follow-up interviews with them until early 2019. The case selection was 
based on informants’ future life plans informed by the first-round of interviews and the degree of 
our rapport. Out of the 16 cases, I developed four primary cases, which represent four distinct 
life trajectories among Brazilian Nikkei youths in Japan. In analyzing the four primary cases, I 
selectively employ these secondary informants’ narratives.9 
In order to gain access to Brazilian Nikkei youths, I used three entry points. First, I, as a 
volunteer, participated in a non-profit educational organization run by a Brazilian Nikkei woman. 
At the organization, I have tutored Brazilian Nikkei youths who were in Japanese schools and 
built rapport with them. I invited them to interview and also asked them to introduce their 
friends. In addition, some of my colleague tutors were Brazilian Nikkei young adults who were 
enrolled in Japanese universities. I offered them interviews as well. 
 
9 All names are pseudonyms. Nikkei youths in Japan often have both Brazilian and Japanese names. I asked what 
they preferred to be called. When they mentioned a Japanese name, I assigned a Japanese pseudonym and vice 
versa. 
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Second, I have visited four Brazilian schools in the Tokai region and two accepted my 
request to cooperate. I visited classrooms and asked students to participate in my research. Third, 
I employed a snowball sampling technique to gain access to potential informants. By attending a 
Brazilian congregation at a local Catholic church and some Brazilian cultural events such as 
Festa Junina, I got acquainted with Brazilian Nikkei youths. I asked them to participate in my 
interview research and to introduce me to their friends. As a side effect of the snowball sampling, 
I had opportunities to know Brazilian Nikkei young adults who live in Japan after graduating 
from Brazilian schools. I offered them an interview as well. 
All translations of archival materials and ethnographic data from Japanese and 
Portuguese are mine. 
  
Chapter Overview 
Chapter 1 does theoretical and empirical work. First, it develops the analytical framework 
for the interactions among the relevant macro contexts, building upon the shortcomings of the 
prior agency-centered and context-centered approaches. Second, it explains different forms and 
breadths of transnational ties between Italian and Japanese migrants in the state of São Paulo in 
the early 20th century: the Italian migrants demonstrated different degrees of diasporic supports 
for the homeland’s war efforts by social class, whereas the Japanese migrants displayed broader 
support for the homeland regardless of social class. Previous approaches cannot explain this 
difference between the two migrant groups. 
I argue that the sustained attention to the four contexts — 1) positions and development 
patterns of Japan, Italy, and Brazil within the international state system, 2) Japanese and Italian 
diasporic bureaucracies, 3) Brazilian incorporative power, and 4) the mobilizing capacity of 
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Japanese and Italian migrants’ networks — and sequential interactions among them better 
explain the different forms and breadths of diasporic engagements between Japanese and Italian 
migrants with the respective homelands. I will argue that due to the different configurations 
among these three contexts, Italian upper- and middle-class migrants formed an integrated 
exclave – a form of migrants’ collective life where both the Italian diasporic bureaucracy and the 
Brazilian incorporative power reached out to the intensive networks of the Italian upper- and 
middle-classes  – whereas the emerging Brazilian nation-state incorporated working-class 
Italians, whose networks were once dispersive, into the Brazilian corporativist regime, and 
finally Japanese migrants formed a diasporic exclave – another form of migrants’ collective life 
where the Japanese diasporic bureaucracy succeeded in embracing the intensive networks of 
Japanese migrants and limited the influence of the incorporative power of Brazil on the migrants. 
Chapter 2 examines intra-group conflicts between the Japanese migrants who accepted 
Japanese defeat and those who did not in the immediate aftermath of the Pacific War. I compare 
two local Japanese communities in the state of São Paulo: Bastos and Registro. The conflicts 
resulted in violent incidents in Bastos, yet Registro saw no explicit violence. I explain this 
difference by the changes in the contextual configuration in the two communities. The retreat of 
Japanese diasporic bureaucracy from Brazil by the time of the outbreak of the Pacific War 
triggered the dissolution of Japanese diasporic exclaves in Brazil. However, there were multiple 
pathways leading to that dissolution. Bastos and Registro represent two different pathways 
respectively: Bastos underwent a rapid erosion of diasporic exclave and Registro experienced a 
gradual transition to a settlement enclave. In the end, they resulted in the contrasting 
developments of intra-group conflicts. 
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In analyzing the difference between the two communities, I pursue two theoretical goals. 
First, I locate the decline of transnational ties among the Brazilian Nikkeis within the broader 
analytical framework developed in Chapter 1. I argue that a change in Japanese diasporic 
bureaucracy (its retreat) affected the mobilizing capacity of migrants’ networks and associations 
(the legitimacy of community associations) differently, depending on local socioeconomic 
conditions (the reliance on an exclave economy), which had been developed under the earlier 
contextual configuration. Bastos, a local Japanese migrants’ community with the heavily reliance 
on exclave economy in the pre-war period, was more susceptible to the changing Brazilian and 
Japanese developments within the international state system during the war period than Registro, 
another local Japanese migrants’ community that relied less on the exclave economy. 
Second, I challenge the largely essentialized cultural argument dominant in earlier 
historiographies of Brazilian Nikkei history (e.g., Maeyama 1972, 1982, Mita 1978, 2009). The 
prior studies on the intra-group conflicts among the Brazilian Nikkeis in the aftermath of World 
War II emphasize the Japanese nationalistic cultural values shared by Brazilian Nikkeis as the 
main cause of the conflicts. However, the conflicts among them cannot be explained by the 
shared cultural values precisely because of the claimed sharedness of cultural values. Against the 
cultural explanation of prior studies, I argue that the disjuncture between economic and 
organizational lives in Brazilian Nikkeis’ local communities better explains the rise of the 
conflicts among them in the aftermath of the war.  
Chapter 3 examines the divergent life trajectories among Brazilian Nikkei youths in 
Japan. The previous two chapters focus on the macro-institutional level contexts. I switch the 
focal level to meso-institutional and micro-agency levels in Chapter 3. 
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Here, let me briefly describe the macro-level contextual configuration for Chapter 3. On 
the macro level, the ethnic return migration of Brazilian Nikkeis to Japan occurred within the 
configuration of the following contexts. First, the Brazilian economy suffered from 
hyperinflation in the 1980s while the Japanese economy boomed. Within this world economy 
context, second, the Japanese government started providing special residential status to the 
Nikkeis overseas to fulfill the increasing labor demands without disturbing the putative ethnic 
homogeneity of the Japanese society (Miyajima 1993: 59, Tsuda 1999b, Tsuda and Cornelius 
2004). However, it does not mean that Japanese citizenship is also guaranteed to them as an 
ethnic privilege. Because of the jus sanguinis principle underlying Japanese nationality law, 
Brazilian Nikkeis and their children legally remain as resident denizens in Japan. While 
naturalization is an available option, their naturalization rate is notably low.10 Third, most 
Brazilian Nikkeis, at least initially, came to Japan as a target earner (Tsuda 1999a, Yamanaka 
2000) and were incorporated into the segmented unskilled labor sector controlled by labor 
brokers (Kajita, Tanno, and Higuchi 2005, Tanno 2007, Takenoshita 2013). Against these 
backgrounds, fourth, Brazilian Nikkeis in Japan formed Brazilian schools as an institutionalized 
exclave accredited by the Brazilian government and recognized by the Japanese government 
under the de facto interstate reciprocity.11 As a result, two different types of educational 
 
10 I estimate their annual naturalization rate is less than 1%. Official statistics puts Brazilians in the “other” category. 
For instance, in the 2010s, less than 2,000 “other” category residents have naturalized each year. Considering the 
number of registered Brazilians, which recorded the lowest number (173,437) in 2015, an estimated naturalization 
rate among them would be less than 1.0% in 2015 even if assuming that those who are categorized as “others” were 
all Brazilians. See, http://www.moj.go.jp/content/001180510.pdf and 
http://www.moj.go.jp/housei/toukei/toukei_ichiran_touroku.html (both retrieved on May 26, 2020). 
11 The recognition of Brazilian schools by the Japanese government is de facto because the Japanese School 
Education Act provides no comprehensive legal basis for “overseas schools.” Some Brazilian and other overseas 
schools are operating as “miscellaneous schools” under the School Education Act and others are operating just as a 
private enterprise. At the same time, the Japanese government does not implement a strict nationalization policy 
towards overseas schools like the ban on ethnic schools by the Brazilian government in early 20th century 
nationalization period in Brazil. 
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opportunity are available for the children of Brazilian Nikkei migrants in Japan: the Japanese 
public school system as an apparatus of national incorporation and the Brazilian school system as 
an diasporic exclave institutionally connected to the Brazilian society. 
The analytical task in Chapter 3 is to unravel the dynamics that produce the divergence in 
life trajectories of Brazilian Nikkei youths in Japan, ranging from an upwardly mobile 
assimilation into the Japanese mainstream, a generational-reproduction of segmented Brazilian 
working-class life in Japan, and to an upwardly mobile return to Brazil within the macro 
contextual configuration described above. I consider Nikkei youths’ agency itself as an evolving 
process with a biographical life. I analyze the interactions between their agency and the relevant 
meso-level contexts, especially the school context and the intra-family migrant bargain. In the 
end, Nikkei youths’ agency evolves through the interactions with those meso-level contexts, and 
produces the divergent patterns among Brazilian Nikkei youths’ life trajectories. 
In the Conclusion, I summarize the major contributions this dissertation makes by 
highlighting three analytical implications that can be useful to advance our understandings of 
varying migrants’ transnational lives more generally. Specifically, I show how each chapter 
contributes to developing an interactive process approach for the analysis of migrants’ 
transnational lives along the three broader theoretical implications. First, the interactive process 
approach develops an analytical framework that considers the varying configuration between the 
diasporic bureaucracy of sending state, the incorporative capacity of receiving state, and the 
mobilizing capacity of migrants’ networks within the international state system. Second, not just 
seeing a contextual configuration at a certain point, it puts a great emphasis on the timing and 
sequential dynamics that bring about changes in migrants’ transnational ties. Third, and related 
to the second, I emphasize the processual nature of migrant youths’ agency, interacting with the 
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relevant contexts over time. In conclusion, the variations of migrants’ transnational lives can be 




CHANGING CONFIGURATION OF MIGRANT TRANSNATIONAL TIES: 
A COMPARISON BETWEEN ITALIAN AND JAPANESE MIGRANTS’ DIASPORIC 




This chapter compares the different patterns of diasporic engagement with the homelands of 
Italian and Japanese migrants in early 20th century São Paulo respectively. Both Italian and 
Japanese migrants responded to their homelands’ war efforts in the mid-1930s, but to varying 
extent and in different forms. Why did the two groups display different transnational 
engagements with the homelands? Guided by this empirical question, this chapter contributes to 
the theoretical debate on migrant transnationalism. Against two prior approaches – agency-
centered and state-centered approaches – I develop an interactive process approach that considers 
dynamic interactions between the diasporic bureaucracy of the sending state, the incorporative 
capacity of the receiving state, and the mobilizing capacity of migrants’ networks within the 
international state system. I argue that their varying conjunctures better explain the different 
form and breadth of migrant transnationalism than the prior approaches. 
 
Introduction 
In 1935, when Mussolini declared a war against Ethiopia, Italian migrants in the state of 
São Paulo hailed it with an enthusiasm. Soon after the declaration, Italian migrants organized a 
war cooperation campaign and raised donations of at least 8,000 contos de réis – roughly 
US$ 640,000 (Trento 1989: 342-4, Bertonha 1998b: 236-7). However, it was disproportionately 
upper- and middle-class Italians who participated in the campaign. Working-class Italians instead 
showed little interest to the campaign (Rios 1958b, Ianni 1963: 120, Bertonha 1998a: 63). A gap 
between social classes characterized the Italian diasporic campaign unfolded in the state of São 
Paulo. 
In the meanwhile, when the Sino-Japanese War broke out in June 1937, Japanese 
migrants in São Paulo also raised donations. By the following November, about 600 contos de 
réis – roughly US$ 48,000 – was amounted (Burajiru Jiho 1937, Seisyu Shimpo 1938). The sum 
of donation raised by Japanese migrants was much smaller than that of Italians, reflecting a 
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smaller size of Japanese migrant population compared to Italian migrants.1 However, they were 
mobilized in the diasporic cooperation campaign more broadly across social classes than the 
Italians (Negawa 2013: 246-8). 
Why did the Italians demonstrate different degree of diasporic engagement with the 
homeland by social class whereas the Japanese offered broader diasporic support for the 
homeland’s war efforts? In answering this empirical question, this chapter seeks to give an 
answer to a broader theoretical question: what affects the form and breadth of migrants’ 
engagement in their transnational ties with the homelands and how? My argument, in brief, is as 
follows. We can understand the difference in the form and breadth of transnational engagement 
between Italian and Japanese migrants by analyzing the different configuration of four contexts: 
1) positions and development patterns of sending and receiving states within the given 
international state system, 2) the diasporic bureaucracy of the sending state, 3) the incorporative 
power of the receiving state, and 4) the mobilizing capacity of migrants’ networks and their 
associations as its nodes. These contexts interact with one another and yield the variation in 
migrants’ transnational ties with the homelands. 
This chapter engages with two theoretical approaches to migrant transnationalism: 
approaches that focus on migrants’ agency and those that focus on the role of the state. The 
former posits that migrants’ own actions produce transnational ties, and predicts that the ties 
decline as migrants’ self-interests gravitate towards the host society or when they do not possess 
resources to sustain the ties. Such approaches, however, do not fully explicate why the form and 
breadth of transnational engagements differed between Italians and Japanese in this chapter. On 
the other hand, state-centered approaches underline the role of receiving and sending states in 
 
1 By 1940, about 186,000 Japanese entered Brazil whereas 1,500,000 Italians did so (Levy 1974). See also Figure1-1 
below. 
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shaping migrants’ transnational ties but undertheorize the conditions in which the states affect 
those ties. 
My own approach is built upon state-centered approaches. Rather than solely focusing on 
the states, however, I underline the configuration of the international state system, sending and 
receiving states, and migrants’ networks and the sequential order of their interactions. The 
development patterns of sending and receiving states within the international state system affect 
their stances toward migrants, and in turn the mobilizing capacity of migrants’ networks. When a 
sending state tries to build diasporic relations with migrants or a receiving state tries to 
incorporate them, the success of their efforts depends on the mobilizing capacity of migrants’ 
networks and associations. The variation in the form and breadth of migrants’ transnational ties 
emerge as a result of these interactions. 
In the following pages, I first show that both agency-centered state-centered approaches 
do not solve empirical puzzles that comparative cases of Italian and Japanese migrants pose. 
Second, I elaborate an interactive process approach, particularly focusing on its macro-
contextual aspect, to investigate the cases in question. Third, I analyze three cases — Upper- and 
middle-class Italians, Working-class Italians, and Japanese migrants in São Paulo. Finally, I 
discuss the implications of the interactive process approach to migrants’ transnational ties with 
the homelands. The comparative cases of this chapter are historical, but its analytical framework 
should apply to contemporary cases as well. 
 
A Critical Review of Agency-centered and State-centered Approaches 
Agency-centered Approaches 
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For over 20 years, migrant transnational ties have drawn a considerable attention by 
challenging the conventional assimilation model (Basch et al. 1994). While the conventional 
perspective places a focus on the mechanism of migrants’ incorporation into the host society, the 
transnational perspective focuses on cross-border ties sustained by migrants with their 
homelands. Since a large portion of the transnational perspectives has emerged out of the 
criticism of methodological nationalism (Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2002), they emphasize the 
standpoint “from below” (Smith and Guarnizo 1998; Portes et. al. 1999). As a result, they tend to 
view migrants’ voluntary actions as the primal driver of transnational practices (Chin and Smith 
2015: 81-2). Some studies with a post-structuralist inclination even seek potential forces that 
may transcend limits of the nation-state system in migrants’ transnational practices (Kearney 
1991, Rouse 1991, Clifford 1994, Appadurai 1996, Ong 1999). Studies in a more positivist 
tradition also posit migrants’ voluntaristic agency as the main factor of their transnational ties. 
Prior approaches mainly point out two agency-focused factors: migrants’ self-interest and 
the resources that they possess. First, the self-interest hypothesis argues that migrants’ 
transnational ties emerge out of their own survival strategy and that the transnational ties 
gradually decline as migrants’ self-interest shift from the homeland to the host society and thus 
the transnational ties are barely transmitted to the subsequent generations (Portes 2001, Kasinitz 
et al. 2002, Levitt and Waters 2002, Rumbaut 2002, Alba and Nee 2003, Waldinger 2015). 
Second, the resource hypothesis predicts that a positive association between the amount of 
migrants’ resources and the degree of transnational ties (Portes et al. 1999). This approach views 
that migrants’ transnational ties are limited to a resourceful few.  
The comparative cases of Italian and Japanese migrants of this chapter pose inconvenient 
puzzles to the agency-centered approaches. The self-interest hypothesis may account Japanese 
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migrants’ broader transnational engagement than the Italians, arguing that Japanese migrants 
with a shorter time in Brazil still had interest in maintaining ties with Japan whereas the Italians’ 
interest with a longer time in Brazil already gravitated towards the Brazilian society. In fact, the 
peak period of Italian migrants’ entry to Brazil was the last two decades in the 19th century 
whereas Japanese migrants’ peak entry period was between the late 1920s and the early 30s (See 
Figure 1-1). In the mid-1930s when both Italian and Japanese migrants engaged in the diasporic 
donation campaigns, the socially active cohort of Italian migrants mainly consisted of the second 
generation whereas that of Japanese migrants was still the first generation. 
 
Figure1-1: Italian and Japanese Migrants’ Entries to Brazil, 1875-1940 
 
Source: Levy 1974: 71-74. 
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However, the self-interest hypothesis does not explain why only upper- and middle-class 
Italians retained transnational ties with Italy despite their longer settlement time in Brazil. In this 
regard, the resource hypothesis may answer the question, arguing that upper- and middle-class 
Italians possessed more resources (both time and money) to invest in transnational practices 
whereas the working-class Italians did not afford such an investment. However, the case of 
Japanese migrants poses an empirical challenge to this inference. The social differentiation 
between landowners and sharecroppers and other lower social classes also emerged among 
Japanese migrants in the 1930s. In 1937, the landowner to other lower classes ratio among 
Japanese migrants was approximately one to one (Census Committee for the Japanese 
Immigrants in Brazil 1964, vol.2: 716-7). The resource hypothesis does not account for why the 
Japanese migrants demonstrated a cross-class transnational engagement with Japan. 
The self-interest and resource hypotheses partly explain the different levels of diasporic 
engagement between Italian and Japanese migrants: the demographically active cohorts of the 
Italians shifted to the second generation whereas the first generation Japanese was socially 
predominant in the mid-1930s and thus the diasporic engagement of the former was limited 
comparing to the latter; upper- and middle-class Italians accumulated resources and showed a 
stronger commitment to the diaspora donation campaign than working-class Italians did. 
However, the same hypotheses do not necessarily account for other aspects of Italian and 
Japanese cases: the upper- and middle class Italians rather intensified the diasporic commitment 
despite the alleged decline of transnational ties over generations; the Japanese demonstrated the 
broad diasporic commitment across social classes despite the social differentiation already 
emerged among them. In short, when triangulating both hypotheses with empirical realities of 
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In contrast to the agency-centered approaches, emerging state-centered approaches draw 
attention to the role of sending and receiving states in shaping migrants’ transnational ties. These 
approaches are innovative in that they point to larger contexts in which migrants are embedded. 
Nevertheless, state-centered approaches have two shortcomings. First, there are few attempts to 
clarify how sending and receiving states affect migrants’ transnational ties. Second, and related 
to the first, they fail to explicate why and how some states successfully affect migrants’ 
transnational ties and others don’t. 
On the one hand, studies on receiving states focus on policies and institutional 
arrangements that either facilitate or hinder migrants’ incorporation into the receiving states 
(Torpey 2000, Koopmans et al. 2005, Bloemraad 2006). They implicitly and explicitly presume 
the “caging” effect of infrastructural power of receiving states (Mann 1993) — the capacity of 
states to regulate the population by state institutions such as passport, citizenship, schools, and 
social welfare and labor programs — on migrant population. Receiving states identify and 
categorize who they are and incorporate or exclude them from the body politic according to the 
assigned categories such as aliens, denizens, or citizens (Hammar 1990). In short, receiving 
states embrace migrant population by its infrastructural power while in a differential manner 
(Mann 1993, Scott 1998, Torpey 2000). Indeed, some influential studies underscore that 
receiving states ward off migrants from the influence of sending state (Alba and Nee 2003, 
Waldinger 2015). 
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On the other hand, studies on sending states draw attention to “diasporic bureaucracy,” 
“diaspora institutions,” or “diaspora policies” of sending state characterized by its symbolic and 
instrumental capacities to embrace its emigrants overseas and establish transnational ties with 
them, exercised through the consular activities such as the registration of co-nationals and 
financial and social supports to them (Smith 2008a, Gamlen 2014, Délano Alonso 2018, Délano 
Alonso and Mylonas 2019, Smith, Waisanen, and Yrizar Barbosa 2020). They document various 
instances and explore conditions that develop diasporic bureaucracies (Sherman 1999, Levitt and 
de la Dehesa 2003, Smith 2003b, Brand 2006, Fitzgerald 2008, Délano 2010, Waterbury 2010, 
Brubaker and Kim 2011, Lafleur 2013, Chin and Smith 2015, Gamlen et.al. 2019). However, the 
causal link between the diasporic bureaucracy and migrants’ transnational ties has been 
disproportionately understudied (Bloch 2017). 
Here again, the cases of Italian and Japanese migrants pose puzzles to the state-centered 
approaches: the Brazilian government incorporated working class Italians but failed to 
incorporate Japanese migrants; the Italian diasporic bureaucracy succeeded to embrace only 
upper- and middle-class Italians; and the Japanese diasporic bureaucracy successfully embraced 
Japanese migrants broadly across social classes. First, the prior studies on the diasporic 
bureaucracy simply do not help to answer why the Japanese diasporic bureaucracy successfully 
embraced its nationals in Brazil whereas the Italian counterpart failed because the analytical 
focus is more on factors and mechanisms that develop the diasporic bureaucracy itself than on 
the relationship between the diasporic bureaucracy and migrant groups. Second, the studies on 
the incorporative power of receiving state do not explicate the different impact of the 
incorporative institutional arrangements of Brazilian government on Japanese and Italian 
migrants. Especially, if the receiving state wards off migrant groups from the influence of the 
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diasporic bureaucracy of sending state, why did the Brazilian government fail to prevent the 
Japanese diasporic bureaucracy to embrace Japanese migrants? 
Certainly, a handful of emergent studies see migrant transnationalism in a triadic 
relationship between sending and receiving states, and a migrant group (Brubaker 1996, Smith 
2003a, Cook-Martín 2013, Mylonas 2013, Kim 2016). However, they do not elaborate 
sufficiently enough the causal dynamics of how sending and receiving states affect migrants’ 
transnational ties. For instance, in the case of Italian and Spanish migrants in Argentine, Cook-
Martín points out that sending and receiving states compete to “gain the allegiance of the same 
population of migrants and their children” (2013: 154). However, he does not specify what 
conditions make which state to win the competition over migrants’ allegiance. After all, the 
state-centered approaches still undertheorize the interactive dynamics between sending and 
receiving states and their relations both to the larger international state system and to migrants’ 
networks. 
 
An Interactive process approach to Migrant Transnationalism 
Building upon the state-centered approaches, especially an emerging body of scholarship 
that understands migrants’ transnational ties in the triadic relationship between a sending state, a 
receiving state, and a migrant group, I propose an interactive process approach as a sensitizing 
analytical framework rather than a definitive theory with rigidly fixed benchmarks (Blumer 
1954). It draws attention to the configuration and sequential interactions among four contexts: 1) 
positions and development patterns of the sending and receiving states in the international state 
system, the infrastructural power of states, more concretely – 2) diasporic bureaucracy of the 
sending states characterized by the capacity to relate to and embrace emigrants overseas and 3) 
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incorporative power of the receiving state characterized by the capacity to incorporate migrants 
into the national body politic – and finally 4) the differentially mobilizing capacity of migrants’ 
networks and associations as its nodes. 
 





Figure 1-2 summarizes the configuration among the international state system, sending 
and receiving states, and migrants’ networks. In this framework, sending and receiving states 
work as hinges of the interactions among the four contexts. Furthermore, not just the 
configuration among them at a certain point, the timing and sequence of their interactions matter 
a great deal. This is because migrants’ transnational ties emerge as a process, not as a congealed 
state. Not only do different combinations of contexts but also different sequences of interactions 
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yield varying configurations, which in turn affect migrants’ transnational ties with the 
homelands. 
The state-centered approaches have pointed out the changing relations of states to the 
given international state system as an important factor that develops state-migrant relations 
(Smith 2003a, 2003b, Zolberg 2008, Gamlen et.al. 2019). The positions and development 
patterns of sending and receiving states within the international state system provide the 
fundamental contexts for the formation of migrants’ transnational ties in two ways. 
First, the development pattern of receiving state presents an opportunity structure into 
which migrants are inserted. Especially, the timing of migrants’ entries in relation to the 
economic development pattern of receiving state is decisive for their incorporation pattern in the 
host country, which in turn set the context for the mobilizing capacity of migrants’ networks and 
associations. Both Italian and Japanese migrants initially went into coffee plantations when they 
migrated to Brazil. Italian migrants soon moved to urban centers including São Paulo city 
whereas most Japanese migrants stayed in the rural hinterland because the different 
socioeconomic opportunity structure changed between the two groups’ peak entry periods. In 
addition, the difference in the local socio-economic contexts affected the way in which Italian 
and Japanese migrants interacted with native Brazilians and organized their own social networks 
respectively. I will return to this point when I discuss the mobilizing capacity of migrants’ 
networks below.  
Second, development patterns of sending and receiving states shape their stances toward 
migrants. In the 1920s and 1930s, the Brazilian government shifted its stance towards 
immigrants in transition from an oligarchic regime to a nation-state. Meanwhile, Italian and 
Japanese governments started actively engaging with their emigrants in Brazil as their positions 
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in the international state system changed in the 1920s and they redefined their relations to 
nationals overseas: Italy for the rise of Fascist government and Japan in search of a potential 
source of cotton imports. 
As the state-centered approaches point out, the sending and receiving states exercise their 
infrastructural powers over migrants. However, its success is not guaranteed (Migdal 2001). Two 
conditions can be taken into account: the balance of infrastructural powers between sending and 
receiving states, and their relations to migrants’ networks. First, the receiving state does not 
always ward off the diasporic bureaucracy of sending state. Depending on the degree of 
infrastructural power of states and their stances toward the migrant groups, the diasporic 
bureaucracy of sending state and the incorporative power of receiving state can take various 
combinations. In the early 20th century, the Brazilian incorporative power was not fully 
developed especially in peripheral regions. In fact, the Japanese diasporic bureaucracy benefited 
from a power void of Brazilian incorporative power in the hinterland of São Paulo. In contrast, 
the Italian diasporic bureaucracy did not meet such a power void in urban areas where Italian 
migrants were concentrated, if not impossible to reach out to them. 
Second, the success of states power also depends on the mobilizing capacity of migrants’ 
networks and associations. The emphasis on migrants’ networks has already become a common 
sense in the field of international migration (Massey et al. 1987, Boyd 1989, Fawcett 1989, Faist 
2000, Portes and Rumbaut 2001, 2014, Waldinger 2004). Of particular importance in the current 
study is the intensity of migrants’ networks and the extent and scope to which the migrants’ 
associations accommodate collective goods to its members through the networks.  
When migrants’ networks are intensive and their associations almost exclusively deliver 
collective goods to the members, such as education, social welfare, and the access to distribution 
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network of agricultural cooperatives, they are more likely to mobilize migrants because 
withdrawal from the networks can penalize the enjoyment of collective goods. In this case, 
collective goods take the form of what economists call club goods – a specific type of collective 
goods, the access to which is non-rivalrous but excludable by membership (Buchanan 1965). On 
the other hand, when migrants’ networks are dispersive and their associations do not 
accommodate the collective goods, the migrants’ networks decrease its mobilizing capacity. In 
this case, migrants may seek alternative sources of collective goods outside the networks such as 
free market or other service providers including trade unions and a social welfare regime of 
receiving state if available. 
The intensity of migrants’ networks was affected by the local contexts of reception 
(Portes and Rumbaut 2014). For instance, the Italian working-class migrants in urban centers had 
opportunities to interact with native Brazilians and did not developed intensive co-national 
networks. In contrast, the Japanese migrants in isolated rural peripheries had few such 
opportunities and thus they had reasonable motivation to organize intensive social networks to 
survive. 
I emphasize the local, as opposed to national, contexts because the local contexts do not 
necessarily reflect the national ones. This is especially important to consider the case of Japanese 
migrants in relation to the racialization process in Brazil. They did not face substantial racial 
discrimination in rural São Paulo despite the general racial prejudice against Asian migrants at 
the national level.2 In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, a racial ideology called 
 
2 This racialization process makes an interesting contrast with Japanese migrants in the US. In the case of Japanese 
immigration to the US mainland, most migrants were inserted to the American West, where the dominant white 
natives already seized a sociopolitical power over the region. The racial discrimination by the dominant natives 
made Japanese migrants’ networks intensive (Azuma 2005, Minamikawa 2007). In any case, the key for the 
mobilizing capacity of migrants’ networks is the intensity of networks induced by the local contexts of reception 
more than the presence of racial discrimination or lack thereof while the discrimination can affect the intensity of 
networks. 
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branqueamento (whitening) was prevailing among Brazilian national elites (Schwarcz 1993, 
Seyferth 1997, 2000, Koifman 2012, Truzzi 2012) and they portrayed Japanese migrants as the 
yellow peril (Mita 1997, Takeuchi 2008). However, Japanese migrants were not discriminated by 
local Brazilians in the rural hinterlands of São Paulo where dominant social relation was not yet 
established. When the Japanese migrants settled in the rural area, the local Brazilians mainly 
practiced subsistence economy, scattering around the area. While the Japanese migrants readily 
organized their social life through the associational activities, the local people remained less 
organized. Because of the weak social organization of the local Brazilians, the Japanese could 
evade the racial discrimination at the local level. Rather, they looked down the local Brazilians 
by regarding them as uncivilized and lazy people (Handa 1970: 297, Committee on 80 Years 
History of Japanese Immigrant in Brazil 1991: 60-1). Therefore, we need to look at the specific 
local context rather than projecting the general context of reception and racialization at the 
national level onto the local one. 
Combining the three parameters — the incorporative power of receiving state, the 
diasporic bureaucracy of sending state, and the intensity of migrants’ networks — Table 1-1 







3 Mechanically, there must be eight types combining three binary parameters. However, other types are either 
unrealistic – consider, for instance, a Hobbesian state of nature type where there is no states’ infrastructural powers 
whatsoever and no network formation between any individuals, or a Heart of Darkness-like situation where 
intensive networks centered on a charismatic figure prevent any intervention of states’ infrastructural powers – or 
simply not relevant to this study. 
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+ - dispersive 
dissolution of ethnic/national 
identity; incorporation into the 
host society 
Settlement 
enclave + - intensive 
salience of ethic/national 
identity; leverages ethnic 
bargaining to advance 
incorporation 
Diasporic 
exclave - + intensive 
salience of ethnic/national 
identity; engagement with 
transnational ties 
Integrated 
exclave + + intensive 
salience of ethnic/national 
identity; simultaneous 
engagement with transnational 




Individual-based assimilation occurs when the incorporative power of receiving state 
works on dispersive migrants’ networks without the diasporic bureaucracy of sending state. 
Migrants are incorporated into the host society’s mainstream on the individual basis and their 
ethnicity becomes less salient as much as they acculturate into the mainstream. Their social 
mobility in the host society largely depends on attributes and properties such as human and 
social capital that each individual possesses. 
Settlement enclave takes place when the incorporative power of receiving state reaches 
out to intensive migrants’ networks without the intervention of the diasporic bureaucracy of 
sending state. Migrants are incorporated into the host society as an ethnic group and leverage 
their bargaining power to advance the incorporation into the host society towards upward social 
mobility, based on their intensive networks.  
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Diasporic exclave, as opposed to settlement enclave, closely connected to the sending 
state with a high degree of institutional completeness (Breton 1964, 1991) to the extent as if a 
migrant community were the territory of sending state surrounded by the territory of receiving 
state (Heisler 1984, 1985),4 emerges when the incorporative power of receiving state is limited or 
when it systematically prevents migrants from national incorporation, and the diasporic 
bureaucracy of sending state embraces migrants’ intensive networks. Migrants engage in 
transnational ties with the homeland with little involvement with host country institutions. They 
maintain national identity within the territory of the host country. 
Integrated exclave gets formed when both the diasporic bureaucracy of sending state and 
the incorporative power of receiving state are exercised over intensive migrants’ networks. 
Migrants engage in transnational ties with the homeland and in host country institutions insofar 
as both sending and receiving states help migrants’ networks deliver collective goods to the 
members. Migrants present themselves as national members to the sending state and ethnic 
members to the receiving state. 
I have to immediately add a crucial caveat: these heuristic types are snapshots to track the 
flows of contexts over time. The empirical case rather unfolds as a process. Thus, not only are 
mixed types possible but sequential order of elements matters. As Charles Tilly once noted, we 
should recognize that “time matters – that when things happen within a sequence affects how 
they happen, that every structure or process constitute a series of choice points” (1984: 14, 
emphases original). As we will see below, for instance, the situation of non-elite Italian workers 
can be characterized as a transition from individual-based acculturation to a settlement enclave. 
 
4 The most prominent and quintessential exclaves in the contemporary world may be US military bases overseas. 
Servicepersons and their families enjoy and rely on social infrastructures and institutions – police and fire 
departments, hospitals, schools, supermarkets, and even currency – and directly brought from and connected to the 
homeland, and maintain a minimum contact with the local society surrounding the base. 
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But they were incorporated as workers not so much as an ethnic group because the Brazilian 
corporatist regime provided an organizational basis to their hitherto dispersive networks. In 
contrast, Italian upper- and middle-class formed an integrated exclave because they leveraged 
their already intensive networks to bargain with Brazilian and Italian states. 
On the other hand, the case of Japanese migrants seems to easily fit in a diasporic 
exclave. Even in this case, the sequential order matters. First, which infrastructural power – 
either Brazilian incorporative power or Japanese diasporic bureaucracy – reached out to the 
Japanese migrants’ networks earlier affected the formation process of the Japanese diasporic 
exclave. The Japanese diasporic bureaucracy embraced the networks of Japanese migrants earlier 
than the Brazilian incorporative power arrived and entrenched them. Second, the different earlier 
development of diasporic exclave brought about a downstream dynamism on the later stage. The 
retreat of Japanese diasporic bureaucracy from Brazil by the outbreak of the Pacific War 
triggered the dissolution of the Japanese diasporic exclaves in the state of São Paulo. However, 
the impact of the retreat varied between local Japanese communities, depending on their 
socioeconomic conditions, which was differently developed under the contextual configuration 
in the preceding period. In the next chapter, I will argue that one community heavily dependent 
on the exclave economy in the pre-war period underwent a rapid erosion of diasporic exclave 
and violent conflicts among the community members in the aftermath of the war whereas the 
other less dependent on the exclave economy experienced a gradual transition to a diasporic 
exclave to a settlement enclave and saw no explicit violence after the war. 
 
Timing of Italian and Japanese Incorporation into Brazilian Economy and Different 
Settlement Patterns 
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Both Italian and Japanese migrants initially settled in coffee plantations in the interior of 
São Paulo. However, the timing of emigration, and a shift of São Paulo’s socioeconomic 
structure and the redefinition of Brazilian development strategy affected how Italians and 
Japanese were incorporated into the Brazilian economy, and where they settled, which in turn set 
contexts for the form and scope of their networks and associations. Italian migrants, who came to 
Brazil in the late 19th century, had fewer chances to become independent farmers in the rural 
area. Hence a large portion of Italian migrants moved to São Paulo city and other local cities. In 
contrast, Japanese migrants, who came in the early 20th century, were more able to become 
independent farmers in the hinterlands. In 1920, 28% of Italian migrants lived in São Paulo city 
but the Japanese in the city were less than 6% and have never exceeded 10% until the end of 
World War II (Truzzi 2016: 23, Census Committee for the Japanese Immigrants in Brazil 1964, 
vol.2: 426-7). 
 
The Italians in the Urban Centers 
The volume of Italian migration to Brazil rapidly increased around the time of Brazilian 
slavery abolition in 1888 because coffee plantation owners demanded cheap labor force to 
replace slaves (Hall 1969, Holloway 1980). The vast majority of Italian migrants initially settled 
in coffee plantations as indentured farmers (colónos) but they soon moved out to urban centers in 
the early 20th century (Trento 1989: 124). The utmost case was São Paulo city. Even in the 
countryside, they gradually moved to the urban center of local cities. The harsh labor conditions 
in the plantations and limited opportunities to be independent farmers in rural areas due to 
socioeconomic dominance of plantation owners over local social life pushed Italian colonos to 
the urban centers (Martins 1979, 1981, Durham 1966; Stolcke and Hall 1983, Stolcke 1986). For 
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Italian plantation workers, emerging industrial jobs in the cities appeared less bad opportunities 
than accepting an indentured status in the rural areas. 
 
The Japanese in the Hinterland 
In contrast, a vast majority of Japanese migrants settled in the newly developed rural 
regions that had been undeveloped when Italians came to Brazil. They benefited from the decline 
of the coffee economy and the redefined Brazilian economic strategy emerged after the peak 
entry period of Italians. As the coffee plantation economy in the traditional cultivation zones 
began to decline by the mid-1910s due to the soil impoverishment, Brazilian government 
redefined its development strategy. It started developing hitherto uncultivated northeast 
hinterlands by expanding the railroad’s reach, and by making land to farm available cheaply to 
small farmers including migrants (Milliet 1941, Holloway 1980: 128, Font 2010: 23-6, Argollo 
2016: 173-217. See also, Appendix B). The Japanese migrants took advantage of this chance of 
being a landholder. They started acquiring small properties since the second half of the 1920s 
(Saito 1961: 135-8, Census Committee for the Japanese Immigrants in Brazil 1964, vol.2: 478-
557, Taniguchi 2014). 
That this new developmental strategy and conditions overlapped with increasing Japanese 
immigration and decreasing Italian immigration explain why the Japanese settled in rural areas, 
while Italians ended up in cities. The different settlement pattern between Italian and Japanese 
migrants in turn set contexts for whether or not and how sending and receiving states 




Brazil’s Incorporative Power vis-à-vis Italian and Japanese Migrants 
In the course of nation-building in the early 20th century, the Brazilian government tried 
to incorporate both Italian and Japanese migrants into its body politic. The Italians were 
susceptible to the Brazilian incorporative power, but the Japanese were not because of their 
settlement locations and uneven development of Brazilian incorporative power. This section 
compares the relation between the Brazilian incorporative power via-à-vis Italian and Japanese 
migrants. Although a sizable portion of Italians settled in São Paulo city, Italian migrants also 
lived in the countryside. Thus, the following pages examine Italians in the countryside as well. 
 
The Italian: Cooptation by the Brazilian Incorporative Power 
Italian migrants in the countryside initially had access neither to social welfare nor 
political participation in the local social life in the late 19th century. They were subordinated to 
the social order imposed by powerful coffee oligarchies (Rios 1958a: 306-7). However, as 
Brazilian government started consolidating national institutions in the early 20th century, Italian 
migrants in the countryside were co-opted by the expanding Brazilian incorporative power. First, 
the emerging state institutions started intermediating labor conflicts between coffee oligarchies 
and Italian agricultural workers in the 1920s (Font 2010: 138-143). For instance, the state 
government of São Paulo created the rural labor relations board (Patronato Agrícola) to mitigate 
labor conflicts between plantation owners and workers in 1911. 
Table 1-2 presents the numbers of agricultural workers’ claims filed at the Patronato 
Agrícola by nationality. Italian agricultural workers were one of nationality groups that filed 
complaints at the Patronato Agrícola the most. They have often done so more than native 
Brazilian workers during the 1920s. For the Italian workers, the state increasingly appeared as a 
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guardian of their interest against powerful plantation owners. Second, soon after the revolution 
of 1930, Vargas’s provisional government set up a local advisory board (Conselho Consultivo) in 
various local municipalities, membership of which was open even to non-citizens. It opened up 
an opportunity to participate in local politics for a few but successful Italian migrants (Truzzi, 
Kerbaury, and Barbosa 2012). As a result, they were incorporated into the local political life. 
After all, as Brazilian state institutions developed further, Italian migrants came to rely on them 
as a sociopolitical guardian. 
 
Table 1-2: Number of Agricultural Workers’ Claims Filed at the Patronato Agrícola by 
Nationality, 1920-1930 
Sources: Secretaria de Agricultura, São Paulo. 1920-1930. Relatório. 
* Percentage is in parentheses. 
 
 
A similar incorporation process proceeded with Italian industrial workers in São Paulo 
city. The federal and São Paulo state governments initially confronted industrial migrant workers 
with the repressive means (Hall and Pinheiro 1985: 103-4, Fausto 2016: 71). However, after 
chronic labor strikes in the 1910s, Brazilian dominant class started offering cooptative means to 
them in the late 1920s (Decca 1987:88-95). Most of all, the Vargas’ regime in the 1930s pushed 
forward labor incorporation of industrial workers (Erickson 1977: ch.2, Conniff 1981). The 
 












































































































Labor Ministry enacted a series of social welfare programs: minimum wage, the social security 
system, paid holidays, maternity benefits, and so on. The Trade Union Law of 1931 legitimized 
the trade unions and put them under the state control (Rodrigues 1979: ch.2, Collier and Collier 
2002 [1991]: 172-3). In fact, the law facilitated the union organizing. Before the Revolution of 
1930, the trade unions in São Paulo were weak because of the repressive means by Brazilian 
dominant class. After the revolution, it is reported that about 200 unions were registered in the 
state of São Paulo in 1934 (Alexander and Parker 2003: 57). 
 
The Japanese: Weak Penetration of the Brazilian Incorporative Power 
In contrast to the Italian case, Brazilian governments’ relation to oligarchs and Japanese 
migrants’ geographical isolation made it difficult for the Brazilian government to insert its 
incorporative power into the Japanese migrants’ networks. Despite the extension of social 
welfare to urban workers, Vargas’ provisional government did not provide equivalent measures 
to agricultural workers in the countryside (Rodrigues 1979: 79). The Vargas’ regime was 
founded on heterogeneous political forces. While Vargas was urged to earn the support from the 
growing urban strata, he also had to maintain an alliance with the rural oligarchies who were still 
powerful. As mentioned earlier, Brazilian institutions did intermediate agricultural workers’ 
interests in the Italian case. However, I discovered little evidence that the Japanese agricultural 
workers made the most of such institutions. For instance, Japanese migrants filed few claims at 
the Patronato Agrícola. Throughout the 1920s, complaints filed by Japanese agricultural workers 
have never exceeded 2% of total claims every year (See Table 1-2 above). I will discuss this 
point in relation to their networks later. 
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Table 1-3: Japanese schools and students in 1928 and 1932 in the state of São Paulo 






Proportion of schools 
with Brazilian 
teachers 





Proportion of schools 
with Brazilian 
teachers 
82 2976 34.1%  177 8995 69.5% 
Sources: Ryoukaku, Yoshishige (両⾓喜重). c.1928 “Report on the Education of Children 
Overseas (在外邦人児童教育に関する報告)”, (DA-MFA, I-1-5-0-2_8_2), Burajiru Jiho 1933. 
 
In addition, the Brazilian incorporative power failed to penetrate into Japanese migrants’ 
social networks. The education policy of São Paulo state was a quintessential case. In the 1910s, 
the São Paulo government started consolidating the school system, eradicating ethnic educational 
institutions. However, its enforcement was nothing more than lax (Demartini 1979: 332, Shibata 
1997: 50). In 1918, the São Paulo government mandated ethnic schools to equip Brazilian 
teachers to teach national curricula (Decree 2.994 of August 8, 1918). However, the government 
could not allocate the teachers to Japanese schools in the rural area. In 1928, an inspector from 
Japan to São Paulo observed that “the popular education in Brazil is not developed yet. 70% of 
Brazilian people do not receive the education and leave their children without learning any 
letters. […] In this present situation, it is imperative that the Japanese take a remedial measure to 
carry out education for their children.”5 Table 1-3 shows the proportion of the Japanese schools 
with Brazilian teachers in the state of São Paulo in 1928 and 1932. In 1928, the schools with at 
least one Brazilian teacher consisted only 34.1%. In 1932, the proportion increased to about 70% 
on paper. But in reality, a sizable portion of the Brazilian teachers did not attend to their duties. 
 
5 Ryoukaku, Yoshishige (両角喜重). c.1928. “A Report on the Japanese Education in Brazil (在外邦人児童教育に
関する報告)”, (I-1-5-0-2_8_2, DA-MFAJ). 
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In 1931, a Japanese consul complained that the São Paulo government did not send teachers to 
the Japanese schools and thus Japanese teachers were making up for their vacancies in practice.6 
In the case of Italian migrants in the countryside, successful Italians were gradually 
incorporated into the local political sphere and the emerging Brazilian national institutions 
appeared as a prominent guardian of the interests of Italian agricultural workers. In São Paulo 
city, Italian industrial workers were also coopted by Vargas’s corporative government. In 
contrast, Brazilian institutions failed to penetrate into Japanese migrants in the rural hinterland. 
With little Brazilian incorporative infrastructure in the hinterland, Japanese migrants had to seek 
out an alternative provider of social welfare. 
 
Development of Italian and Japanese Diasporic Bureaucracies 
Both Italy and Japan developed diasporic bureaucracies. Yet its impact varied: the Italian 
diasporic bureaucracy embraced only upper- and middle-class migrants whereas the Japanese 
diasporic bureaucracy embraced Japanese migrants more broadly across social classes. This 
difference can be explained by different conjunctures of diasporic bureaucracy and the 
mobilizing capacity of migrants’ networks between Italian and Japanese cases. This section 
examines the development of Italian and Japanese diasporic bureaucracies and the next section 
explores the organizational shape of Italian and Japanese migrants’ networks. 
 
Italy: From Selective Diasporic Engagement to Fascist Embrace 
 
6 “On the Schools Established by the Japanese in Brazil (在留邦人の設立する学校に関する件),” from Consul 
Mitsuo Hamaguhi (浜口光雄領事) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Kijyuro Shidehara (外務大臣幣原喜重郎), 
July 8, 1931, (I-1-5-0-1_002, DA-MFAJ). 
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Until the rise of Mussolini in 1922, the Italian government regarded Italians overseas as 
civilian ambassadors who would facilitate Italian trade interests with the countries where they 
settled (Choate 2008: chs.1, 2). The Italian consulate extended its diasporic bureaucracy to 
Italian emigrants in São Paulo to make them an agent of Italian interests. However, it did so 
selectively. The consulate valued the upper- and middle-class Italians and supported their 
associations (Castaldi 1960: 337-9, Bertonha 1998a: 56). In contrast, it was little interested in the 
non-elite Italian workers (Biondi 2011: 64). It showed less interest in labor movements in the 
1910s, which involved many Italian workers and in complaints from Italian agricultural workers 
in the countryside (Rios 1958a: 332-5, Biondi 2000: 161). In short, Italian consulates 
demonstrated contrasting diasporic engagements depending on migrants’ social class: an ardent 
engagement with upper- and middle-class Italians in São Paulo city and a general indifference 
towards matters of Italian workers. 
Since Mussolini seized political power in the early 1920s, the Italian government 
redefined its relation to nationals overseas, regarding them as colonial wealth supporting Italian 
expansion in Africa and started organizing them across social classes (Cannistraro and Rosoli 
1979, Gabaccia 2003: 141-4, Cook-Martín 2013: 58-59). The Italian diasporic bureaucracy not 
only reinforced its control over the existing upper- and middle-class Italian associations but also 
created fascist organizations designed for the working-class Italians (the National Recreational 
Club or Opera Nazionale Dopolavoro) in the 1930s (Trento 1989: 329-30, Bertonha 1998b: 93-
6). However, such fascist organizations failed to attract the Italian migrant workers (Trento 1989: 
268-9). A chapter of fascist organizations in São Paulo city, where a vast number of Italian 
workers were concentrated, attracted only 400 memberships in 1939 (Bertonha 2010: 67). 
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Italian ethnic schools also failed to attract non-elite Italian while retaining upper- and 
middle-class Italians. In 1924, soon after the rise of fascism in Italy, there were 87 Italian schools 
with 10,626 students in the state of São Paulo. The number dropped to 28 with 4,455 students in 
1937 (Bertonha 1998b: 128). The diasporic bureaucracy under the fascist government failed to 
retain transnational commitments of the second-generation Italians. This decline is predictable 
from the self-interest hypothesis of migrant transnationalism. However, upper- and middle-class 
Italians were an exception. Italian nationalist education was sustained and rather intensified in 
elite Italian schools in São Paulo city until the end of the 1930s (Bertonha 1998b: 122-9, dos 
Santos 2001: 81-8: Franchini 2015). 
In sum, upper- and middle-class Italians retained transnational ties with Italy through 
their associations and intensified them with the rise of Fascist government. In contrast, working 
class Italians were already incorporated by Vargas’s corporatist regime when the Italian 
government endeavored to organize them with the fascist organizations such as Opera Nazionale 
Dopolavoro. The Italian diasporic bureaucracy lagged behind the Brazilian incorporative power 
in embracing working class Italians. 
 
Japan: From Hesitant Diasporic Engagement to Cross-class Integration  
Similar to the Italian case, the Japanese diasporic bureaucracy was underdeveloped until 
the 1920s. Until then, the primal destination of Japanese emigration was the US. The emigration 
to Brazil was a side story of Japanese emigration policy. However, when the US shut down 
immigration from Japan in 1924, the Japanese government rapidly shifted its attention to Brazil 
(Haraguchi 1997, Iikubo 2003, Endoh 2009: ch.3). The failure of the emigration project to the 
US overshadowed the fundamental tone of Japanese diasporic bureaucracy towards emigrants in 
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Brazil. It was hesitant to openly engage with Japanese migrants in Brazil. In this respect, the 
Japanese consulate’s relationship to Japanese schools is suggestive. In 1930, a consulate 
determined not to provide subsidies to the Japanese ethnic schools if they would not be endorsed 
by the Brazilian authorities.7 
However, when the Japanese government found interests in the cotton production by the 
Japanese migrants, the Japanese diasporic bureaucracy over them grew in full. The cotton 
industries played a main economic driver for the modernization process of Japan and the 
government had always sought new import sources of raw cotton to avoid dependency on a few 
limited countries (Beckert 2015: 342-3, 401-8). When the US and India raised tariffs on cotton 
due to the emerging protectionism in the early 1930s, the Japanese farmers in Brazil increasingly 
appeared to be a strong potential cotton exporter to Japan. In 1934, the consulate took a 
leadership to organize the Japanese farmers in Brazil by forming a central federation of their 
agricultural cooperatives. With a boom of cotton production among the Japanese farmers, the 
number of affiliated households increased to approximately 5,000 (Seabra 1977: 33).8 By the late 
1930s, the Japanese consulate in São Paulo achieved the vertical integration of the Japanese 
associations with the consulate on the top. 
Both Italian and Japanese governments initially implemented their diasporic 
bureaucracies partially: Italy only targeted upper- and middle-class migrants and Japan hesitated 
to embrace its nationals after all. However, as their positions in the international state system 
 
7 “On Schools Established by the Japanese in Brazil (在留邦人の設立する学校に関する件)”, from Consul Mitsuo 
Hamaguhi (在サンパウロ領事浜口光雄) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Kijyuro Shidehara (外務大臣幣原喜
重郎), July 8, 1931, (I-1-5-0-1_002, DA-MFAJ). 
8 The economic sphere is not the only area through which the Japanese consulate organized Japanese migrants. It 
organized community associations and ethnic schools as well (Negawa 2013, Shibata 1997, see also “On the 
Meeting of the Representatives from Japanese Associations across the State of São Paulo (各地日本人会代表者会
議に関する件)”, from Consul General in São Paulo Kozo Ichige (在サンパウロ総領事市毛孝三) to the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs Kouki Hirota (外務大臣広田弘毅), October 15, 1937, (K-3-2-2-2, DA-MFAJ)). 
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shifted, both states redefined the relations with the nationals since the mid-1920s. Both used 
ethnic associations as the medium of diasporic embrace. But the consequences were contrasting: 
the Italian diasporic bureaucracy failed to gain working class Italians’ engagement whereas the 
Japanese diasporic bureaucracy successfully organized its nationals across social class. To 
consider the success and failure of diasporic bureaucracy, the mobilizing capacity of Italian and 
Japanese migrants’ networks must be examined next. 
 
Success and Failure of Diasporic Bureaucracy vis-à-vis Italian and Japanese Migrants’ 
Networks 
The success of the diasporic bureaucracy of sending state largely depends on the 
mobilizing capacity of migrants’ networks and associations as the nodes. Both Italian and 
Japanese migrants formed their own associations as a means of mutual aids. Yet, the extent and 
scope of their activities were different. Italian migrants’ networks and associations were divided: 
while upper- and middle-class Italians formed intensive networks, working class Italians were 
excluded from them and their networks remained dispersed. In contrast, Japanese migrants’ 
networks and associations in the hinterlands were intensive and integrated. Their associations 
became the most salient social institution for most of them. The different socioeconomic 
relations to Brazilian society derived from their geographical locations of settlement shaped the 
intensity of their networks and its mobilizing capacity, which in turn affected their relationships 
with Italian and Japanese diasporic bureaucracies, and with the Brazilian incorporative power. 
As a result, they demonstrated different configurations for the transnational ties with the 
homelands respectively: upper- and middle-class Italians demonstrated an integrated exclave; the 
working class Italians showed labor incorporation into the Brazilian corporative regime via a 
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transition from individual-based assimilation to a settlement enclave; and the Japanese in the 
hinterland displayed a diasporic exclave. 
  
Italian Division between Integrated Exclave and National Labor Incorporation 
Italian migrants’ networks and associations were characterized by social class division 
(Hutchinson 1958, Hall 2010). In local cities, a handful of successful Italians controlled the 
mutual aid societies and took advantage of them to build a close relationship with the local 
oligarchies who were still powerful in the rural areas (Furlanetto 2007, Truzzi et al. 2012: 138-
41, Truzzi 2016: 82-3). The membership to these mutual aid societies was substantially 
inaccessible to non-elite Italians (Teixeira 2013). In São Paulo city, the class differentiation was 
also salient. The upper- and middle-class Italians formed honor societies with support from the 
Italian consulate (Trento 1989: 322). However, a mass of working-class Italians was excluded 
from membership in such associations (Biondi 2000: 160). In short, Italian workers did not meet 
ample opportunities to have a membership in mutual aid associations and were left with little 
social welfare. In addition, class identity rather than coethnic identity characterized non-elite 
Italian workers. While the Italian ethnic identity and class identity overlapped each other in the 
urban social movements in the 1910s and 1920s, Italian workers took sides with class solidarity 
rather than coethnic identity when the two were in conflict. For instance, in the 1924 Tenentista 
Revolt, which was an urban class revolt led by junior army officers against traditional 
oligarchies, a sizable proportion of Italian working class participated in the revolt and attacked 
their warehouses of Italian upper- and middle-class (Fausto 1995: 19-20).  In this context, the 
labor incorporation by the Brazilian state appeared as a chance of gaining quasi-social 
citizenship to them. 
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It was against this background that the Italian diasporic bureaucracy started embracing 
the Italians broadly in the late 1920s. It successfully embraced upper- and middle-class Italians 
both in local cities and in São Paulo city through the already established associations. 
Membership in such associations granted upper- and middle-class Italians prestige and brought 
them profits through the trades with the homeland (Bertonha 1998b: 147-61). At the same time, 
they also maintained ties to Brazilian dominant class to promote their interest in Brazilian society 
(Rios 1958b: 516). The upper- and middle-class Italians formed an integrated exclave. 
In contrast, the Italian diasporic bureaucracy failed to embrace Italian workers. First, it 
had not been interested in the non-elite Italian workers before the rise of fascism. Second, Italian 
ethnic associations had not included most of Italian workers to the membership. And third, the 
Brazilian state incorporated the Italian migrant workers into the national corporatist regime. 
When the Italian fascist government embarked on the full-fledged diasporic bureaucracy in the 
mid-1920s, it did not have an organizational basis to embrace the working-class Italians. Their 
settlement enclave was already entrenched by the Brazilian corporatist regime. 
   
Japanese Diasporic Exclave in the Rural Hinterland 
As the Italian migrants did, the Japanese migrants also formed their associations but in 
isolated rural peripheries where substantial social relations and infrastructures were not yet 
established. Under such a social environment, it was almost mandatory to cooperate with each 
other (Handa 1970: 233-8, 251-2). As their own institutions such as community organizations, 
schools, and agricultural cooperatives developed, the Japanese migrants in the rural hinterland 
came to fulfill collective goods by themselves. In general, the Japanese community associations 
(Nihonjin-kai) regulated the collective activities and intermediated their contacts with the 
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broader Brazilian society outside their settlement (Cardoso 1995: 124-5, Saito 1959). At the same 
time, Japanese migrants tended to avoid local Brazilians, viewing them as lazy and poor (Aoyagi 
1953: 54-5, Handa 1970: 569). By so doing, the Japanese associations supplied the socio-
economic welfare to the members.9 
The Japanese community association also controlled members’ activities by sanctions. 
When a certain member of a Japanese community association broke the social order of the 
settlement, the association warned him by a threat of expulsion. Although it was rare that the 
expulsion was actually executed (see Brajiru Jiho 1928, 1930), the threat was sufficient to 
regulate Japanese migrants’ behavior because the expulsion from the associational life 
substantially meant a social death. For instance, agricultural cooperatives suppressed members’ 
violation of collective sales price by preventing the violators from using the shared agricultural 
machineries.10 It was almost impossible that a Japanese farmer would independently carry out his 
work without any help from his fellows in the agricultural fields (Saito 1959: 132). Under these 
social conditions, collective goods were delivered to the community members only as club 
goods. 
It was in this social context that the Japanese consulate strengthened its diasporic 
bureaucracy towards Japanese migrants’ community associations with an increasing interest in 
 
9 Both the Japanese diasporic bureaucracy in São Paulo and the Japanese migrants themselves expected community 
associations, especially agricultural cooperatives, to work as a bulwark against the exploitation by native Brazilian 
merchants in fact they did work as such. See, Aoki, Rinzo (青木林蔵). “Observations on the Japanese Agricultural 
Cooperatives (2) (在伯邦人産業組合所見 (二))”, June 1932 (移 1 (D3), reel #17, MJE-NDL), “On the 
Rationalization of the Economy of Cotton Growers (綿作者経済の合理化に関する件)”, from the Consul General 
Kozo Ichige (在サンパウロ総領事市毛孝三) to the Japanese-Brazilian Central Cooperative (日伯産業組合中央
会), August 23, 1937, File “Matrials on the Relationship between the Japanese-Brazilian Central Cooporative and 
the Japanese Consulate General in São Paulo (日伯産業組合中央会と聖市総領事館との関係資料)” (MHIJB). 
10 “Memorandum of the 6th General Meeting of the Japanese-Brazilian Central Cooporative (日伯産業中央会第六
回総会メモ)”, c.1939, (移 1 (D3), reel #9, MJE-NDL). 
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cotton production.11 Encouraged by the consulate support and orientation, the cotton production 
became a boom among Japanese small farmers in the newly developed hinterlands. While the 
cotton production consisted of 15% of the total Japanese production in those hinterlands in 1932, 
it increased up to 53% in 1942 (Census Committee for the Japanese Immigrants in Brazil 1964, 
vol.2: 668-71). Furthermore, the Japanese diasporic bureaucracy reinforced the mutual 
dependency among Japanese migrants by encouraging the organizing of agricultural cooperatives 
among them and creating their federation with the consulate on the top. 
In the previous section, I find little evidence that the Brazilian incorporative power 
coopted Japanese migrants. Their highly intensive collective life in the hinterland suggests a 
plausible reason. On the one hand, Japanese associations accommodated quasi-social-
citizenship-like club goods to the members. On the other hand, members’ deviation from 
collective regulation leads them to sanction. Because of these positive and negative incentives, 
the Japanese migrants stayed away from Brazilian incorporative measures. 
The Japanese consulate and the federation of agricultural cooperatives channeled the 
export of cotton to Japan. The federation controlled all the sales of cotton produced by Japanese 
migrants. In 1940, the federation sold about 82% of their cotton to the Japanese trade 
companies.12 Through the socio-economic formation centered on cotton production and export, 
the Japanese migrants’ settlements in the hinterland practically constituted a diasporic exclave 
directly connected to Japan. 
 
11 “On the Funding for the Japanese Agricultural Cooperatives in Brazil (在伯邦人産業組合金融資金融通申請に
関する件)”, from Japanese-Brazilian Central Cooperative (日伯産業組合中央会) to the Consul General in São 
Paulo, Kozo Ichige (在サンパウロ総領事市毛孝三), April 27, 1936 in File “Matrials on the Relationship between 
the Japanese-Brazilian Central Cooporative and the Japanese Consulate General in São Paulo (日伯産業組合中央
会と聖市総領事館との関係資料)”, (MHIJB). 
12 Miyao, Atsushi (宮尾厚). “On Application for Licensed Quotas of Cotton (許可申請に関する件)”, October 14, 
1940 (移 1 (D3), reel #45, MJE-NDL). 
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The Japanese migrants supported Japanese war efforts because their intensive networks 
and its relations to the Brazilian incorporative power and to the Japanese diasporic bureaucracy 
did not offer an alternative option other than taking part in the campaign. First, their 
geographical and social isolation in the hinterland attenuated the penetration of the Brazilian 
incorporative power into their settlements. Second, their social networks anchored in ethnic 
associations were practically the only channel to the enjoyment of club goods. And third, the 
Japanese government exercised its diasporic bureaucracy under such social conditions. When the 
government redefined its emigrants in Brazil as a potential resource of national development, the 
Japanese diasporic bureaucracy reorganized Japanese migrants' associations in a vertical 
structure by providing subsidies and orientations. As the combination of these factors 
transformed the Japanese migrants’ settlements into a diasporic exclave in the late 1930s, the 
Japanese migrants broadly engaged in diasporic supports to the homeland’s war efforts. When 
the Brazilian incorporative power later strengthened, its effects to the Japanese migrants in the 
rural areas were largely attenuated by the already entrenched diasporic exclave.  
 
Conclusion: Towards a Configurational Understanding of Migrant Transnationalism 
 
This chapter sought to explicate the varying form and breadth of migrants’ transnational 
ties with their homelands by comparing the salient manifestations of diasporic engagement of 
Italian and Japanese migrants in the state of São Paulo in early 20th century. In response to the 
diasporic mobilization campaign of their homelands, the Japanese migrants showed a broader 
diasporic engagement across social classes whereas the Italian migrants displayed a divided 
engagement by social class. The comparison of the two cases posed theoretical challenges to 
agency-centered and state-centered approaches to migrant transnationalism. I argued that the 
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interactions among four contexts are important for accounting for the different form and breadth 
of migrant transnationalism. They are: 1) positions and development patterns of sending and 
receiving states within the given international state system, 2) the diasporic bureaucracy of the 
sending state, 3) the incorporative power of the receiving state, and 4) the mobilizing capacity of 
migrants’ networks and their associations as its nodes. 
 




Table 1-4 summarizes the different configurations of these contexts between Italian and 
Japanese migrants in the state of São Paulo. The two cases showed a contrasting pattern in their 
socio-geographical settlements. Because of the timing of their arrivals to Brazil vis-à-vis the 
development of the Brazilian national economy, many Italian migrants settled in urban centers 
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locations set the context for the form and scope of migrants’ networks and associations. Italian 
migrants in local cities and in São Paulo faced the division of social class. The geographical and 
social isolation of Japanese migrants strengthened their mutual dependency despite the actual 
differentiation in social class. 
The different settlement locations also affected the ways in which the infrastructural 
power of sending and receiving states – Italian and Japanese diasporic bureaucracies and 
Brazilian incorporative power – engaged with the migrant groups. Although the Brazilian 
government exercised its incorporative measures toward Italian and Japanese migrants, the 
former was more susceptible to them than the latter. At the same time, both Italian and Japanese 
diasporic bureaucracies tried to embrace their own nationals in São Paulo. However, their 
consequences differed significantly. The Italian diasporic bureaucracy succeeded to maintain ties 
with upper- and middle-class Italians but failed to embrace the working-class Italians. In 
contrast, the Japanese diasporic bureaucracy successfully organized Japanese migrants in a 
hierarchical manner. 
In this respect, different mobilizing capacity of Italian and Japanese migrants’ networks 
affected the extent to which the infrastructural power of sending and receiving states can 
embrace each migrant group. Italian migrants’ networks and associations were fragmented by 
social class. Upper- and middle-class Italians formed an integrated exclave. The Italian diasporic 
bureaucracy embraced them through their associations. Working-class Italians’ networks were 
initially dispersive and unorganized. It was the Brazilian corporatist regime that organized them. 
When the fascist government started organizing working-class Italians, they had already been 
incorporated into the Brazilian corporatist regime. In contrast, the hierarchically organized 
Japanese migrants formed a diasporic exclave, which further reinforced their diasporic 
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engagement with the homeland. In short, the Italian and Japanese migrants manifested the 
different degree of diasporic engagement with the homelands as a result of the different 
configuration of these contexts. 
Within this interactive process framework, I underline two key points. First, the role of 
sending and receiving states can be highlighted in shaping migrants’ diasporic engagement with 
the homelands. Under the given international state system, both sending and receiving states 
strategically embrace their claimed nationals. The balance of their infrastructural powers creates 
a tension between migrants’ incorporation process into the host society and their transnational 
ties with the homelands. The sending and receiving states compete with each other to embrace 
the same group of people whom they respectively claim as their nationals (Cook-Martín 2013). 
Second, the interactions among the four contexts take place as a process. Thus, timing 
and sequential order of events matters more than just a certain snapshot configuration at a given 
moment. In the cases of Italian and Japanese migrants in early 20th century São Paulo, timing 
and sequence mattered in two senses. First, the timing of their arrivals to São Paulo in relation to 
the Brazilian development pattern made a difference in their settlement location and in turn in 
the form and scope of their networks and associations. Second, the attention to the sequential 
order among the infrastructural power of sending and receiving states and migrants’ network 
formation made it possible to trace various patterns in transnational ties and incorporation 
process among Italian and Japanese migrants. A clear contrast stands between Italian working-
class migrants and Japanese migrants. The Brazilian incorporative power reached out to the 
Italian working-class earlier than the Italian Fascist government started extending its diasporic 
bureaucracy to them. As a result, the Italian diasporic bureaucracy was foreclosed to embrace 
them. In contrast, the Japanese diasporic bureaucracy embraced Japanese migrants in the 
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hinterland earlier than the Brazilian incorporative power grew sufficiently to reach out to the 
rural areas. Because of the earlier arrival of Japanese diasporic bureaucracy, the Japanese 
diasporic exclaves endured. These timing and sequential dynamics generated upstream branching 
points in the variations in Italian and Japanese transnational ties. 
To this point, one may suspect that the cases of Italian and Japanese migrants in São 
Paulo in the early 20th century are rare exceptions to the general patterns of migrant 
incorporation and transnationalism because they were cases at the time when the notion of the 
nation was still in the making and the state institutions that underpin the notion had not yet fully 
developed, and also because the diasporic exclave is not a common type of migrants’ social 
organization. Yet I do not think they were exceptions. An interactive process approach to 
migrant transnationalism has a broader implication beyond the cases of Italian and Japanese 
migrants under current concern. For instance, the case of Koreans in post-WWII Japan 
demonstrates a case in which the receiving state, Japan, fostered the exclusion and the 
repatriation of Korean residents to North Korea and the latter embraced its nationals in Japan 
with success (Morris-Suzuki 2007, Kim 2016). In this case, the social exclusion of migrants in 
the host society created a diasporic exclave. Also in the case of West Germany in the Cold War 
era, the West German government invited teachers from Turkey to teach in the German public 
schools in the hope of facilitating their eventual return to Turkey, and the Turkish government 
actively cooperated with the initiatives of West Germany (Van Wyck 2017). In this case, both 
the sending and receiving states collaborated to form another type of diasporic exclave. In short, 
it is not exceptional that the diasporic bureaucracy of the sending state embraces its nationals 
abroad. Its success largely depends on the configuration of contexts in which migrants are 
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DIVERGENT DISSOLUTIONS OF DIASPORIC EXCLAVES: 
INTRA-GROUP CONFLICTS AMONG JAPANESE MIGRANTS IN BASTOS AND 




In the immediate aftermath of the Pacific War, a large number of Japanese migrants in the state 
of São Paulo claimed Japan had won the war, while others accepted it had lost. This eventually 
resulted in intra-group conflicts. Why and how were Japanese migrants attracted by the claim of 
Japanese victory? Why and how did the conflicts occur? To these questions, earlier 
historiographies have provided cultural accounts, arguing that those who had a strong patriotic 
attachment to Japan attacked those who did not. By drawing on different responses of two rural 
communities – Bastos and Registro – to the Japanese defeat, I argue that the disjuncture between 
local economic and organizational bases caused the weakening of community associations’ 
legitimacy, which led to the conflicts. In the long run, Japanese diasporic exclaves dissolved and 
shifted settlement enclaves. However, Bastos and Registro demonstrated two different courses of 
the dissolution: Bastos saw violent conflicts among Japanese residents because of a widening 
disjuncture of its socioeconomic and organizational bases whereas Registro did not see the 
violence because it sustained coherence between socioeconomic and organizational bases. 
 
Introduction 
The Emperor Hirohito announced the surrender of Japan to the Allies through the radio 
broadcasts on August 15, 1945. This was the first time that Japanese common people listen the 
voice of the emperor. While the emperor delivered his speech in the formal classical Japanese 
that few common people could easily understand, the Japanese in Japan readily accepted the 
emperor’s declaration and embraced the defeat (Dower 2000). However, the situation was more 
complicated in the case of the Japanese in Brazil. A group of Japanese migrants who did not 
believe the surrender of Japan (deniers or kachi gumi) emerged in the state of São Paulo. Their 
proportion was substantive: a 1952 survey reported that 85.5% of the Japanese migrants did not 
believe Japanese defeat one week after the end of the war (Izumi 1957: 82). It is understandable 
that the confusion of information and communication made them doubt the defeat, especially 
given Brazilian government’s restrictive measures such as bans on ethnic associations and 
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newspapers during the war period. Most Japanese migrants in Brazil did not have an opportunity 
to directly listen to the Emperor’s radio speech on his acceptance of the defeat. Even those who 
had such an opportunity clandestinely listened to the unclear speech transmitted through a weak 
shortwave radio signal (Maeyama 1982, Miyao 2003). 
However, the belief of Japanese victory was persisted beyond the immediate days after 
the war. It was crystalized in an ultra-nationalistic secret society named Shindo Renmei (League 
of Imperial Subjects’ Way). The following December, they circulated pamphlets to compatriots 
to propagate their belief of Japanese victory. The front page started with a somewhat sentimental 
remark: “The Japanese nation certainly believes that the motherland must never be defeated. 
But… We are awed and sob, knowing the amount of blood the motherland sacrificed. […] We 
devotionally follow the imperial subjects’ way”.1 The fact was that Japan had lost the war. Those 
who accepted its defeat (accepter or make-gumi) traveled around Japanese communities in the 
hinterland of São Paulo to announce the fact: “The surrender was venerably decided by His 
Majesty the Emperor. […] It was His Majesty’s great will that laid down the arms, saving the 
possibility of national rebuilding just moments before the total eradication of the nation.”2 
Interestingly, both accepters and deniers employed the same symbolism, the Emperor’s 
authority, to legitimize their opposing claims: deniers implicitly referred to their loyal 
subjecthood to the Emperor; accepters explicitly deployed the name of Emperor. Despite, or 
precisely because of, the shared cultural symbolism, the opposition between deniers and 
accepters eventually escalated into violent conflicts, including 23 homicides and 86 injuries by 
1947 (Miyao 2003: 65-72). 
 
1  “Imperial Subjects’ Way (臣道),” no.1 (December 1945), 移 1 (D3), reel #36, MJE-NDL. 
2  Miyakoshi, Chibata (宮腰千葉太). c.1945. “Draft for Announcement of Japanese defeat to Local Communities 
(地方巡回実情報告草稿).” MHIJB. 
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Why did a substantial number of Japanese migrants maintain the belief of Japanese 
victory beyond the days of confusion immediately after the war? Why did they split up into 
deniers and accepters and resulted in the intra-group conflicts between them? The prior studies 
have provided three interrelated accounts: cultural, organizational and socioeconomic. While 
they differ in emphases, they commonly regard the rise and persistence of deniers represented by 
Shindo Renmei as a prominent manifestation of the durable diasporic nationalism. However, 
they tend to overgeneralize cultural values shared by Japanese migrants. Additionally, they 
overlook local variations of the intra-group conflicts between deniers and accepters, treating the 
conflicts as the phenomenon encompassing all Japanese communities in the state of São Paulo. 
If deniers and accepters shared the nationalist symbolism, how can cultural values 
explain the rise of conflicts between them? Did the conflicts encompass all Japanese 
communities? I focus on the two rural communities of Japanese migrants, Bastos and Registro, 
that showed contrasting responses to the Japanese defeat despite sharing many community 
characteristics (for their geographical locations, see Appendix C). Whereas the intra-group 
conflicts between deniers and accepters increasingly spread in Bastos, Registro saw no 
organizational rise of deniers represented by Shindo Renmei and thus no violence. To the 
questions above, I respond that the shared cultural values themselves cannot explain not only 
conflicts between deniers and accepters but also the difference between Bastos and Registro 
because Japanese migrants in both places maintained Japanese cultural values to more or less a 
similar extent. Instead, I argue that the rise of Shindo Renmei and the intra-group conflicts can 
be better understood by the structural disjuncture, or lack thereof, between economic and 
organizational bases of local Japanese communities.  
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In the pre-war period, both Bastos and Registro were diasporic exclaves (see Chapter 1) 
supported by the Japanese diasporic bureaucracy but with different degrees of reliance on the 
exclave economy. When the Japanese diasporic bureaucracy retreated from Brazil in 1941, 
Bastos underwent a rapid dissolution of diasporic exclave and suffered from an unstable 
economy during the war period. In contrast, the retreat of Japanese diasporic bureaucracy did not 
damage the economic basis of Registro because it relied less on the exclave economy. 
In Bastos, the rapid erosion of the exclave economy damaged the legitimacy of 
community associations, especially that of agricultural cooperative, since its legitimacy was 
mostly derived from the capacity to provide the members club goods such as the access to the 
distribution network of agricultural products via export quotas to Japan, which became 
dysfunctional as the Japanese diasporic bureaucracy left Brazil. As a result, the community 
associations became unable to sustain cohesion among the members in the aftermath of the war 
and failed to prevent the penetration of Shindo Renmei’s influence into the community. In 
contrast, the Japanese community in Registro could not rely on the exclave economy largely due 
to its agri-geographical conditions unsuitable for export-oriented products such as cotton. Thus, 
the retreat of the diasporic bureaucracy did not damaged Registro’s economic basis already 
oriented towards the Brazilian domestic market. During the war period, the agricultural 
cooperative in Registro successfully maintained and even strengthened their legitimacy over the 
community members, supported by a flourishing agricultural economy. As a result, Shindo 
Renmei failed to penetrate its influence into the Japanese migrants in Registro, tearing down the 
legitimacy of the agricultural cooperative. 
The following pages first examine whether or not and how prior studies successfully 
explain the rise of Shindo Renmei and the intra-group conflicts between deniers and accepters. 
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Second, I reconsider the weights of the three factors used in prior explanations and reformulate 
the causal configurations among them, centered on the changing relations of economic and 
organizational lives of rural Japanese communities. And third, I analyze the cases of Bastos and 
Registro with a sustained attention to economic and organizational lives of Japanese farmers and 
their agricultural cooperatives. 
 
Culture, Organization, and Social Economy: A Critical Review on the Prior Studies of the 
Intra-group Conflicts between Deniers and Accepters 
Prior studies on the intra-group conflicts among Japanese migrants over the defeat or 
victory of Japan in the war provide three interrelated explanations: the first relies on cultural 
values shared by Japanese migrants, the second focuses on their organizations and networks, and 
the third emphasizes their socioeconomic backgrounds. However, they overstate the impact of 
shared cultural values. Even the organizational and socioeconomic arguments conflate their own 
distinct explanatory factors with the cultural factor. By analytically distinguishing the three 
explanatory components, this section shows how they fail to explain the rise of Shindo Renmei 
and the intra-group victory-defeat conflicts. 
 
Cultural Argument 
The cultural argument emphasizes the role of cultural values shared by Japanese migrants 
although it is rarely presented in its purest form except some earlier studies and journalistic 
writings (Miranda 1948, Tigner 1954, Takagi 1970, Fujisaki 1974, Nakadate 1988). The most 
common explanation argues that the intra-group conflicts between deniers and accepters were the 
extension of diasporic nationalism formed in the pre-war era. Japanese migrants in Brazil have 
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been internalized “Japanese spirit (nihon seishin)” centered on the idea of emperor worship 
(Maeyama 1972: 169-170, see also Wago 1939). When the war was over, they could not accept 
Japanese defeat that contradicted their nationalistic belief of Japanese victory (Mita 1978, 2009: 
ch.4, Maeyama 1982). As a result, they attacked co-nationals who claimed Japan’s defeat as 
traitors. Strangely, the cultural argument does not clarify who accepted Japan’s defeat. However, 
according to its logic, those who did accepted the defeat must have internalized the Japanese 
spirit less. 
The shared cultural values may explain the socio-psychological background of deniers 
represented by Shindo Renmei. However, it faces two challenges. First, it is hard to verify the 
extent to which Japanese migrants shared such cultural values in common ex ante. As the prior 
studies demonstrate by analyzing propaganda pamphlets issued by Shindo Renmei and some 
members’ diaries (Maeyama 1982: 166-174, Lesser 1999: ch.5, Hatanaka 2002: ch.3, Miyao 
2002: 20-55), it is plausible that the core members had such nationalistic mindsets. However, this 
does not prove that their followers also had the same mindsets. 
Yet, being unobservable does not automatically imply being implausible. I do not reject 
that Japanese migrants shared the cultural values. However, an inconvenient fact is that accepters 
also appealed to the same “Japanese spirit.” Whereas deniers claimed that those with the 
“Japanese spirit” must believe in the victory, accepters appealed that those with the “Japanese 
spirit” must accept the defeat “manly” and gracefully (Maeyama 1996). 
In this respect, an analytical distinction between cultural idiom and ideology is helpful 
(Skocpol 1994, see Sewell 2005: ch.5 for a similar conceptual distinction between culture as 
system and culture as practice). The former has a more general, anonymous, and less articulated 
existence whereas the latter has a more concrete and specific content employed by identifiable 
 69 
actors. Ideological entrepreneurs can construct different, even conflicting ideological arguments 
deriving from same cultural idioms. As deniers and accepters competed over the interpretation of 
the same Japanese nationalistic cultural idioms, why did many Japanese migrants were attracted 
to deniers’ appeal, not that of accepters? The cultural argument does not provide an answer to 
this question.3 In sum, the cultural argument may explain the general tendency among Japanese 
migrants but does not account for the conflicts among them. 
 
Organizational argument 
The organizational argument points to Japanese associations and networks as crucial 
factors sustaining the diasporic nationalism among Japanese migrants (Willems and Saito 1947, 
Tigner 1961, Maeyama 1979, 1982, Hatanaka 2002: ch.4). It argues that their broad and 
intensive networks organized by the diasporic bureaucracy in the pre-war era worked as the 
infrastructural basis for the diffusion of Japanese nationalistic cultural idioms. Certainly, the 
Brazilian authorities shut down the formal organizations in Japanese diasporic exclave as 
diplomatic relation with Japan broke down in 1942. However, Japanese cultural values were 
more durable than formal organizations. Their diasporic exclave was sustained by informal 
networks. It was then that secret societies, the most prominent and organized of which was 
Shindo Renmei, emerged and reorganized Japanese migrants (Maeyama 1979: 598-599). In 
addition, the Brazilian government’s restrictive measures further reinforced Japanese migrants’ 
cohesion (Kumasaka and Saito 1970: 168-169, Handa 1970: 625-641, Reichl 1995, Dezem 2000, 
 
3 Literature on framing contests in the studies of social movements tackles this issue. However, they failed to 
identify factors that shape the contest outcomes. They imply the tautological ex post legitimation: the frame that won 
wide support was the influential frame (Benford and Snow 2000). From a different perspective, the post-structuralist 
discourse analysis also approaches the same issue. It does not also identify ex ante conditions of why a certain 
specific ideology gains hegemony over others (Howarth 2000, Laclau 2005). 
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Takeuchi 2008, Shizuno 2010). In the aftermath of the Pacific War, the rumor of Japan’s victory 
was rapidly and broadly spread through the informal networks and made the majority of 
Japanese migrants believe in it. 
However, the organizational argument faces a challenge: it may account for the rise of 
Shindo Renmei but cannot explain conflicts. For a conflict to emerge, there must be at least two 
engaging parties. If the Shindo Renmei was so influential and broadly spread among Japanese 
migrants, why did the intra-group conflicts between deniers and accepters occur in the first 
place? The organizational argument would argue that those Japanese who stood outside the 
informal networks became accepters. Even if that was the case, the organizational argument 
leaves a crucial question unanswered because it conflates the informal networks with cultural 
values: why were some Japanese migrants not involved in the secret societies? And where did 
they stand on Japan’s defeat or victory in the war? 
 
Socioeconomic argument 
Socioeconomic argument may offer an answer to the questions above. It emphasizes the 
socioeconomic differentiation among Japanese migrants. Leaders of local Japanese communities 
had already established a stable economic basis and, as representatives of the communities, they 
had frequent contacts with native Brazilians including public authorities. Additionally, limited 
but emerging urban dwellers also had constant contacts with the wider Brazilian society. They 
were relatively assimilated to the Brazilian society (Willems and Saito 1947: 150, Maeyama 
1979: 601). In contrast, non-elite Japanese farmers, especially renters, sharecroppers, and 
indentured workers, were economically unstable and relied on the nationalistic cultural value to 
motivate their morale for living. They thought that their hard efforts under severe socioeconomic 
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conditions would pay off when Japan would win the war and then they would be able to return to 
the homeland with pride (Vieira 1973: ch.9, Mita 1978). When the war was over, they were 
attracted by Shindo Renmei’s propaganda compatible with their wishful thinking. In short, the 
socioeconomic argument accounts for the factional divide by the socioeconomic differentiation 
between local leaders and urbanized migrants on the one hand and non-elite agricultural migrants 
on the other. 
 
Table 2-1: Socioeconomic Differentiation among Japanese Migrants in 1942 and Their 
Involvements in Shindo Renmei in circa 1945 






by region in 1945 
Involvements in Shindo Renmei in circa 
1945 






Alta Paulista 0.9 22.3% 44,350 (39.4) 24.4% 
Noroeste 0.9 24.8% 39,500 (35.1) 19.6% 
Sorocabana 0.8 13.2% 21,500 (19.1) 20.0% 
Araraquara and Borda do 
Planalto 
4.6 9.3% 5,900 (5.2) 7.8% 
São Paulo city and its 
environs 
1.7 20.0% 250 (0.2) 0.2% 
Vale do Paraíba 1.8 1.3% 1,100 (1.0) 10.1% 
Coastal 1.0 4.2% 0 (0.00) 0.0% 
Other 1.9 5.1% 0 (0.00) 0.0% 
Total 1.2 100.00% 112,600 (100.00) 17.0% 
Sources: “Relação de Representantes de Filiais da Sociedade ‘Shindo Renmei’.” (DEOPS-SP 
collection, fls.2316-2318, vol.10, CENB), Census Committee for the Japanese Immigrants in 
Brazil 1964, vol.2: 426-429, 716-719. 
* For geographical location of each region, see Appendix C. 
** For the estimation procedure, see Appendix D. 
 
To examine this socioeconomic argument, I turn to available statistical data. First, the 
socioeconomic argument, if valid, must predict that regions with a higher non-elite farmer ratio 
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presented a higher level of involvement in Shindo Renmei. The leftmost column on Table 2-1 
represents non-elite farmer (renter, sharecropper, and indentured worker) ratio against 
landowners in 1942. Three regions indicate higher ratios: Araraquara and Borda do Planalto 
(4.6), São Paulo City and its environs (1.7), and Vale do Paraíba (1.8), except “other” category. 
However, the three regions did not indicate higher levels of Shindo Renmei involvement (the 
rightmost column on Table 2-1). Instead, three regions with a roughly even landowner to non-
elite farmer ratio indicated higher level of involvement in Shindo Renmei: Alta Paulista (24.4%), 
Noroeste (19.6%), and Sorocabana (20.0%). Moreover, the Coastal region did not demonstrate 
any observable involvements in Shindo Renmei. 
Second, the socioeconomic argument also points out that rural location made Japanese 
farmers more susceptible to Shindo Renmei’s appeal. Indeed, the proportion of Shindo Renmei 
associates within São Paulo city and its environs was low. In contrast, the three regions with 
higher proportion of Shindo Renmei associates – Alta Paulista, Noroeste, and Sorocabana – were 
the less-developed northwestern hinterland regions. Here again, the Coastal region stands an 
inconvenient case to this association. It does not indicate any observable involvement in Shindo 
Renmei even though it was agriculture-dominant rural region.4 In short, the available statistical 
data cast doubt on the validity of the socioeconomic argument. 
More importantly, the socioeconomic argument, despite its apparent emphasis on the 
socioeconomic conditions, conflates non-elite Japanese farmers’ status with Japanese cultural 
values. However, as discussed above, cultural idioms are open to multiple interpretations. Due to 
 
4 The Coastal region covers a narrow area along the coastline (see Appendix C). However, the majority of Japanese 
migrants were demographically concentrated in Vale do Ribeira area, the center of which was Registro. Even in 
1959, 67% of Japanese migrants in the Coastal region lived in Vale do Ribeira area and only 19% of them lived in 
urban zones within it despite the accelerating urbanization process in Brazil (Census Committee for the Japanese 
Immigrants in Brazil 1964, vol.2: 7). 
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this conflation, the socioeconomic argument is pushed back to the initial challenge that the 
cultural argument faces: why were the Japanese farmers mobilized by a specific ideological 
articulation of cultural idioms, and not by another?  
 
The prior studies do not fully explicate the course of the intra-group conflicts between the 
deniers and accepters. The cultural and organizational arguments may account for psychological 
and organizational backgrounds of the rise of deniers represented by Shindo Renmei. However, 
they do not explain the divide and conflicts among Japanese migrants. While the socioeconomic 
argument points to class differentiation among them, their demographic distribution does not 
support this claim. The problem lies in the conflations between the cultural factor and other 
explanatory components. All in all, the three arguments overemphasize the impact of Japanese 
cultural values in the emergence and development of the conflicts between deniers and accepters. 
A notable consequence of this overemphasis is that the prior studies face difficulty to 
account for Japanese migrants’ changing social orientation after the conflicts calmed down. 
Overall, Japanese migrants started incorporating into the Brazilian society in the post-war period. 
The prior studies view this process primarily as the consequence of their purposive mental shift 
en masse from diasporic to incorporative ones (for the clearest formulation, see Maeyama 1996). 
Here lies a question. On the one hand, they account for the rise of deniers and Shindo Renmei by 
durable Japanese cultural values. On the other hand, they turn to Japanese migrants’ purposive 
agency to explain their incorporation into the Brazilian society. However, they do not explain 
why Japanese cultural values were durable and constraining at one point but not so much at 
another. 
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I do not claim that Japanese cultural values did not count at all. Nor do I claim that 
people’s motivations did not matter for the conflicts between deniers and accepters and their 
aftermath. Cultural values can affect one’s motives that, in turn, guide his or her actions. 
However, cultural values are not the only factor that affects one’s agency. I contend that the 
overemphasis on the cultural factor and its generalization keep us from properly acknowledging 
the organizational and socioeconomic factors. Above all, the overemphasis of cultural factor 
obscures local variations of the conflicts. Distinct effects of organizational and socioeconomic 
factors on these local variations become clearer when I compare Bastos and Registro later. 
 
A Corrective View: The Retreat of Japanese Diasporic Bureaucracy and Varying 
Economic and Organizational Lives of Japanese Migrants 
While the three factors that the prior studies pose cannot fully explain the rise of Shindo 
Renmei and the intra-group conflicts between deniers and accepters, I do not reject them. Rather, 
I reconsider the explanatory weight of each factor and their causal configuration assigned by the 
prior studies. First, I do not reject the possibility that Japanese migrants shared nationalistic 
cultural values. But I doubt the cultural values as the fundamental precondition of the rise of 
Shindo Renmei and the conflicts. I suggest that the ideological association between Japanese 
cultural values and the belief of Japan’s victory was a product of the conflicts themselves, 
articulated and crystalized through the course of events. Second, I do not reject an explanatory 
role for Japanese migrants’ diasporic exclave. However, I do not view the diasporic exclave as 
the crystallization of Japanese migrants’ cultural values, nor see the endurance of the Japanese 
diasporic exclave as a cause of the conflicts. Instead, I argue that its rapid dissolution was a 
significant factor that divide Japanese migrants into the two factions, deniers and accepters. 
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Third, I do not refute the socioeconomic differentiation among Japanese migrants. Yet, I do not 
hastily equate the Japanese agricultural workers’ socioeconomic conditions with their socio-
psychological state. Instead, I pay sustained attention to the changing socioeconomic conditions 
themselves that encompass Japanese migrants. 
Thusly reconsidering the three factors, I argue that the rise of Shindo Renmei and the 
intra-group conflicts between deniers and accepters can be better understood by the structural 
disjuncture between economic and organizational bases of local Japanese communities. The 
difference of socioeconomic conditions in the pre-war period eventually affected the legitimacy 
of local Japanese associations over the community members in the aftermath of the war. Of 
particular importance is agricultural cooperatives’ capacity to deliver the members membership 
benefits or club goods (Buchanan 1965) crucial for their economic stability, such as agricultural 
facilities, supplements, and most importantly, the distribution network of agricultural products. 
This capacity varied across local communities of Japanese migrants during the war period 
largely depending on their reliance on exclave economy. The communities with the diminished 
capacity failed to maintain its legitimacy over the community members whereas those with the 
sustained capacity did not. 
Bastos and Registro represent these two different types of Japanese diasporic exclave in 
the state of São Paulo. In the pre-war period, both Bastos and Registro were diasporic exclaves 
supported by the Japanese diasporic bureaucracy. A significant difference between them was 
their socioeconomic conditions: Bastos relied on an export-oriented exclave economy while 
Registro didn’t. This difference eventually led them to different processes of the dissolution of 
diasporic exclave. Figure 2-1 summarizes the dynamics that produced their different responses to 















































 In the pre-war period, Bastos enjoyed an export-oriented exclave economy whereas 
Registro struggled to establish a stable economic basis. This difference in the two places were 
contingent upon their agri-geographic features: Bastos’s soil was suited for cotton production 
while Registros' wasn’t. While the Japanese diasporic bureaucracy supported the two places, its 
retreat from Brazil in 1942 affected them differently. The sudden loss of the dominant export 
destination entailed by the retreat destabilized the economic basis of Bastos whereas it did not in 
Registro. The retreat of the diasporic bureaucracy rather facilitated Registro’s economy to 
penetrate into the Brazilian domestic market through the extended connection with another 
Japanese agricultural cooperatives. 
This difference in the economic basis affected the organizational basis of each 
community. In Bastos, the capacity of the agricultural cooperative to provide the community 
members club goods important to secure their economic stability represented by the distribution 
network of products via export quotas to Japan diminished significantly. As a result, its 
legitimacy to unite the community members was damaged when Bastos faced a critical economic 
crisis in the aftermath of the war. In Registro, the agricultural cooperative could keep delivering 
the members club goods such as the distribution network of the products penetrating into the 
Brazilian domestic market and thus could sustain its legitimacy and control over the community 
members.5  When Shindo Renmei tried to mobilize Japanese migrants in the two communities, 
 
5 This implies that the Japanese community associations with a stable legitimacy could unite the members either 
under the belief of victory or defeat of Japan. Although the evidence is limited, the case of Presidente Prudente 
suggests a case in which the local leadership organized the Japanese residents under the belief of Japanese victory. 
According to the police records, an influential Japanese who was the president of Japanese Association (Nihonjin-
kai) in the pre-war era formed a secret society in the aftermath of the war. The secret society was based on the 
former Japanese Association and succeeded to organize the majority of community members, except a very few. 
Although some members of the secret society blackmailed a few Japanese residents, it did not escalate to violent 
incidents. See, “Testemunha de Iwao Ban,” April 26, 1946 (DEOPS-SP collection, fls.1080-1081, vol.5, CENB), 
“Testemunha de Akira Takahashi,” April 29, 1946 (DEOPS-SP collection, fls.1158-1159, vol.5, CENB), 
“Testemunha de Kyoshi Inoue,” May 2, 1946 (DEOPS-SP collection, fls.1238-1239, vol.5, CENB). 
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the community leaders in Bastos could not prevent the penetration of Shindo Renmei into the 
community members whereas those in Registro could. Bastos saw the escalation of conflicts 
between deniers and accepters and it resulted in violence. Registro, in contrast, did not see such 
an escalation even though some residents must hold a deniers’ view personally. Different 
responses to Japan’s defeat in Bastos and Registro were the consequence of these different 
dissolution processes of diasporic exclave. 
 In sum, the Japanese communities that relied on exclave economy, represented by Bastos, 
underwent a rapid disjuncture between their economic and organizational bases with an 
increasingly declining legitimacy of community associations, whereas those with less reliance on 
exclave economy, represented by Registro, experienced a gradual shift from a diasporic exclave 
to a settlement enclave (see Chapter 1) with the sustained legitimacy of the community 
associations. In the long run, Japanese diasporic exclaves eventually dissolved and shifted 
toward settlement enclaves. However, the ones undergone a rapid dissolution had to pay a big 
price in the form of violent conflicts. 
This point aligns with the broader theoretical argument developed in the previous 
chapter: migrants’ transnational engagement with the homelands largely depends on the 
changing configuration among global socio-economic, state-institutional, and migrant-network 
contexts. A change in the state-institutional context (the retreat of the diasporic bureaucracy) 
affected migrants’ associations and networks (the legitimacy of community associations) 
differently depending on socio-economic conditions (the reliance on exclave economy). The 
local Japanese migrants’ communities that heavily relied on the exclave economy in the pre-war 
period were more susceptible to the changing Brazilian and Japanese developments within the 
international state system during the war period than those that didn’t. This transformation of 
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contextual configuration eventually led Japanese diasporic exclaves to different patterns of the 
dissolution. 
 
Comparison between Bastos and Registro in Relation to the Rise of Shindo Renmei and the 
Conflicts between Deniers and Accepters 
This section compares two communities of Japanese migrants — Bastos and Registro — 
and their contrasting responses to Japan’s defeat. It is certain that Shindo Renmei gained many 
Japanese migrants’ involvement and the intra-group conflicts between deniers and accepters 
intensified mostly in the regions where their large majority lived. Yet, this does not automatically 
confirm the causal factors drawn solely from the characteristics of these positive cases. Negative 
cases, even if they are anomalous, enable us to reconsider the effect of existing factors and offer 
new insights for the rise of Shindo Renmei and the victory-defeat conflicts (Rogowski 2004). 
Bastos and Registro are such strategic sites for comparison. Bastos is located in Alta 
Paulista region that was one of demographic centers of Japanese migrants in the pre-war period. 
In contrast, Registro is located in the Coastal region that was a demographic periphery in terms 
of the populational distribution of Japanese migrants.6 In this sense, Registro represented an 
exceptional case. Also, we should be cautious to regard Bastos as the microcosm of Japanese 
diasporic exclaves in the northwestern hinterland. Nevertheless, Bastos and Registro showed 
contrasting responses to Japan’s defeat despite sharing most of characteristics that the prior 
studies claimed as the causes of the rise of Shindo Renmei and the intra-group conflicts: the 
substantial proportion of Japanese migrants in Bastos were mobilized by Shindo Renmei and 
resulted in violent incidents including a homicide and eight injuries, whereas Japanese migrants 
 
6 Only 4.2% of Japanese migrants lived in the Coastal region in 1945. See Table 2-1. 
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in Registro were not mobilized by Shindo Renmei and no explicit violence occurred.7 The 
comparison between the two communities make us to revise prior theorizing and develop a more 
plausible account of these cases. 
First, I will examine the demographic composition of old and new migrants in the two 
because Bastos and Registro formed in different times. I also examine if Bastos and Registro had 
the community characteristics that the prior studies claimed as the causes of the rise of Shindo 
Renmei and the conflicts between deniers and accepters. In short, the two communities shared all 
the community characteristics. Despite all this, the conflicts escalated in Bastos while Registro 
did not see such an escalation. Then, second, I analyze how the relationship between economic 
and organizational bases in the two communities changed before and after the retreat of the 
Japanese diasporic bureaucracy and show the structure disjuncture of the two bases better 
explains the difference between Bastos and Registro concerning the conflicts between deniers 
and accepters. 
 
Old and New Japanese Communities and Their Demographic Composition 
First of all, I point out that demographic compositions of Bastos and Registro at the end 
of the war were more or less similar even though the former was established much later than the 
latter: 1916 for Registro and 1929 for Bastos, a 13-year difference in lengths of settlement in 
Brazil. With this information, one may suspect that this difference can explain their different 
responses to Japan’s defeat: Japanese migrants in Registro were old timers and they already lost 
interests in the homeland’s affairs; those in Bastos were newer arrivals and thus they had a 
stronger patriotic attachment to Japan as the self-interest hypothesis of migrant transnationalism 
 
7 “Testemunha de Isawao Ueno,” April 6, 1946 (DEOPS collection, fls.144-145, vol.1, CENB). 
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would theorize (Portes 2001, Alba and Nee 2003, Waldinger 2015). However, the length of 
settlement per se does not account for their different responses because both places had a more 
or less similar mixed demographic composition of old and new migrants due to the domestic 
migration of Japanese migrants between Japanese local communities during the 1920s and 
1930s. 
On the one hand, Registro’s population growth was unstable in the early years. Due to the 
booming coffee and cotton economies in the northwestern hinterland, many Japanese settlers 
moved to the hinterland (Handa 1970: 354, Vazemi 2011: 30). Between 1917-1931 period, about 
48% of families that had once settled in Registro left for the other regions (Burajiru Jiho 1933: 
27). In 1931, 314 Japanese families remained in Registro. The newer Japanese migrants started 
to settle again in the late 1930s when Registro found tea and other agricultural products as major 
commodities. In 1938, the number of Japanese families recovered to 467 (Registro Japanese 
Youth Federation 1938b). On the other hand, the colonization company of Bastos initially 
planned to recruit all settlers directly from Japan. However, it failed to attract such new 
emigrants in Japan. As a result, they recruited from the old migrants who came to Brazil earlier. 
Between 1929 to 1938 period, 1,130 families settled in Bastos. Among them, 70% were old 
migrants who came from other regions in Brazil (Mizuno 1955: 31-32, 54, 81). 
In short, both Registro and Bastos had a mixture of old and new migrants. Thus, the 
length of communities’ history does not explain the different responses to Japan’s defeat 
between them. 
 
Shared Community Characteristics of Bastos and Registro in the Pre-war Era 
1) Shared Japanese Cultural Values 
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The prior studies assume that the shared Japanese cultural values were the major factor of 
the phenomenon in question. Nevertheless, it is hardly determinable if and to what extent 
Japanese migrants in Bastos and Registro were internalized such cultural values in the pre- and 
during war period due to data limitation. As noted in the previous section, it is difficult to 
observe inside people’s hearts and minds especially in the historical context. Certainly, both in 
Bastos and Registro, Japanese migrants have annually commemorated Emperor’s birthday in the 
pre-war period (see, Burajiru Jiho 1931, Registro Japanese Youth Federation 1933). Moreover, 
residents in both communities participated in patriotic donation campaign to Japan (Burajiru 
Jiho 1933, 1937).8 The prior studies take these and other nationalistic, somewhat ritualistic, 
collective actions as manifestations of Japanese cultural values shared by the Japanese migrants 
(Maeyama 1972, 1984, Negawa 2013: 95-110). 
However, the exercise of the nationalistic collective actions does not automatically evince 
participants’ voluntary engagement motivated by their own value-commitments. As discussed in 
the previous chapter and I will show concrete instantiations in Bastos and Registro later, the 
Japanese community organizations in the rural areas of São Paulo could exercise social control 
over the members by sanctions because they regulated the access to club goods. While I do not 
reject the possibility that the community members voluntarily participated in the nationalistic 
collective actions, I cannot also reject the possibility that they reluctantly participated in them, 
being afraid of potential sanctions — for instance, the exclusion from the enjoyment of 
agricultural cooperative’s facilities and distribution network — if not participated. After all, we 
should be cautious to view these collective actions in Japanese communities as the evidence of 
 
8 In the case of Registro, even elementary school pupils were mobilized to the patriotic donation campaign (Registro 
Japanese Youth Federation 1938a). Although I did not find a concrete evidence, it is highly plausible that school 
pupils in Bastos were also mobilized to the donation campaign. 
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cultural values shared by Japanese migrants. Rather, it is safe to understand them simply as the 
evidence of institutionalized practices. By so doing, we can look at the organizational and 
institutional foundations on which the community members enact those collective actions in 
Bastos and Registro respectively. 
 
2) Formation of Diasporic Exclave and the Constraints by the Brazilian Government 
In regard to the organizational and institutional factors, the prior studies point out 
specifically two aspects of community life that allegedly contributed to the events leading up to 
the conflicts between deniers and accepters: the formation of diasporic exclave led by the 
diasporic bureaucracy of the homeland, and constraints imposed by the Brazilian government on 
the Japanese communities. These characteristics were present both in Bastos and Registro. 
Both Bastos and Registro were typical diasporic exclaves. They were developed by semi-
official Japanese colonization companies as a part of diasporic bureaucracy.9 In both places, they 
prepared basic infrastructures such as roads, clinics, agricultural facilities, and community 
organizations, and gave technical and moral guidance through these community organizations 
with subsidies from the Japanese Consulate General in São Paulo city (Matsumura 1922, Mizuno 
1955: 20-24). Japanese migrants in both places could enjoy social and economic advantages 
derived from the collective life of diasporic exclave. 
For instance, as the agricultural cooperative of Bastos accommodated agricultural 
facilities and distribution network, the members affiliated to the cooperative increased year by 
year. It built cotton mill factories available to the members (Mizuno 1955: 61-63) and developed 
 
9 Bastos by Burajiru Takushoku Kumiai (the Colonization Corporation of Brazil) and Registro by the Kaigai 
Kougyou Kabushiki Kaisha (the Oversea Development Corporation). 
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an export channel of cotton to Japan through the diasporic bureaucracy.10 When it was initially 
founded in 1933, about a half of Japanese families in Bastos were affiliated. In 1939, however, 
practically all the Japanese families had the membership to enjoy growing collective advantages 
(Mizuno 1955: 67-68, 95). In addition to positive incentives, the community organizations in 
Bastos also exercised negative sanctions. They sometimes expelled unruly residents from the 
community when they found necessary (Mizuno 1955: 18, 47). 
In a similar vein, the agricultural cooperatives in Registro grew as they provided club 
goods to the community members. While the cooperative of Registro was established with 221 
affiliated families in 1928, it was in poor shape due to weak agricultural production and poor 
management until the mid-1930s. In 1937, the membership decreased to 85 families. Still, the 
diasporic bureaucracy continued to support the Japanese farmers in Registro, providing 
agricultural facilities and guidance to establish stable production bases (Crissiuma 1934: 113, 
Vazami 2011: 27-30). As the farmers in Registro found a growing prospect in tea production in 
the late 1930s, an agricultural cooperative, which developed the access to the broader Brazilian 
domestic market as we will see later, grew strong and many Japanese farmers sought affiliation 
with it to take advantage of club goods (Committee for Sixty Years History of Registro 1978: 85-
91, 101-106).11 
Second, increasing constraints by Brazilian government affected both Bastos and 
Registro in the same manner. Since 1937 when the full-fledged nationalist Estado Novo regime 
was established, the Brazilian government strengthened the constraints over migrant 
 
10 Miyao, Atsushi (宮尾厚). “On Application for Licensed Quotas of Cotton (許可申請に関する件)”, October 14, 
1940 (移 1 (D3), reel #45, MJE-NDL), Rocha, Eduardo Lusada. “Relatório sobre Alta-Paulista e Noroeste ao 
Delegado de Ordem, Política e Social,” April 27, 1942 (Prontuário 8342 “Nipônismo,” vol.1, AP-ESP). 
11 This agricultural cooperative named Cooperativo Agrícola de Cotia is different from the one formed in 1928. As 
we will see later, it was initially formed in Cotia, a small town located in the outskirt of São Paulo city. During the 
war period, it expanded its influence to set up a brunch in Registro. 
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communities in addition to existing nationalization policies towards them. For instance, it banned 
the teaching of foreign languages in 1938. Especially after Brazil broke diplomatic relations with 
the Axis countries, its restrictive measures extended to many areas of activities: bans on ethnic 
association; publications in foreign languages; meetings using foreign languages; political 
discussion in the public space; travels without a pass; and moving without an advance notice to 
the local authorities. However, these measures did not squash Japanese migrants’ associational 
activities. As the prior studies point out, they were maintained as informal networks. In this 
respect, agricultural cooperatives were the key. The Brazilian government allowed them to 
operate while shutting other Japanese organizations because the government could not ignore the 
agricultural production made by Japanese migrants (Taniguchi 2014). 
Local Japanese communities used the agricultural cooperatives as a shield for their 
associational activities. In Bastos, the leaders of the Japanese Association (Nihonjin-kai), which 
was the decision-making body of the general community affairs, overlapped with those of the 
agricultural cooperative in the pre-war period (Mita 1999: 95). After the Nihonjin-kai shut down 
in 1938, the community’s social functions were concentrated in the agricultural cooperative.12 
The first generation migrants who were in charge of community organizations officially 
relegated their positions to the second-generation members who had Brazilian citizenship by 
birth but practically continued to manage the cooperative’s activities behind them. While the 
teaching of Japanese language to the children was prohibited, it was maintained as clandestine 
classroom at night (Mizuno 1955: 270). Again, the situation in Registro was almost the same as 
Bastos. The agricultural cooperative in Registro practically functioned as the center of 
 
12 “Relatório sobre Atividades Nipônicas no Município de Guararapes,” March 17, 1942 (Prontuário 8342 
“Nipônismo”, vol.1, AP-ESP). See also, Mita 1999: 114-116. 
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associational activities after the other community organizations shut down. Also, the teaching of 
Japanese continued to be carried out in a clandestine form.13 
In sum, Bastos and Registro shared organizational and institutional characteristics that the 
prior studies claimed to cause the rise of Shindo Renmei and the intra-group conflicts. Both in 
Bastos and Registro, a diasporic exclave was formed by the diasporic bureaucracy in the pre-war 
period. Community organizations exercised social control over the members through the 
provision of club goods represented by the access to distribution network of agricultural products 
and agricultural facilities. While the Brazilian government strengthened constraints on their 
activities, the informal networks helped to maintain a social cohesion among Japanese migrants 
both in Bastos and Registro. They practiced collective actions mentioned above such as the 
annual commemoration of Emperor’s birthday and patriotic donations under such an institutional 
opportunity structure centered on the community organizations and informal networks. 
 
3) Socioeconomic Differentiation and Contact Opportunities with the Native Brazilians 
The class differentiation and contact opportunities with the native Brazilians were the two 
conditions that the socioeconomic argument claims to produce the factional divide among the 
Japanese migrants. Here again, Bastos and Registro indicated almost the same characteristics: 
both communities had the class differentiation among Japanese residents; a small but sizable 
portion of non-Japanese residents lived in both communities. 
First, both Bastos and Registro had class differentiation in terms of land ownership. As 
mentioned above, both communities were developed by colonization companies. Initially, they 
 
13  “Agreements in the School Council Meeting (学校協議会長会議ニ於ケル申合),” c.1937. 102-14, Eiji 
Matsumura collection (松村英治関係資料), MJE-NDL. See also, Fukasawa 2014: 155-156. 
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planned to sell plots to independent Japanese farmers to maintain relatively equal social 
relations. However, as they gradually developed, class differentiation became visible. 
Early in 1933, four years after the establishment of Bastos, 104 out of 829 Japanese 
families (13.1%) were renters and sharecroppers there (Mizuno 1955: 53). The proportion of 
renters gradually grew as the cotton economy flourished in Bastos. Pushed by the cotton boom in 
the 1930s, a sizable number of Japanese farmers switched from a polyculture farming in a self-
owned plot to a monoculture farming of cotton in a leased plot to maximize a short-term profit 
(Mizuno 1955: 63-64, Mita 1978: 43-44). The proportion of renters among the Japanese farmers 
in Bastos grew to approximately 30% in 1941 (Mizuno 1955: 114). 
Similar to Bastos, social class differentiation seemed to grow large in Registro. Although 
the statistical data were not available, some studies suggest that when some of Japanese settlers 
left Registro due to the economic stagnation by the mid 1930s, the remained farmers acquired 
vacant plots. As the economic conditions recovered with the growth of tea production in the late 
1930s, they started leasing the plots to those coming from other regions (Müller 1980: 50-57, 
Hatanaka 2002: 84-85). A notable fact in this context is that only landowners could participate in 
the meetings of community associations (Vazemi 2011: 40). In this respect, the social 
discrepancy between the landowners and other lower status residents was more salient in 
Registro than in Bastos. 
Second, both Bastos and Registro had a limited but sizable portion of non-Japanese 
residents. Although both communities were initially expected to be Japanese colonies par 
excellence, it was practically impossible to exclude non-Japanese residents from the two places. 
Native Brazilian merchants and agricultural workers who worked with or under the Japanese 
farmers also lived there. Bastos had 2,034 (30.4%) Brazilians out of 6,696 total residents in 1935 
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(Mizuno 1955: 54). In contrast, Registro had 1,672 (35.1%) Brazilians out of 4,763 total 
residents in 1938.14 Certainly, having Brazilian residents within the communities does not 
automatically indicate frequent social interactions between Japanese and Brazilian residents. Nor 
does it mean that all the Japanese residents had same frequency of contacts with the Brazilians. 
The crucial point, however, is that only Bastos underwent the rise of Shindo Renmei and the 
victory-defeat conflicts despite that both communities had more or less similar proportion of 
Brazilian residents. 
 
Table 2-2: Occurrence of Conflicts between Deniers and Accepters and Local Community 
Characteristics of Bastos and Registro  
Bastos Registro 
Shindo Renmei’s influence and the conflicts between 
deniers and accepters + - 
Demographic composition of old and new migrants Mixture of old and new migrants 
Community 
characteristics 
that the prior 
studies 
claimed as the 








bureaucracy + + 
Brazilian government’s 
restriction on migrants’ 
activities 
+ + 
Development of informal 
networks + + 
Socioeconomic 
argument 
Class differentiation + + 
Contact opportunity with 
native Brazilians + + 
 
 
Table 2-2 summarizes the presence and absence of community characteristics of Bastos 
and Registro that the existent historiographies pose as the causes. All in all, they shared all the 
 
14 “The Overview of Iguape Colony at the End of 1938 (昭和一三年末現在イグアペ植民地一般情勢一覧表),” 
財 0015-03650, NAJ. 
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community characteristics that the prior studies claim caused the rise of Shindo Renmei and the 
intra-group conflicts between accepters and deniers. Notwithstanding, it was only in Bastos that 
some residents were mobilized by Shindo Renmei and the conflicts broke out. It was not the case 
that Shindo Renmei activists were not interested in Registro which was located in a periphery of 
São Paulo state. They came to Registro to establish a branch. In addition, some residents in 
Registro actually believed Japan’s victory. Nonetheless, Shindo Renmei activists failed to 
organize Japanese residents there. Now, I will turn my focus to the different trajectories of 
economic development and their effects on the social organizations in Bastos and Registro. 
 
Changing Economic Basis Vis-à-vis Organizational Basis in Bastos and Registro 
1) Bastos: Rapid Erosion of Exclave Economy and Its Effect on the Legitimacy of Agricultural 
Cooperative 
 In the 1930s, Bastos was known for its cotton production. However, it underwent 
unstable economic times once the cotton production declined. The rise and fall of economic 
prosperity of Bastos was highly susceptible to the changing Brazilian and Japanese developments 
within the international state system. 
Initially, the colonization company in Bastos planned to cultivate coffee as the major 
product of Bastos.15 However, the São Paulo government prohibited new coffee crops to stabilize 
coffee price in the international market in 1932. At the same time, Japan started seeking cotton 
import from Brazil during the same period. As a result, the colonization company in Bastos 
guided the Japanese farmers to cultivate cotton as the main agricultural product (Mizuno 1955: 
61-64). Figure 2-2 represents cotton production in Bastos. In 1930, Bastos produced about 
 
15 Journal of Federation of Overseas Emigrant Cooperatives (海外移住組合連合会誌), no.2, Ohno Rokuichirou 
collection (大野緑一郎関係文書), reel R84, MJE-NDL. 
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66,000kg of cotton. The amount of cotton production rapidly grew. In 1939, Bastos produced 
approximately 8,597,000kg, which was about 130 times more than in 1930. Moreover, its value 
share in the entire community revenue was significantly high. During the late 1930s, over 70% 
of total revenue of Bastos came from cotton sales. 
 
Figure 2-2: Cotton Production in Bastos, 1930-1946
 
Sources: Staff Office of GAT Movement 1936: 5, 1937: 6-7, 1938: 8-9, 1939: 8, 1941: 12-15, 
Mizuno 1955: 61-63, 132, 142. 
* Data are missing in 1942 and 1943. 
 
 
However, the economic development of Bastos declined rapidly in the 1940s. Especially 
after the Japanese diasporic bureaucracy retreated from Brazil in 1942, the Japanese cotton 
producers suddenly lost the major buyer of the cotton.16 They found silk as the major substituting 
product. Farmers did not need large-scale investments to switch from cotton to silk production. 
Moreover, the breakout of the Pacific War helped the development of silk industry in Bastos. 
 
16  There was also an agri-engineering reason. Soil fertility diminished significantly in the late 1930s. It was 
suggested by the decline of cotton yield per an acreage. Despite the increase in the net amount of cotton production, 
its per unit yield decreased 42% from 1935 to 1941 (Mizuno 1955: 63, 110). 
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The price of Brazilian silk in the international market increased significantly because the silk 
supply from Japan, which was the then largest supplier in the world (Ma 1996), suddenly 
stopped. Figure 2-3 represents silk production in Bastos. In 1939, the Japanese migrants in 
Bastos produced about 44,000kg of raw silk. In 1946, the amount increased to about 870,000kg, 
which was 20 times more than in 1941. Nevertheless, it was not the case that the silk industry 
sustained Bastos’s economic development in a constant manner. Immediately after the Pacific 
War, news about the return of Japanese silk to the international market made the price of 
Brazilian silk fall sharply (Mizuo 1955: 130-131). Bastos underwent a serious economic 
downturn with the overproduction of quasi-unmarketable silk. 
 
Figure 2-3: Silk Production in Bastos, 1939-1949
 
Sources: Mizuno 1955: 110, 132. 
* Data are missing in 1942 and 1943. 
 
 
These shifts in the economic conditions destabilized the legitimacy of the agricultural 
cooperative in Bastos. When the economy was in a good shape, the agricultural cooperative 
could maintain its legitimacy over the community members because it was capable of providing 
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them club goods, especially the access to the distribution network of agricultural products, 
exclusion from which could deteriorate their economic stability. Even during the war period, it 
successfully kept the Japanese migrants out of the influence of nationalistic secret societies, 
backed by the growing prosperity of silk production. For instance, some Japanese farmers in 
Bastos formed a secret society named the Association of Imperial Rule Assistance (Taisei 
Yokusan Doushi-kai) around 1942. In response, the leaders of the agricultural cooperative fired 
11 employees who were affiliated with the Association and expelled its leaders from Bastos. 
With the intervention of the agricultural cooperative using the threat of exclusion from the 
enjoyment of club goods, the residents of Bastos got back to normal (Mizuno 1955: 118-120). 
At the same time, however, the cohesion among the community members sustained by 
the legitimacy of the agricultural cooperative started dissolving as the economic conditions 
fluctuated in the late 1930s. The agricultural cooperative increasingly became incapable to 
provide the members club goods, especially the access to distribution network of agricultural 
products, which underwrote the agricultural cooperatives’ legitimacy over them. First, due to the 
decline of cotton production, about 25% of the Japanese settlers left Bastos by 1941 (Mita 1999: 
118). Second, the agricultural cooperative failed to prevent the members to sell cotton apart from 
its distribution network. And third, Japanese farmers started withdrawing their deposits from the 
banking department of the agricultural cooperative due to credit instability (Mizuno 1955: 123-
124). While the rise of silk industry temporarily halted this tendency, the fall of silk price in the 
immediate aftermath of the war decisively damaged the legitimacy of the agricultural 
cooperative.17 The agricultural cooperative in Bastos had to lay off its employees in a large scale. 
 
17 In addition, an additional investment in the silk industry by the agricultural cooperative of Bastos during the war 
period exaggerated its financial crisis in the immediate aftermath of the war. In 1944, the agricultural cooperative, 
backed by the booming silk production, started building a new silk factory, raising investments from its members. 
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In addition, due to the financial stringency, it became unable to pay the affiliated farmers in time 
for their silk delivery. In the end, a substantial number of members withdrew from the 
agricultural cooperative (Mizuno, 1955: 132-137). The intra-group conflicts between deniers and 
accepters among the community members occurred in this context. 
 
2) Registro: A Gradual Transition from Diasporic Exclave to Settlement Enclave 
In contrast to Bastos that found its major economic basis in cotton production, Registro 
failed to develop competitive agricultural products during its early years. Thus, it had to seek 
alternative products that would sustain its economic basis and eventually developed a variegated 
polyculture production system that cultivates multiple agricultural products by the late 1930s. 
While the development of polyculture economy was contingent upon its agri-geographical 
conditions rather than deliberately planned by the agricultural cooperative in Registro, this 
unintended development kept Registro from the damaging impact of the sudden retreat of the 
Japanese diasporic bureaucracy on its economic life and also helped its agricultural cooperative 
to sustain its legitimacy over the members, further developing its distribution network of 
agricultural products penetrating into the Brazilian domestic market. 
Registro is located in a humid forest area by the Ribeira de Iguape river. When a 
colonization company formed the community of Japanese migrants in Registro in 1916, it had a 
plan to harvest rice crops as the main product securing the community’s economic foundation. 
However, the agri-engineering and geographical conditions of Registro prevented its steady 
growth. While Registro region was known for rice production long before the settlement of 
Japanese migrants, the Japanese migrants soon found that the specific geographical location of 
 
However, the sudden fall of silk price after the war made the agricultural cooperative impossible to recompense the 
investments (Mizuno 1955: 124-125). 
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Japanese community that the colonization company purchased was not ideally suited for rice 
production. In addition, they also found that rice production made lower profits than initially 
expected. First, there was no rice mill plant until 1922. The Japanese farmers in Registro had to 
rely on Brazilian mills outside the community by paying additional costs. Second, the market 
demand for rice was not sufficiently developed in Brazil. As a result, they had to seek alternative 
products that would supplement rice production (Committee for Sixty Years History of Registro 
1978: 56-59, Vazemi 2011: 34-35). 
One of such alternative products was coffee. The colonization company initially hesitated 
to cultivate coffee because the humid climate of Registro was not suitable for coffee cultivation. 
However, as it became clear that rice production would not be able to sustain community’s 
economy, it started encouraging coffee production for the Japanese farmers by calling on an 
agricultural engineer from Japan in 1922. In the early 1930s, a large majority of Japanese 
farmers cultivated coffee as the main product (Handa 1970: 354). However, as time went by, it 
became evident that the coffee quality in Registro was inferior to that of northwestern hinterland. 
The coffee production gradually went obsolete in the middle of 1930s. As mentioned earlier, a 
large portion of Japanese migrants left Registro by this period. 
In the late 1930s, tea production gradually grew as a major competitive product in 
Registro. The colonization company also made a large investment to encourage tea production. 
With the growth of tea industry, Japanese migrants who had once settled in the northwestern 
hinterland started to resettle in Registro since the late 1930s. Eventually, tea production became a 
leading agricultural industry during the war period. However, the tea production did not 
dominate Registro’s economy.18 Threatened by unsuccessful commercialization of rice and 
 
18 In the post-war period, the tea production became a leading but one of multiple agricultural products in Registro. 
In 1962, tea accounted 60% of total agricultural revenue in Registro (Executive Committee for Fifty Years 
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coffee until the early 1930s, the Japanese farmers have spontaneously pursued polyculture 
production in the pre-war period. 
 
Figure 2-4: Agricultural Revenues in Registro, 1931-1938
 
Sources: Burajiru Jiho Sha 1933: 27, Registro Japanese Youth Federation 1933b: 27, Oversea 
Development Cooperation (海外興業株式会社). c.1937. “The Overview of Iguape Colony at the 
End of 1936” (財0015-03650, NAJ), Oversea Development Cooperation. c.1939. “The Overview 
of Iguape Colony at the End of 1938” (財0015-03650, NAJ). 
* Data are missing in 1932, 1934, 1935, and 1937. 
 
 
Figure 2-4 represents agricultural revenue in Registro in the 1930s. Although data on 
multiple years are missing in the figure, it roughly indicates the general tendency of agricultural 
productions there. Whereas cotton accounted nearly 80% of Bastos’s revenue in the late 1930s, 
there was not such dominant product in Registro during the same period. Certainly, tea 
production was growing. However, it accounted 30% of the total agricultural revenue in 1936 
 
Commemoration Festival of Registro Colony (レヂストロ植民地開設五拾年祭祭典実行委員会), ed. 1963. 
Overview on the Current Registro County (レヂストロ郡現勢概覧). Registro: s.n. Available at VE801-575, MJE-
NDL). 
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and 25% in 1938. Another notable feature in Registro was the sizable share of “other” category 
in the agricultural revenue. It included a variety of vegetables and fruits shipping for the 
Brazilian domestic market. They accounted 36% of the total revenue in 1938. In short, after 
failing to form a monocultural economy centered on rice and coffee productions, Registro has 
developed a polyculture farming system with the growing tea production in the late 1930s. 
Social organization of the Japanese migrants in Registro has developed against these 
economic backgrounds. Registro’s economic trajectory different from Bastos minimized the 
damaging impact of the retreat of the Japanese diasporic bureaucracy. Whereas the retreat 
exposed Bastos to the economic instability, it rather facilitated Registro’s economy to penetrate 
into the Brazilian domestic market through the extended connection with another Japanese 
agricultural cooperative. 
When the Japanese migrants suffered from economic stagnation in the 1920s and 30s, the 
colonization company supported their search for alternative products. It encouraged the farmers 
to organize the agricultural cooperative and also provided facilities and technical guidance to 
them. When the Japanese diasporic bureaucracy left Brazil, the agricultural association in 
Registro was once shut down as the Brazilian authorities regarded it as a part of the Japanese 
diasporic bureaucracy (Committee for Sixty Years History of Registro 1978: 85-91). However, 
another agricultural cooperative, which was initially formed in Cotia, a small town in the outskirt 
of São Paulo city (see, Appendix C), took over most of functions that the original agricultural 
cooperative had played and kept organizing the Japanese migrants in Registro. This 
organizational transition occurred because of the retreat of Japanese diasporic bureaucracy. 
In the pre-war period, the Japanese diasporic bureaucracy demanded Japanese 
agricultural cooperatives not to extend the activities beyond their own communities to avoid 
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potential competition between them. However, once the diasporic bureaucracy retreated from 
Brazil, such restrictions were practically abandoned. As a result, the agricultural cooperative in 
Cotia, which had a strong distribution network connected to São Paulo city, started expanding its 
activities to other neighboring Japanese communities. On the other hand, the Japanese farmers in 
Registro needed the distribution network to the market after the colonization company left the 
community. In addition, the agricultural cooperative of Cotia as an organization officially 
accredited under the Brazilian labor law had access to essential materials such as gasoline and 
fertilizers controlled under the war-time rationing regime. In sum, the agricultural cooperative of 
Cotia could provide the access to essential club goods to the farmers in Registro. During the war 
period, over 300 Japanese families in Registro were affiliated with it (Andoh 1959: 145-146, 
Committee for Sixty Years History of Registro 1978: 101-102, 106). Within these economic and 
organizational contexts, the Japanese migrants in Registro saw the end of the war. 
 
Conflicts between Deniers and Accepters in Bastos and Registro and Their Aftermath 
Escalation of Conflicts in Bastos and Latent Conflicts in Registro 
On August 15, 1945, Japan declared its defeat in the Pacific War. The news soon spread 
among the Japanese migrants in Brazil. However, they did not accept it immediately. Some of 
them formed secret societies and kept claiming that Japan had won the war. The agricultural 
cooperatives in Bastos and Registro notified the news of Japan’s defeat to the residents. In this 
respect, they had contrasting reactions from community members respectively. 
In Bastos, the agricultural cooperative attempted to calm down the residents. On August 
15, Ikuta Mizobe, a managing director of the agricultural cooperative, immediately circulated 
pamphlets to the neighborhood leaders with his signature, that informed the Japanese defeat and 
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requested the Japanese residents in Bastos to “avoid any thoughtless behavior” (quoted in Neves 
1960: 361). Ten days after the circulation of the pamphlet, a secretary of the agricultural 
cooperative wrote to Mizobe as follows in reporting community members’ responses to the 
pamphlet: 
There is no Japanese who did not wish and believe in Japan’s victory. We also have 
patriotic feeling as strong as any other Japanese. But we are, by mistake, treated as anti-
patriots. If it was a personal criticism, it would be still acceptable. But there is no reason 
to be criticized in the name of the agricultural cooperative. […] I am trying to avoid 
antagonism, but the situation is, instead of getting better, is deteriorating and unbearable 
(quoted in Mita 1999: 163). 
This report suggests two things. First, it is not the fact that the leaders of the agricultural 
cooperative were not patriotic to Japan and readily accepted its defeat for that reason. Their 
patriotic feeling towards the homeland was compatible with the acceptance of the defeat. This 
fact casts doubt on the existent cultural explanation that equates Japanese nationalistic values 
with the denial of the defeat. 
Second, the agricultural cooperative failed to control those who did not believe the defeat 
by its enforceable authority. Rather, the antagonism between accepters and deniers ran deep in 
Bastos. This contrasted with the successful suppression of the ultra-nationalistic group during the 
war. As discussed above, the agricultural cooperative prevented the spreading influence of a 
secret society named the Association of Imperial Rule Assistance by expelling its associates 
from Bastos during the war period. In the aftermath of the war, in contrast, the agricultural 
cooperative in Bastos could not calm down the tension within the community. Due to the crisis 
of its agricultural economy immediately after the war, it was unable to control members anymore 
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neither by benefits derived from club goods nor by threats of exclusion from their enjoyment. 
Instead, Shindo Renmei gradually expanded its influence over the community members and 
consolidated the community members who did not accepted Japan’s defeat in Bastos. 
Since the first pamphlet did not convince residents to accept the defeat, the leaders of the 
agricultural cooperative once again circulated another pamphlet with copies of Imperial Rescript 
of Surrender in October 1945. The pamphlet was signed by old leaders in São Paulo city who 
had had direct relationship with the Japanese diasporic bureaucracy and employed the Emperor’s 
authority to legitimize their announcement of Japan’s defeat. The pamphlet cited a message from 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan: 
The imperial government and subjects decided to face such an extremely difficult 
situation with the dignity of Japanese nation by respectfully accepting the Emperor’s 
venerable wish addressed in the rescript on 14th August. We homeland government and 
nation who share the same feelings with you greatly expect our compatriots overseas to 
share the same decision that we made.19 
However, this pamphlet caused hardened suspicion and resentment for deniers influenced by 
Shindo Renmei rather than changing their attitude. Agitators of Shindo Renmei claimed that the 
pamphlet was fake, fabricated by unfaithful and anti-patriotic accepters (Mizuno 1955: 155). By 
this time, the antagonism between deniers and accepters has been already entrenched. Since early 
1946, activities of Shindo Renmei became openly active. They sent multiple blackmail letters to 
the leaders of accepters in the agricultural cooperative. In March 1946, a small group of Shindo 
Renmei members assassinated Mizobe, the managing director of the agricultural cooperative 
who circulated the initial pamphlet informing Japan’s defeat. The following April, they sent 
 
19 “Memorandum for the Announcement of the End of War (終戦事情伝達趣意書)” c.1945. MHIJB. 
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bombs to several accepters and injured them (Mizuno 1955: 156-157). The agricultural 
cooperative could not prevent the escalation of violent conflicts in Bastos. 
In contrast to Bastos, historical records about the development of intra-group conflicts 
between accepters and deniers are limited in Registro. However, some evidences suggest that 
some community members believed Japan’s victory personally, and also activists of Shindo 
Renmei visited there to mobilize the Japanese residents. An old Japanese migrant in Registro 
recalled that he met a second-generation Brazilian Nikkei acquaintance in the immediate 
aftermath of the war: “He was in military uniform and found us. He saluted us, saying ‘now I 
came back from the Italian campaign.’ I was really happy to see him back alive. […] But in those 
days, I believed in my own mind that Japan had actually won the war” (quoted in Fukazawa 
2014: 156). Another Japanese migrant remembered, “guys from Shindo Renmei came to Sete 
Barras and Quilombo [peripheral districts of larger Registro] to establish the branches. But they 
failed to close the deal” (quoted in Fukazawa 2014: 157). Unlike Bastos, some Japanese 
migrants’ beliefs in the victory of Japan and the mobilization efforts by Shindo Renmei did not 
culminate into the violent conflicts between deniers and accepters in Registro. The conflicts 
remained latent. 
A noticeable difference between Registro and Bastos is residents’ response to the 
pamphlet that informed Japan’s defeat. In Registro, the agricultural cooperative of Cotia, which 
strengthened its influence over Japanese farmers during the war period, provided community 
members the same pamphlet that was circulated in October 1945 in Bastos (Andoh 1959: 166-
167, Miyao 2003: 62). Unlike Bastos, however, there was no explicit repercussion against the 
leaders of the agricultural cooperative. As suggested above, some residents must not trust the 
pamphlet. However, they neither showed their thoughts openly in the public nor were mobilized 
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by ultra-nationalistic secret societies such as Shindo Renmei. In contrast to Bastos where the 
agricultural cooperative’s legitimacy and control over the members was largely undermined as it 
became unable to deliver club goods to them the after the war, the agricultural cooperative in 
Registro sustained its enforceable authority over the members as it could guarantee the access to 
its distribution network connected to the broader Brazilian domestic market. 
 
Two Pathways of Incorporation into the Brazilian Society in the Aftermath of the Conflicts 
The conflicts between deniers and accepters among Japanese migrants marked the 
dissolution of Japanese diasporic exclaves in Brazil. By the mid-1950s, the conflicts were 
gradually settled by the interventions of Brazilian police. Since then, the Japanese migrants 
started following two major pathways: the transition from diasporic exclave to settlement 
enclave; and the process of individual-based assimilation. 
As we have seen, the transition from a diasporic exclave to a settlement enclave already 
started in the pre-and during-war years in Registro. Bastos also followed this transition process 
after the conflicts calmed down. Japanese migrants in Bastos reorganized agricultural 
cooperative centered on egg farming. They started developing sales networks penetrating into the 
Brazilian domestic market (Mizuno 1955: 149-151). In both places, the Japanese migrants sought 
an upwardly mobile pathway, making the most of the collective advantages of ethnic networks 
and associations (Yasuda 1969, Makabe 1999, Taniguchi 2014). 
In parallel with the transition from a diasporic exclave from a settlement enclave, some 
Japanese migrants started following an individual-based assimilation process as well. In the 
1950s, a considerable number of Japanese migrants in the rural areas started moving to urban 
centers, especially São Paulo city. While the proportion of Japanese migrants living in São Paulo 
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city had never exceeded 10% until the end of the war, it increased to 24% in 1958 (Census 
Committee for the Japanese Migrants in Brazil 1964, vol.2: 6, 426-427). They sent their children 
to Brazilian educational institutions and helped them to incorporate into the mainstream middle-
class (Maeyama 1973, 1990). Those in the rural regions also pursued the individual-based 
assimilation. Especially, successful farmers developed their own distribution network and did not 
necessitate that of agricultural cooperatives anymore. In the pre-war period, as we saw in the 
cases of Bastos and Registro above, almost all Japanese farmers had affiliation in Japanese 
associations. However, those affiliated with the associations decreased to 41% among 
agriculturalists and 31% among non-agriculturalists in 1958 (Census Committee for the Japanese 
Migrants in Brazil 1964, vol.2: 314, Cardoso 1995: 126). 
Even in Registro, where the agricultural cooperative once played a significant role to 
expand the distribution network connected to the broader Brazilian domestic market, the 
membership of agricultural cooperative declined as farmers eventually developed their own 
distribution network. In the mid-1970s, the number of memberships in the agricultural 
cooperative of Cotia decreased to one third of that in the war period (Committee for Sixty Years 
History of Registro 1978: 106). 
Also in Bastos, the memberships in agricultural cooperatives declined. The direct cause 
of the decline is the hyperinflation in the 1980s. The agricultural cooperatives in Bastos could 
not financially sustain themselves (Committee for Eighty Years History of Bastos 2010: 151-
153). Since then, the activities of agricultural cooperatives have never recovered to the former 
level. I did not systematically study the social background of this decline of agricultural 
cooperatives in Bastos after the hyperinflation. Yet, a story of a successful egg farmer, Yasuo, 
suggests growing disadvantages, rather than advantages, of agricultural cooperative especially 
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for successful farmers.20 Yasuo’s family has been running poultry farming since his 
grandfather’s generation. When his grandfather started the business in the early 1950s, he joined 
an agricultural cooperative. However, when Yasuo took over the family business, he left the 
agricultural cooperative. Yasuo told me: 
When the business was still small, the agricultural cooperative gave us advantages. It 
guaranteed us stability in purchase [of chicks and feedstuff] and sales [of eggs]. But when 
the business grew large and when we could develop sales routes by ourselves, the 
membership in the agricultural cooperative became more of burden than benefit, such as 
a commission to the cooperative. Also, when other farmers are not doing good, the 
cooperative covers their debts and even jeopardizes our business in the end.  
Yasuo still holds membership in a Japanese cultural association in Bastos. However, he told me 
that he was feeling bothersome to participate in its activities. 
In the long-run, Japanese migrants and their descendants in Bastos and Registro are 
incorporated into the Brazilian society. Ironically, club goods of the agricultural cooperatives 
deriving from the group cohesion diminished as individual members made a successful 
socioeconomic advancement in both places.21 In this respect, the self-interest hypothesis of 
migrant transnationalism holds true (Portes 2001, Alba and Nee 2003, Waldinger 2015). 
However, Bastos and Registro followed two different paths to reach to the same point in the 
migrant assimilation process. Bastos, which underwent a rapid transition with a structural 
disjuncture between economic and organizational bases, went through the violent conflicts 
 
20  I visited Bastos in June 2017 and had opportunities to listen to his and other Japanese farmers’ life histories. 
21 In this respect, Ostergren documented a parallel decline of transnational ties in the case of highly intensive 
Swedish immigrant community in Minnesota in the late 19th and early 20th centuries (Ostergren 1988). According 
to his account, the transnational ties started declining when the urbanization process, especially new economic 
opportunities opened up by the railroads connecting to the outside of the community, penetrated into the community. 
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among the community members whereas Registro, which made a gradual transition to settlement 
enclave, prevented such violent conflicts.  
 
Conclusion 
The intra-group conflicts among Japanese migrants between deniers and accepters 
occurred in the aftermath of the Pacific War. To explain these violent conflicts, the prior studies 
offer the three interrelated arguments: cultural, organizational, and socioeconomic. However, 
they tend to merge the cultural factor with other factors and overgeneralize the impact of cultural 
factors in the rise of ultra-nationalistic secret societies represented by Shindo Renmei and the 
intra-group conflicts between deniers and accepters among Japanese migrants. As a result, they 
failed to explain the local variations of the conflicts. This deficit becomes clear when comparing 
the two Japanese communities: Bastos and Registro. Bastos and Registro shared the community 
characteristics that the prior studies claimed as the causes of the conflicts. Despite these shared 
characteristics, Shindo Renmei succeeded to mobilize Japanese migrants and eventually the 
intra-group conflicts broke out in Bastos whereas Shindo Renmei failed to do so and the violent 
conflicts did not occur in Registro. 
A significant difference between the two communities was their socioeconomic 
conditions in the pre-war period. In particular, communities’ reliance on the exclave economy 
matters to the subsequent dissolution of diasporic exclave in the two places: Bastos underwent a 
rapid dissolution of diasporic exclave whereas Registro experienced a gradual transition from 
diasporic exclave to settlement enclave. 
Both Bastos and Registro maintained intensive diasporic exclaves in the pre-war period, 
supported by the Japanese diasporic bureaucracy. However, the sudden retreat of the diasporic 
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bureaucracy affected the two communities differently. While the retreat destabilized Bastos’ 
exclave economy that relied on cotton export to Japan, it did not negatively affect Registro’s 
economy because Registro developed a variegated economy oriented towards the broader 
Brazilian domestic market. Correspondingly, the legitimacy of agricultural cooperatives over the 
community members, which was largely derived from its capacity to provide the community 
members club goods best represented by the access to the distribution network of agricultural 
products, declined in Bastos whereas it was sustained in Registro. When the news of Japan’s 
defeat reached both communities, the agricultural cooperative in Bastos failed to keep the 
community members from the influence of Shindo Renmei’s mobilization. The agricultural 
cooperative in Registro, in contrast, succeeded. 
The Japanese diasporic exclaves started dissolving when the diasporic bureaucracy 
retreated from Brazil. After the conflicts between deniers and accepters were settled to a large 
extent, they started moving to urban centers and pursuing an upwardly mobile incorporation into 
the Brazilian mainstream. Even those who stayed in the countryside lost pressing interests in 
ethnic associational activities as they achieved socio-economic success. In the long run, the 
Japanese migrants’ interests shifted from the homeland to the host society. However, two 
different unfolding processes of the intra-group conflicts in Bastos and Registro indicate that 
there are multiple pathways leading to a same point in the process of migrant incorporation, 
depending on the contextual configuration preceding to the dissolution of diasporic exclave. 
Bastos, which experienced a rapid erosion of its diasporic exclave, had to pay a big price in the 
form of violent conflicts whereas Registro, which made a gradual transition to settlement 




UPWARDLY MOBILE RETURN AND OTHER PATHWAYS INTO EARLY ADULTHOOD: 





This chapter analyzes the divergent life trajectories of four Japanese Brazilian youths in Japan. 
Their pathways to early adulthood diverged including a shallow slope incorporation into the 
working-class life in Japan and an upwardly mobile return to Brazil. The prior theoretical 
perspectives – migrant transnationalism, institutionalism, and cultural approaches – cannot fully 
explicate such divergent trajectories. One shortcoming is the static understanding of their agency. 
I argue that the school contexts and the migrant bargain channel the development of Nikkei youths’ 
agency conceptualized as the dynamic relationship between their social belonging and possible 
self. Their agency in turn provides a decision framework for the choices ahead and their pathways 
diverge in the transition to early adulthood. 
 
Introduction 
Yukari, Taina, Stella, and João were the children of Brazilian Nikkei ethnic return 
migrants in Japan. They share most socioeconomic and family backgrounds: all of their parents 
work in an unstable labor sector and are not fluent in Japanese. Nonetheless, their pathways into 
early adulthood widely diverged (see Figure 3-1). Yukari is an upwardly mobile bicultural 
striver. She started her school career at a Brazilian school but switched to the Japanese school 
system and is now a college student in Japan. Taina is a transnational straight-arrow, whose 
constant enrollment in the Brazilian school helped her to pursue an upwardly mobile return to 
Brazil. Both Stella and João switched from Japanese to Brazilian schools in childhood. 
Nevertheless, their pathways to early adulthood diverged. Stella is a transnational second-
chancer, whose factory experience made her seek an upwardly mobile return to Brazil. João is a 
bicultural shallow-sloper (Smith 2008), who holds a modest job at a factory in Japan. 
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Figure 3-1: Divergent Life Trajectories of the Four Nikkei Youths in Japan
 
 
Most theories of immigrant assimilation presume migrants arrive at a destination country 
with a sojourner mentality but gradually assimilate themselves into the host society. However, 
the story may deviate from this typical assimilation pattern when the sojourner mentality finds an 
institutional anchor that connects it to the homelands. In this respect, Brazilian Nikkeis in Japan 
are a prominent case because Brazilian schools work as such an institutional anchor that helps 
them to retain the transnational engagement with the homeland, and create the possibility of 
upward mobile return migration to Brazil among the children of Nikkei raised in Japan.1 Those 
schools were initially formed by Brazilian Nikkei parents’ initiatives in the mid-1990s in the 
regions where they are concentrated such as the Tokai region (see Appendix A). Since the early 
2000s, the Brazilian government started accrediting them under the Brazilian educational system. 
 
1 Brazilian Nikkeis in Japan are also a case of ethnic return migration (Joppke 2005, Tsuda 2009). Although the 
Japanese immigration regime treats them as Japanese descendants and offers a special residential visa status, they 
are culturally Brazilian (Tsuda 2003). 
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Some Brazilian Nikkei parents send their children to Brazilian schools in Japan in hoping 
eventual return to Brazil. Yet the story does not end here. As João’s case demonstrates, not all 
graduates of Brazilian schools in Japan return to Brazil but a sizable portion of them stay in 
Japan. In addition, there are Brazilian Nikkei youths who are enrolled in Japanese schools like 
Yukari. In sum, the Nikkei youths in Japan demonstrate a wide range of life trajectories 
including a shallow slope incorporation into the working-class life in Japan and an upwardly 
mobile return to Brazil. How does the upwardly mobile return to Brazil grow to be a practically 
achievable option to young Brazilian Nikkeis in Japan? Why it is feasible for some youths and 
not for others? What make some Nikkei youths choose to settle in Japan? More broadly, what 
mechanisms diversify their life trajectories: some more transnational whereas others more 
incorporative? I argue that we can understand these divergent life paths by examining how the 
school context, the migrant bargain, and migrant youths’ agency interact and shape their choices 
ahead to early adulthood. 
The case of Nikkei youths in Japan may be exceptional in that few migrant groups have 
an exclave institution connected to the sending country (Heisler 1984, 1985) such as Brazilian 
schools, and only a minority of Nikkei youths is enrolled in Brazilian schools in Japan.2 
Nevertheless, the Nikkei case is strategic and sociologically important for analyzing migrant 
youths’ diverging life trajectories for two reasons. First, it offers an upwardly mobile return 
pathway to the homelands that some Nikkei youths actually takes. This social mobility pattern 
has not been documented in the existent literature on the second-generation migrants that focuses 
 
2 There were 72 Brazilian schools with roughly 4,700 students in Japan (Kojima 2013: 93, Li and Shibuya 2015: 51) 
in 2011. In contrast, the Japanese National Census of 2010 registered 27,233 Brazilians in the 5-19 years old range. 
Given these numbers, it is estimated that about 18% of Brazilian youths in Japan are enrolled in Brazilian schools. 
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on their socioeconomic mobility only within the host societies.3 Second, in addition to the 
upwardly mobile return pathway, young Brazilian Nikkeis in Japan demonstrate various patterns 
of social mobility including a shallow slope incorporation into the working-class life in Japan 
and an upwardly mobile incorporation into the Japanese mainstream. Given these wide variations 
of life pathways into early adulthood, none of prior theoretical perspectives systematically 
explain them. Guided by the gap between the prior theoretical predictions and empirical reality 
of Brazilian youths in Japan, this chapter elaborates the micro-agency side of the interactive 
process approach to migrant transnationalism. It underscores interactions between the school 
context, the migrant bargain, and the Nikkei youths’ agency defined as the dynamic relationship 
between their social belonging and possible self. The Nikkei youths in Japan develop varying 
social belonging, interacting with the school context and the migrant bargain. As they progress 
through adolescence, their social belonging guides their decisions in relation to multiple possible 
selves ahead to early adulthood. As a result, their pathways diverge widely. 
Based on biographical and comparative analytical logics (Heimer 2001, Smith 2014), this 
chapter compares four Nikkei youths’ life trajectories – Taina, Yukari, Stella, and João – in order 
to make sense of their varied trajectories. I organize them into two sets of paired comparison: 
Taina and Yukari, and Stella and João. My case analyses follow two steps. First, the comparison 
of Taina and Yukari mainly analyzes the impact of different school context between Japanese 
and Brazilian schools and the migrant bargain consistent with each school context on the 
development of their agency. The school difference, however, does not fully explain cross-
border divergence of Brazilian school graduates’ pathways. Second, the comparison of Stella and 
 
3 To name a few, Portes and Rumbaut 2001, Suárez-Orozco and Suárez-Orozco 2001, Kasinitz et al. 2002, Suárez-
Orozco, Suárez-Orozco, and Todorova. 2008, Telles, Ortiz, and Moore 2009, Louie 2012, Crul, Schneider, and Lelie 
2012, Lee and Zhou 2015, and Gonzales 2016. 
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João analyzes how different migrant bargains affect their agency within the same Brazilian 
school context. 
In the following pages, first, I examine the fit between the prior theories on assimilation 
and transnationalism of the second-generation migrants and the case of Nikkei youths in Japan. 
Second, I sketch out how school context sorts the Nikkei youths into different social mobility 
tracks and how the migrant bargain affects the development of their social belonging. And third, 
I show how their agency guides the decisions leading up to early adulthood by analyzing the four 
Nikkei youths’ life trajectories. 
 
The Nikkei Youths in Japan as an Inconvenient Key Case for Theories of Assimilation and 
Transnationalism 
To understand migrant youths’ diverging pathways, there are three influential theoretical 
approaches: migrant transnationalism, and institutionalism, and neo-cultural approaches. The 
prior studies have heatedly debated about the second-generation migrants’ incorporation paths 
into host societies on the one hand and their engagement with cross-border practices on the other. 
However, it is uncommon that the two branches of research have a theoretical dialogue with each 
other. A unique characteristic of Nikkei youths in Japan is that they demonstrate a wide variety 
of life trajectories ranging from the incorporation into Japanese society to the cross-border return 
to Brazil. Below I examine how the three existent perspectives fail to explain these divergences 
and demonstrate how my interactive process framework can do so in the next section. 
 
1) Migrant Transnationalism 
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Studies on migrant transnationalism have discussed the inter-generational succession of 
transnational ties with the homelands. Major studies document that migrants’ cross-border ties 
decline as the center of their social networks shift from the homelands to the host societies over 
time, and thus they are barely transmitted to the subsequent generations (Portes 2001, Kasinitz et 
al. 2002, Levitt and Waters 2002, Rumbaut 2002, Alba and Nee 2003, Waldinger 2015). This 
tendency is consistent with Yukari and João’s settlement pathways among the four primary cases 
of this study. However, the general decline of transnational ties among the second generation 
migrants does not account for why some young Nikkeis like Taina and Stella choose a return 
pathway to Brazil despite that they have spent almost their entire lives in Japan. 
 
2) Institutionalism 
First, institutionalist argument draws attention to the effect of institutional contexts such 
as schooling system and labor market on their incorporation pattern (Faist 1995, Crul and 
Vermeulen 2003, Crul and Schneider 2010, Crul 2013, Alba and Foner 2015). Second, it also 
points to the effect of coethnic associations on their transnational ties. Building on the notion of 
institutional completeness (Breton 1964), it argues that the children of migrants are more likely 
to engage in transnational practices when they contain themselves in coethnic associations such 
as ethnic schools (Levitt 2002, Brubaker et al. 2006: ch.9, Kim 2016: ch.2). In sum, 
institutionalism underlines the effect of institutional contexts on migrant children’s life 
trajectories and explain their transnational ties as well. 
Institutionalism may explain the general bifurcating patterns between Brazilian Nikkei 
youths in different school systems: Japanese and Brazilian schools. Brazilian schools in Japan 
institutionally cultivate an upwardly mobile return option for their students by preparing them for 
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higher education in Brazil (Haino 2005, Kojima 2013, LeBaron von Baeyer 2015: ch.5, 
Yamamoto 2016: ch.3). In contrast, Nikkei youths enrolled in Japanese school system see such 
an option neither desirable nor achievable. However, institutionalism does not account for 
variations among the graduates of Brazilian schools. Among the three Brazilian school graduates 
in this study, João chose to stay in Japan despite his enrollment in Brazilian school while Taina 
and Stella chose to return to Brazil. 
 
3) Neo-cultural Approaches 
Unlike classical culturalists who tend to essentialize culture inherent to an ethno-racial 
group, neo-culturalists focus on the mechanism by which varying cultures of mobility emerge 
out of relevant contexts. The most prominent is segmented assimilation theory. It highlights the 
impact of inter-generational acculturation patterns, which are shaped by context of reception, 
parents’ human capital, and community coherence, on the social mobility of the children: an 
upward assimilation into the mainstream through consonant acculturation; another upward path 
via selective acculturation; and a downwardly mobile path to the marginalized social strata via 
dissonant acculturation (Portes and Zhou 1993, Zhou 1997, Portes and Rumbaut 2001). Another 
study addresses the varying success frame across migrant groups (Zhou et al. 2008, Lee and 
Zhou 2014, 2015). Depending on immigrant selectivity and ethnic resources, migrant groups 
develop varying understandings of success and strategies with which their children thrive. As a 
result, social mobility patterns of the children of migrants diverge at the intergroup level. In sum, 
the neo-cultural approaches pay attention to the formative mechanism of cultures of mobility that 
motivate the children of migrants to different pathways. 
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The neo-cultural approaches may predict that the Nikkei youths in Japan follow a 
downwardly mobile pathway with a modest understanding of success. Although most of the first-
generation Brazilian migrants came to Japan with a special residential visa designed for the 
Nikkei, the segmented labor market pushed them into unstable labor sectors controlled by labor 
brokers (Higuchi and Tanno 2003, Tsuda and Cornelius 2004). The job instability hinders them 
from forming a coethnic community with fruitful social capital and ethnic resources (Kajita et al. 
2005, Takenoshita 2013). Additionally, the first-generation Brazilian Nikkeis are with limited 
Japanese fluency in general. These group characteristics predict Nikkei youths’ downward or 
horizontal assimilation. In fact, they are among the lowest educational achievement migrant 
groups in Japan (Higuchi and Inaba 2018). Furthermore, as we will see later, my informants who 
took shallow slope or horizontal assimilation into the Japanese society viewed their pathways as 
success compared to their parents. 
The neo-cultural approaches, however, have two limits to explain the Brazilian Nikkei 
youths in this study. First, inasmuch as they focus on intergroup variations in the culture of 
mobility, they do not explicate the intragroup divergence of the four Nikkei youths’ life 
trajectories despite their shared socioeconomic and family chrematistics. Second, and more 
importantly, they do not take into account the variability of Nikkei youths’ agency over time. 
They posit that a young migrant sticks to a certain culture of (either upward or downward) 
mobility over the entire life course once he or she adapts to it in childhood (Smith 2008, 2014). 
However, as we will see later, Nikkei youths’ agency changes dynamically over the life course. 
 
In short, none of the three theoretical approaches account for the full range of the four 
Nikkei youths’ diverging pathways in this study. The case of Brazilian Nikkei youths in Japan 
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offers an inconvenient puzzle to the prior approaches to the children of migrants. One shared 
shortcoming is the static understanding of migrant youths’ agency. They treat the agency as a 
“homunculus” (Abbott 2016: 246, see also Douglas and Nay 1998) or a mere physiological 
medium that constantly translate the causal factors claimed by the prior approaches (either the 
center of social networks, institutional contexts, or cultures of mobility) into a certain outcome. 
The prior approaches presume that as if the agency was fully formed from the inception and does 
not vary across persons in different context or within the same person over time. However, our 
human agency is not a fixed entity but a process changing through time, reflecting on the past 
and projecting on the future in relation to the present (Emirbayer and Mische 1998, McAdams 
2013, Abbott 2016). It varies as individuals take different life trajectories and build different 
sense of the self. Especially, the youth evolves a sense of the self during the adolescence period 
(Erikson 1968, Rindfuss 1991, Shanahan 2000). Thus, migrant youths with different sense of the 
self may respond differently even in the same contextual condition. While all the claimed factors 
matter in the divergence mechanism of the four Nikkei youths’ trajectories in this study, they do 
so in relation to migrant youths’ agency changing over time. Below I propose the interactive 
process approach that better explains the wide divergence of the Nikkei youths’ life trajectories 
in this study. 
 
The Nikkei Youths in the Interactive Dynamics: School Context, Migrant Bargain, and 
Processual Agency over the Life Course 
The micro-agency side of the interactive process approach to migrant transnationalism 
underscores the process through which contextual conditions and agency interact with each 
other. For contextual conditions, I specifically pay attention to the school context and the migrant 
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bargain. For agency, I underscore its temporal and evolving nature, which is defined by the 
dynamic relationship between social belonging and possible self. Social belonging represents 
one’s sense of belonging to subcultures. Possible self expresses one’s future self-images. The 
Nikkei youths develop their social belonging, interacting with the school context and the migrant 
bargain, and reflect their sense of self such as a transnational straight-arrow in Brazilian school 
like Taina or a bicultural striver in Japanese school like Yukari. In turn, the varying relationship 
between their social belonging and possible self provides a decision framework for the choices 
ahead to early adulthood with different meaning and weight. Consequently, their pathways 
diverge widely in terms of not only social but also transnational mobility. 
 
1) School context 
The different school context between Japanese and Brazilian schools and their relations 
to labor market institutionally channel Nikkei youths’ life trajectories. Japanese and Brazilian 
school systems are different both in curricula and in their relations to the larger societies. 
Japanese public school system offers a standardized national education for the students. It more 
or less incorporates them into the Japanese society. In contrast, Brazilian schools offer education 
based on Brazilian curriculum. They are designed to help the students to go back and 
reincorporate themselves into the Brazilian society. 
As Brazilian Nikkei youths progress from childhood to adolescence, the institutional 
bifurcation effect becomes salient. During childhood period, the Nikkei youths can transfer 
between the two school systems as Yukari, Stella, and João demonstrate. However, high school 
entrance puts an end to this transferability. In the Japanese school system, compulsory education 
finishes at the lower secondary education level. To move up to upper secondary education, 
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students have to take admission exams (usually at the age of 15). This stands as a barrier for the 
students in Brazilian schools because they are not prepared to take the Japanese admission 
exams. Once Nikkei youths pass over the high school entrance age, it becomes extremely hard to 
move across the institutional wall between the two school systems. In fact, both Flora and Aline, 
the two young Nikkeis who appeared in the opening anecdotes in the very beginning of this 
dissertation, affirmed the difficulty to transfer from Brazilian to Japanese school. Flora came to 
Japan at age of 14. To her, Brazilian school was the only possible option because she was not 
prepared to take Japanese high school admission exams in a year: “I had no Japanese proficiency 
to enter a Japanese [high] school.” Similarly, Aline faced the difficulty of changing school. She 
came to Japan at age of nine. Her parents put her in Brazilian school with the plan to return in 
two years. However, their stay in Japan prolonged. Aline once considered to transfer to Japanese 
school at the middle school age when she found her parents had not prepared for the return to 
Brazil. However, she gave up the transfer: “those [young Nikkeis] in the Japanese school speak 
Japanese very well because they study there since the beginning, but I didn’t. […] And it’s very 
difficult [to pass the admission exam] and then I ended up staying in Brazilian school.” 
This bifurcation of school tracks after high school is consequential for Nikkei youths’ 
pathways to early adulthood. Linguistic and academic proficiency that students cultivate through 
each school system is of particular importance, not to mention school credentials. For Nikkei 
students in Japanese schools, two pathways are salient: some move up to Japanese higher 
education; others work in service or manufacturing industries. In general, those who go up to 
higher education are limited compared to the native Japanese students largely due to the shortage 
of human and social capital (Takenoshita et al. 2013, Higuchi and Inaba 2018). Nevertheless, as 
we will see in Yukari’s case, some Nikkei students cultivate academic motivation and 
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competence by relying on extra-family mentorship (For the role of the extra mentorship for 
disadvantaged migrant children, see Stanton-Salazar 2001, Smith 2008b, Louie 2012). On the 
other hand, the pathway to Brazilian universities is practically unachievable to them. In fact, 
none of my nine informants who were in Japanese school system even imagined such a return 
pathway to Brazil. 
In contrast, most Nikkei students in Brazilian schools do not see the pathway to Japanese 
higher education as achievable. This is because Brazilian schools do not offer them academic 
and linguistic resources to pass the Japanese university exams. Instead, two pathways are salient: 
incorporation into unstable labor sectors in Japan; and upwardly mobile return to Brazil. There is 
no systematic statistical data available. But in 2016, the owner of a large Brazilian school group 
with over 1,200 student enrollments, mentioned that roughly a half of their graduates goes back 
to Brazil to prepare for the higher education and the other half works as haken workers (unskilled 
temporary workers controlled by labor brokers) and in other equivalent labor sectors in Japan.4 
In contrast, those graduates who go to Japanese higher education including vocational schools 
are only 1%. 
However, the school context alone does not determine Nikkei youths’ pathways. First, it 
does not account for why some Brazilian school students like João stay in Japan whereas others 
return to Brazil. Second, there is more than one trajectory that leads to a certain pathway. For 
instance, Stella’s return to Brazil is such an in-between trajectory. Stella had once worked as a 
haken worker but eventually returned to Brazil. School context tells little about Nikkei youths’ 
agency that makes such track changes. 
 
 
4 A principal of another middle-size Brazilian school tole me a bit different distribution in 2016: approximately 35 to 
40% of their graduates go back to Brazil and the rest stays in Japan. 
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2) Incorporative and transnational migrant bargain 
Combined with the school context, the migrant bargain — that children make up parents’ 
sacrifice by meeting their expectation — helps some children of migrants to achieve upward 
social mobility despite the disadvantageous socioeconomic and family backgrounds (Suarez-
Orozco and Suarez-Orozco 2001, Smith 2006, 2008, Suarez-Orozco, et al. 2008, Zhou et al. 
2008, Louie 2012, Lee and Zhou 2015). This insight is gained predominantly from the US 
context and the literature presumes that both migrant parents and children together aim at success 
in the host society.5 However, it is not always the case that they share the same goal of migrant 
bargain. Especially in the case of the Nikkei youths in Japan, where Brazilian schools are one of 
educational options, the goal of migrant bargain can be bidirectional: either children’s 
incorporation into the Japanese society or their return to Brazil. Thus, I posit two orientations of 
migrant bargain goal: incorporative and transnational. 
 










incorporative incorporative Japanese school upward mobility in Japan 
Congruent 
transnational 
transnational transnational Brazilian school upward return to Brazil 
Incongruent 
transnational 




transnational incorporative Brazilian school child’s upward mobility in 




5 Perhaps for this reason, the existent literature uses the term “immigrant bargain.” Instead, I use “migrant bargain” 
to avoid the teleological connotation that the term “immigrant” implies. 
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Table 3-1 represents varying combined effect of parents’ and child’s orientations of 
migrant bargain and the school context on the child’s pathways.6 The consonant incorporative 
effect: the child takes an upwardly mobile pathway in Japan when a Nikkei youth keeps 
incorporative bargain with the parents in the Japanese school context. The consonant 
transnational effect: the child takes an upward return to Brazil when a Nikkei youth keeps the 
transnational bargain in the Brazilian school context. The dissonant transnational effect: the 
child’s upward return to Brazil is impeded when the parents aim at the incorporative goal while 
the child holds a transnational orientation in the Japanese school context. The dissonant 
incorporative effect: the child’s upward mobility in Japan is impeded when the parents aim at the 
transnational goal while the child has an incorporative orientation in the Brazilian school context. 
Certainly, consonant and dissonant effects of the migrant bargain conceptually overlap 
with two inter-generational acculturation types — consonant and dissonant — in the segmented 
assimilation model. However, the effect of the migrant bargain changes over time whereas the 
segmented assimilation model assumes that the effect of inter-generational acculturation endures 
once set in place. A consonant transnational or incorporative effect at one time can turn to be 
dissonant at another time and vice versa. As noted above, the Nikkei youths can change the 
school context at least by the beginning of high school. Furthermore, both sides of migrant 
bargain can also change. For one thing, the parents’ orientation may change because most of 
them came to Japan as a target earner and their migration plan oscillates between settlement and 
return (Tsuda 1999a, Yamanaka 2000). For another, the children’s orientation also can change 
because they may have different future self-image at different times over the life course. A 
 
6 Three binary parameters mechanically generate eight combinations in total. I exempted four types because it is 
unlikely that the parents send their child to the school incompatible with their orientation of migrant bargain at least 
initially. 
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Nikkei child who envisions his or her future in Brazil in early childhood may come to wish his or 
her career in Japan in adolescence. This is because the children of migrants develop their agency 
over time. 
 
3) Migrant youths’ agency as the dynamic relationship between social belonging and possible 
self 
I conceptualize the Brazilian Nikkei youths’ agency as the dynamic relationship between 
social belonging and possible self. Social belonging is one’s sense of belonging to multiple 
subcultures, which in turn cues possible selves – representations of the self in the future (Markus 
and Nurius 1986) – with different meanings and weights. The concept of social identity has often 
been employed to grasp one’s agency. However, it tends to unnecessarily imply uniqueness and 
stability albeit human agency is not fixed on a single social identity (Brubaker and Cooper 2004). 
Instead, the notion of social belonging can shed light on the multiplicity and variability of Nikkei 
youths’ agency. The Nikkei youths can simultaneously belong to multiple subcultures to varying 
degrees. Furthermore, one’s social belonging changes as one progresses through the life course. 
In the transition to early adulthood, Nikkei youths’ social belonging provides a decision 
framework to choose a certain pathway among multiple possible selves. I operationalize these 
dynamics by three steps. First, I identify four subcultures relevant to the Nikkei youths in Japan. 
Second, I consider one’s social belonging as a configuration of multiple subcultures. Third, I 
conceptualize the manner by which the Nikkei youths choose a certain pathway to early 
adulthood as the relationship between their social belonging and possible self. 
 
Four subcultures in the context of Brazilian Nikkei youths in Japan 
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Four subcultures are particularly relevant to the Nikkei youth in Japan: middle-class 
mainstream, bicultural striver, Brazilian haken, and transnational striver. One’s social belonging 
emerges from the contexts in which one is embedded. Thus, these subcultures point to idealized 
combinations among the school context, the migrant bargain, and the pathways to which the 
Nikkei youths can aspire. Below I characterize the four subcultures by six traits: migrant bargain, 
school, language, friend and social networks, work, and ethnic identity (see Table 3-2). 
 
Table 3-2: Four Subcultures and Their Traits in Six Social Domains for Brazilian Nikkei Youths 
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incorporative 
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transnational bargain 
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Career job in the 
host society 
Career job either in 
the host society or 
ethnic enclave 
unskilled job in the 
haken labor market 






bicultural identity Racialized ethnic 
identity associated 






Middle-class mainstream: When a child keeps the incorporative migrant bargain with the 
parents, she is expected to achieve upward mobility in the host society. Both parents and the 
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child learn the language and culture of host country and eventually abandon those of their 
homelands. The child studies on par with the native peers and make friends with them. As the 
child succeed academically through mainstream institutions and eventually become middle-class, 
her ethnic salience becomes attenuated. 
Bicultural striver: When a child keeps the incorporative migrant bargain with the help of 
external-family supports, it can help him to attain upward mobility in the host society without 
stripping off the parents’ language and culture even if parents’ incorporative orientation of 
migrant bargain is weak or absent. The child finishes high school and above, and gets a career. 
He maintains both native and coethnic friends and display a bicultural identity. 
Brazilian haken: Segmented assimilation model associates the downward mobility 
pathway with the rainbow underclass, all too few members of which engage with work (Wilson 
1996, Waldinger and Feliciano 2004). Brazilian haken (unskilled temporary job controlled by 
labor brokers) addresses an ethnicized working class pathway that offers a living wage but out of 
which it is difficult to advance and the sense of entrapment. Luis, a young Nikkei informant who 
works as a haken worker put it as follows: “We Brazilians are entrapped in the haken loop. It is 
inherited from parents to sons and daughters… That’s our life in Japan.” When a child fails to 
hold up her end of the migrant bargain (either incorporative or transnational), she is predicted to 
follow a parallel, if not downward, mobility pathway to the haken labor market where Brazilian 
Nikkei workers are disproportionately concentrated. The parents do not learn host society’s 
language and culture and fail to monitor the child. The child also fails academically at school and 
often result in school drop-out. She makes friends with those sharing the same subculture. She 
gets an unskilled haken job and perceive her ethnic identity in relation to the haken labor. 
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Transnational striver: When a child keeps the transnational migrant bargain with the 
parents, he is likely to take an upwardly mobile return path to the parents’ homeland. The 
migrant family utilizes the exclave institutions such as ethnic schools to maintain children’s 
language and cultural understanding of the homeland. Their social networks do not extend 
beyond the coethnic networks and those in the home country. The child seeks a career in the 
homeland instead of the host country. His national identity is that of homeland. 
These subcultures are not mutually exclusive. The Nikkei youths, like everyone else, can 
belong to several subcultures simultaneously. For instance, a Nikkei youth may feel belong to 
Brazilian haken and bicultural striver simultaneously because he is motivated to study hard with 
the extra mentorship even while being exposed to the oppositional subculture at school. Another 
Nikkei youth may find her social belonging both in transnational striver and Brazilian haken as 
she is enrolled in Brazilian school without a strong motivation to return to Brazil. Thus, I will 
look at which configuration of subcultures becomes predominant at different periods in the life 
course. 
 
Possible selves in relation to social belonging 
Yet, Nikkei youths’ social belonging does not directly determine the pathway they take 
because they also possess multiple possible selves that inform future pathways. Psychology 
literature points out that we take action for achieving a certain future self only when certain 
conditions are met (For detailed review, see Oyserman and James 2009, 2011). I focus on two 
conditions relevant and significant to the current study: desirability drawn from balanced 
formation of positive and negative possible selves; and achievability derived from the connection 
between the current sense of social belonging and future possible selves. 
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First, when an individual develops both positively desirable and negatively undesirable 
possible selves, one is likely to achieve the desirable self. Certainly, to have a desirable self is the 
prerequisite for its realization. However, such a desirable self alone is not enough to sustain 
one’s motivation. An undesirable possible self of which one is afraid is also needed. For 
instance, when a Nikkei youth wishes to be a college student in Japan, such a desirable self may 
remain just as a whimsical dream without an undesirable self, for example a haken worker, that 
motivates him to avoid it and make the desirable one real. 
Second, a desirable possible self must be achievable, and an undesirable possible self 
must be avoidable. Otherwise, an individual is not motivated to pursue the desirable possible self 
and/or to avoid the undesirable possible self. For instance, when a Nikkei youth views becoming 
a lawyer in Brazil as unachievable, she would not pursue such a possible self even if it is 
desirable. Similarly, when a Nikkei youth sees a future as a haken worker as inevitable, he would 
not dare make effort to avoid it even if it is undesirable. 
Desirability and achievability (and avoidability) of possible selves are all relative to one’s 
social belonging. Thus, the same pathway of upward return to Brazil, for instance, means 
different things to Nikkei youths with different configuration of social belonging. It can mean a 
desirable and achievable pathway to a Nikkei youth who studies in Brazilian school with a strong 
sense of transnational striver. The same pathway can mean an unachievable and even undesirable 
pathway to another Nikkei youth who studies in Japanese school and feels belong to middle-class 
mainstream and bicultural striver. Likewise, a haken job may appear inevitable to a Brazilian 
school student who does not find her social belonging in transnational striver and bicultural 
striver. Rather, the same student may convince herself that a haken job is more desirable than 
returning to Brazil only with a Brazilian high school diploma. In this way, Nikkei youths’ social 
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belonging offers a decision framework with which they judge which possible selves are 
desirable, undesirable, achievable, or inevitable. 
In sum, The Nikkei youths in Japan develop the different social belonging, interacting 
with the school context and the migrant bargain over time. In the transition to early adulthood, 
they choose a certain pathway among multiple possible selves, each of which has a different 
weight and meaning in relation to their social belonging. As a result, Nikkei youths’ life 
trajectories diverge widely. 
 
Four Nikkei Youths and Their Diverging Pathways 
This section compares life trajectories of four Nikkei youths in Japan: Taina, Yukari, 
Stella, and João. While they share most socioeconomic and family backgrounds in common, 
their life trajectories significantly diverged at early adulthood. To highlight how the school 
context and the migrant bargain affect the development of their social belonging and how it 
guides their choice in the transition to early adulthood, I present the four cases in two coupled 
comparisons: 1) Taina and Yukari, and 2) Stella and João. The first comparison of Taina and 
Yukari analyzes how Japanese and Brazilian school contexts with the consistent migrant bargain 
respectively affect their agency. The second comparison of Stella and João analyzes diverging 
choices within the same Brazilian school context, focusing on the different migrant bargains, 
especially the timing of dissonance: Stella chose to return to Brazil whereas João chose to stay in 
Japan. 
 
1) Taina and Yukari: Institutionally Channeled Life Trajectories in Contrast 
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Taina and Yukari’ cases are largely predictable from the perspective of institutionalism. 
Both of them have been in Japan for almost their entire lives, and their parents’ socioeconomic 
and cultural backgrounds are similar, i.e., factory workers with weak Japanese fluency. However, 
Taina returned to Brazil to take university entrance exam whereas Yukari is studying in a 
Japanese college. They differ in an important aspect: Taina graduated from Brazilian school in 
Japan whereas Yukari graduated from Japanese high school. 
 
Taina, a transnational straight-arrow 
Taina came to Japan at age of three with her parents. Since then, she has been in Japan 
for almost her entire life. Initially, her parents planned to stay and work for a few years and then 
go back to Brazil. Therefore, they put Taina in a Brazilian child-care program soon after they 
arrived Japan. Taina moved up to elementary, middle, and high school section of the Brazilian 
school and returned to Brazil upon the graduation. Taina’s life trajectory can be characterized as 
a transnational straight-arrow in developing her sense of transnational striver predominantly (see 
Figure 3-1 above). 
Taina's enrollment in Brazilian school has curved the scope of her social networks. In 
stark contrast to Taina’s immersion in coethnic social networks centered around her Brazilian 
school, she has not developed meaningful social connections with Japanese natives. Throughout 
her almost life-long settlement in Japan, Brazilian school was the only educational institution 
that Tania has been enrolled. She has not had Japanese friends. “All my friends are Brazilians. I 
know some Japanese, no, actually two outside the school. I am taking a private English lesson 
and they are with me. But we don’t talk so much. And also, I don’t understand what they are 
talking about.” When she is in need of communicating with the Japanese, she relies on other 
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Brazilian friends. Although her Japanese fluency was limited, she worked at a fast food 
restaurant after school. I wondered how she managed to work with such limited Japanese 
fluency. Taina replied, “many [Brazilian] friends are working there. So, I don’t need to talk to 
Japanese staff. They [her Brazilian peers] help me.” Encompassed by social relations 
predominantly centered on the Brazilian school, Taina’s social world in Japan was enclosed in 
the Brazilian institutional exclave.7 
While Taina’s family stayed in Japan unexpectedly longer than they initially planned, she 
held up her end of the transnational migrant bargain well. Taina’s mother has always encouraged 
Taina and her older sister to keep studying and achieve their goal in Brazil. While Taina’s 
mother did not want her daughters to stay in Japan: “I decided to make my daughters study in 
Brazil because I didn’t want them working in the factory.” Taina’s mother was afraid of her 
daughters working in the factory as a haken worker like herself. Her anxiety was reflected in 
Taina’s understanding of factory work in Japan. Contrasting herself with other Brazilian youths 
working in factories, Taina said, “they are just stuck by money at hand, they are not doing what 
they like. I don’t like to be like them. I want to do what I really like.” She regarded the haken 
pathway as an option that would rather hamper her ambition and should be avoided. 
Academically and linguistically, the advantage of returning to Brazil was clear to Taina. 
Teachers in her school assessed that Taina was one of the brightest students in the school. She 
has never fallen from the top grade of the cohort. Taina liked studying: “I think I like everything 
[subjects] but I like biology the most,” and she had a dream to be a doctor in the future. With her 
good grades at school and her language dominance in Portuguese, Taina viewed universities in 
Brail as the most desirable and achievable option: “Because of my language, studying in 
 
7 This experience is not unique to Taina. For the students in Brazilian school, especially for those with weak 
Japanese fluency, it is common not to develop meaningful relationship with Japanese people. 
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Brazilian university is much easier [than studying in anywhere else]. I know it is difficult 
because medical schools are very competitive. So, I have to study a lot.” In addition, her older 
sister’s return to Brazil and her confidence in academic study alleviated Taina’s anxiety about 
her new life in Brazil, where she had never been to since she was three years old: “I am anxious 
a bit if I can adapt to Brazil. But my sister told me about that [life in Brazil]. Also, study 
materials mustn’t be different from what I have studied [in her school]. So, I am not that 
anxious.” In contrast, Taina did not imagine herself studying in Japanese university: “It must be 
cool. But because I don’t speak Japanese, Japanese universities are difficult to me. I haven’t 
considered such an option.” She viewed the upwardly mobile path through higher education in 
Japan simply unachievable if not desirable. Now, she is preparing for university entrance exams, 
living with her older sister in the state of Paraná, Brazil. Among the available future pathways, 
Taina chose the most desirable and achievable one. 
 
Yukari, an upwardly mobile bicultural striver 
Yukari was born in Japan and has never been to Brazil since then. Like Taina, Yukari’s 
parents initially put her in a Brazilian elementary school program with the hope of return. Unlike 
Taina, Yukari made a school track change from Brazilian to Japanese school in childhood. As of 
fall 2018, Yukari was a third-year college student in Japan. Her life trajectory can be 
characterized as an upwardly mobile bicultural striver, a composite of bicultural striver and 
middle-class mainstream (see Figure 3-1 above). 
During the early childhood period, Yukari’s salient social belonging was transnational 
striver. Living in a public housing area with a mixture of Japanese native and foreign-born 
households, Yukari had both Japanese and Brazilian friends when she was a little child. 
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However, Yukari’s contacts with Japanese friends eventually waned when her parents put her in 
a Brazilian elementary school. “All the friends at school talked in Portuguese. So did I naturally. 
[…] When I was in Brazilian school, it was so natural to me. So, I didn’t doubt my situation.” 
Consistent with her parent’s wish of return, Yukari “vaguely sensed” — as she put it — that her 
family would go (back) to Brazil in a few years. 
However, Yukari faced a series of challenges toward the end of her childhood. First, her 
parents got divorced. Second, her mother temporarily lost her job at a factory. Due to these 
contingent events, Yukari’s mother could not afford the tuition of Yukari’s Brazilian school. In 
the late childhood period, Yukari stayed at home, working on workbooks by herself while taking 
care of her little sister, without any schooling.8 During this period, Yukari was exposed to the 
threat of downward mobility: unstable family structure, isolation both from mainstream and 
ethnic institutions and social networks. However, the threat was avoided as Yukari’s mother 
sought help from a Japanese civil society organization. Being worried about Yukari’s 
unschooling, her mother contacted a migrant supporting non-profit organization offering an 
adaptation program to Japanese school. Yukari remembered the moment when her mother 
suggested the non-profit: “It didn’t matter wherever it was if I could study.” Stayed away from 
any learning opportunities for a while, Yukari seized on the opportunity and thrived with the help 
of the mentors in the organization. After attending the organization about one year, Yukari was 
eventually enrolled in a Japanese middle school. 
Yukari was motivated to study and eager to move up to high school when she started the 
middle school. However, Yukari’s lack of Japanese school experience until then worked against 
 
8 Since the Japanese Ministry of Education officially interprets that children without Japanese citizenship are 
exempted from the framework of compulsory education, unschooled foreign children are often not tracked by the 
Japanese school authorities (Sakuma 2006, Miyajima 2014). 
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her. Yukari was worried if she was able enough to pass the Japanese high school entrance exam. 
“I wanted to go to a full-time high school if I could. But as I have been to [Japanese] school only 
one year, my classroom teacher suggested me an evening high school.” Being afraid of failing 
the entrance exam, she followed the teacher’s suggestion. Yukari’s evening high school did not 
provide academically favorable conditions to motivate her studying. Yukari recalled that most of 
her classmates were not academically motivated. She observed: “they [Yukari’s classmates] were 
playing with phones even when teachers were giving lesson. […] I guess they were 
overwhelmed and gave in to such a mood.” It was not uncommon that students dropped out of 
school. Yukari noticed “most of them [dropouts] went to factories … as haken”. In addition, 
teachers at the school were not so much supporting: “I haven’t received specific supports from 
the teachers. […] A career guidance teacher gave me some supports, lending me college 
brochures and workbooks but my classroom teacher was … not supportive, to be honest.” The 
evening high school institutionally exposed her to the haken subculture. 
Looking at Yukari’s exposure to the haken subculture, the neo-culturalist approaches may 
anticipate her downwardly mobile prospect. However, the exposure to the subculture does not 
automatically result in its embrace. Yukari prevented it by extra-family mentorship at the non-
profit organization. Even after entering the evening high school, Yukari was involved in the non-
profit organization as a volunteer: “They helped me when I was in such a hard time. So, I 
thought I could help them [Brazilian children in the organization].” At the nonprofit 
organization, she came to know a handful of other Nikkei Brazilian youths’ “success stories”: 
“Back then, Alice [a senior Nikkei volunteer staff] was also working at [organization name 
deleted], and she told me about how her college life was and that made me want to go there, 
too.” Yukari’s migrant bargain with her mother was not as salient and clear as Taina’s. Yukari’s 
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relationship with her mother does not seem conflictive: “My mom told me I should do what I 
believe.” However, she also told me that her mother often expressed her wish of return to Brazil 
even now. Instead, the extra-family and -school mentorship that Yukari has received from 
mentors, especially Alice, at the non-profit organization, played a significant role in helping her 
to perceive the pathway to college in Japan not only desirable but also achievable, and not to 
embrace the haken subculture as inevitable. Upon graduating from high school, Yukari passed 
the entrance exam for the same college Alice was in. 
As Yukari moved up the Japanese school system, her traits in transnational striver were 
attenuated and she saw a return path to Brazil as unachievable. Although she speaks Portuguese 
fluently, she is less comfortable when she writes and not confident to pass the admission exams 
of Brazilian universities. The attenuation of transnational striver traits is not limited to 
academically successful students like Yukari. Gilberto is such a case of academically modest 
Nikkei students in Japanese school. He came to Japan at the age of ten. He graduated from the 
same evening high school as Yukari. Gilberto is now working as a carpenter in a local builder. 
He described his social belonging as follows: “My dad told me, ‘the factory work in Japan was 
over.’ […] He said we’d be able to earn more in Brazil now. I guess he said so because he didn’t 
finish high school. But I am different [from his father]. So, I feel my place is here [Japan].” In 
the case of Gilberto, neither the migrant incorporative bargain nor the extra mentorship was 
strong. He did not possess the context that relativized his evening school context closely 
associated with the Brazilian haken subculture. Nonetheless, he did not take the pathway to the 
haken labor. He has once worked in a factory when he graduated from the middle school and 
came back to the Japanese school track. When Gilberto entered the evening high school, he told 
me as follows: 
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Until recently, I thought I was fine [with a haken job]. I didn’t mind if I’d do the same 
thing my dad was doing. We ain’t poor, and I’d be fine with that. But as I started 
working, I got aware, ‘Ok, this is what my dad told me… He was right.’ […] I thought I 
wouldn’t have to do such a job if I go to high school and I wouldn’t be like my dad… 
For Gilberto, the main frame of reference is his father’s social position in Japan as a haken 
worker. As a young carpenter, Gilberto perceived that he was doing better than his father and did 
not consider the return to Brazil desirable.  
Now, Yukari is following an upwardly mobile trajectory without stripping off Brazilian 
cultural heritage. As of fall 2018, she was in the third year of the college. She continued 
volunteering at the nonprofit organization. Her current social networks were centered on the 
college, where the majority of her friends were native Japanese. In contrast, Yukari’s contacts 
with high school friends were fading, not to mention friends from the Brazilian elementary 
school. While Yukari felt connected to her relatives who went back to Brazil via social network 
services such as Facebook, she envisioned her future career in Japan. “I feel rather mixed, both 
Brazilian and Japanese if you ask, I feel connected to both.” When I asked Yukari about her 
future plan, she replied that she wanted to build her career making the most of her bilingual skill. 
 
Taina and Yukari’s Agency in Contrast 
Taina and Yukari share two conditions in common: almost life-long settlement in Japan 
and their parents’ socioeconomic status as unskilled haken worker. If migrants’ transnational ties 
decline over time as the major studies on migrant transnationalism predict, both Taina and 
Yukari must have weakened their transnational ties with Brazil. If parents’ socioeconomic and 
acculturation levels affect children’s social mobility as the neo-culturalist approaches predict, 
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both of them should have followed a downward mobility path in Japan. However, both of them 
are successfully developing their educational careers but in different countries: Taina in Brazil 
and Yukari in Japan. They have developed different levels of agency through different school 
contexts with the consonant transnational migrant bargain in Taina’s case and with the 
incorporative extra-family and -school mentorship in Yukari’s case. 
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Table 3-3 shows the development of Taina’s and Yukari’s social belongings at the three 
life stages. Taina’s life trajectory is a quintessential case of the straightforward transnational 
pathway. Her school and family contexts (the continuous enrollment in Brazilian school with 
parents’ sustained encouragement to return) in concert made her sense of transnational striver 
salient and other subcultures latent, and that in turn informed her several possible selves with 
different valence in the transition to early adulthood. First, the haken pathway in Japan was 
undesirable to her. It signaled a negative possible self that she perceived certainly avoidable with 
her good academic standing in the Brazilian school. Second, higher education in Japan appeared 
unachievable if not desirable. In contrast, third, Taina viewed her positive possible self — 
desirable and achievable — in the upward return path to Brazil. In the transition to the early 
adulthood, Taina returned to Brazil to take such a pathway. 
Yukari’s life trajectory is an upwardly mobile bicultural striver. First, Yukari’s traits in 
transnational striver were attenuated as she transferred from Brazilian to Japanese school. 
Second, Yukari’s high school context exposed her to the haken subculture. However, third, the 
extra mentorship enhanced the sense of bicultural striver and helped her to see not only that the 
downward pathway to the haken labor market was avoidable but also that college in Japan was 
desirable and achievable. As she moved up to the college and socialized with native Japanese 
friends, her social belonging in middle-class mainstream grew as well. 
 The school difference between Japanese and Brazilian schools made some pathways 
achievable and others not: Taina saw transnational striver as her predominant social belonging 
whereas Yukari felt belong to middle-class mainstream and bicultural striver. However, the 
school context did not fully determine their pathways. Especially, Yukari successfully took an 
upwardly mobile pathway despite the disadvantageous school context. Having multiple contexts 
 135 
is the key to understand Yukari’s upwardly mobile prospect. This can be accentuated by 
contrasting Yukari with Gilberto. Yukari and Gilberto graduated from the same evening high 
school. While Yukari could relativize her evening school context by the extra support and 
mentorship from senior Nikkei youths, Gilberto did not have such an opportunity. He rather 
perceived his carpenter job desirable to compare to his father’s haken job. 
 
2) Stella and João: Divergent Social Trajectories of Brazilian School Students 
Both Stella and João were enrolled in Brazilian high school in Japan. Like Taina and 
Yukari, Stella and João have been in Japan for a long time. Their parents’ socioeconomic 
backgrounds are also similar to Taina and Yukari’s. Notwithstanding, Stella took a return path to 
Brazil whereas João chose to stay in Japan. The comparison between Stella and João analyzes 
how the different migrant bargain, especially the timing of dissonance, affects their agency even 
within the same Brazilian school context and consequently led them to different pathways in the 
transition to the early adulthood. 
 
Stella: a transnational second-chancer 
Like Taina, Stella came to Japan when she was a little child. However, she dropped out 
from Brazilian school and worked as a haken worker once. Now, she is a college student in 
Brazil. Stella is a transnational second-chancer, a composite of transnational striver and Brazilian 
haken (see Figure 3-1 above). 
Like many other Brazilian migrants in Japan, Stella’s parents had a plan to return to 
Brazil after working a few years. Therefore, they wanted to send Stella to a Brazilian school. 
However, there was no Brazilian school nearby. So, they put Stella in a Japanese childcare 
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program. Stella’s enrollment in the Japanese school system helped her learning Japanese and 
making Japanese friends. However, when she was in the sixth grade in Japanese elementary 
school, her parents made her transfer to a Brazilian school. Stella’s parents were urged by two 
concerns. First, they worried that it would be trouble if Stella would not have sufficient 
proficiency in Portuguese when they went back to Brazil. Second, and more importantly, Stella’s 
parents were afraid that Stella would fail in the Japanese school system: 
We [Stella, her father, and a teacher at Japanese elementary school] had an opportunity to 
talk about my future plan. My teacher mentioned to my dad that it’s by chance possible 
that I wouldn’t be able to go to college in Japan. Then, my dad got afraid of such a case 
happening and … he took me out [of the Japanese school]. 
Failing Japanese school is a pressing anxiety to Brazilian families in Japan. As Taina’s mother 
mentioned above, this anxiety is closely associated with the fear of making the child a haken 
worker. When Stella’s parents sensed such a possibility, they placed their hope for Stella’s 
success in the upwardly mobile path in Brazil through Brazilian school in Japan. 
Stella recalled, “it was bad to me because I had learned in Japanese and my parents put 
me in the Brazilian school, then I had to learn everything again [in Portuguese] from scratch. 
That made me confused.” Despite her initial confusion, Stella kept the transnational migrant 
bargain well. Stella’s parents have always encouraged her to go college. Moreover, Stella shared 
the fear of being a haken worker with her parents: “I had a friend, a Brazilian girl who has done 
Japanese school all the way. […] She finished high school and she was working in the factory. 
[…] She told me that she found that the chance to go to college was really limited to foreigners 
yet.” Although Stella lagged behind two years of academic progress when she was transferred to 
the Brazilian school, she studied hard to catch up. 
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However, unlike Taina, Stella’s return pathway to Brazil was bumpy. When Stella moved 
up to the second year of Brazilian high school, her parents reconsidered their plan and decided to 
settle in Japan. This plan change was largely derived from their waning prospect in Brazil. Stella 
explained to me that “it’d be difficult if they [Stella’s parents] returned to Brazil. […] He 
[Stella’s father] told us, ‘I don’t know if we can secure a good life in Brazil, having a nice house, 
enjoying travel once in a while, and all the things that we have in Japan if we return.’” Having 
been in Japan for over 10 years, Stella’s parents’ initial plan of return increasingly dimmed.9 
“My dad was 47 and my mom was 45 then. What could they do for these ages if they 
went back to Brazil? Because there is no good job for old people. Well…, neither in Japan 
though…” Looking back from now, Stella understands her parents’ decision but it made her 
confused and disappointed initially. “I had studied hard because I believed we would return to 
Brazil one day. My parents always told me, ‘you should go to university and get a good job,’ and 
I followed them. But if we stayed in Japan, it’s meaningless to study so hard [in Brazilian 
school].” By then, Stella’s and her parents’ future orientations were consistent. Her parents had a 
plan to go back to Brazil and Stella has kept the transnational migrant bargain by studying hard. 
When her parents changed the plan to settle in Japan, their expectations suddenly came at odds 
with each other. The transnational migrant bargain was broken not by Stella but by her parents. 
At that point, Stella’s upwardly mobile path in Japan appeared unachievable since she has 
not made effort for that orientation. She was fluent in Japanese but not confident in Japanese 
academic writing: “If I had been enrolled in Japanese school all the way and if my Japanese had 
been fully developed, I would have done college in Japan. […] But I’ve already left Japanese 
school. I’d have had to study all over again [if Stella tried Japanese university].” Stella initially 
 
9 This episode does not indicate Stella’s parents’ determination of permanent settlement in Japan. According to 
Stella, the possible prospect in Brazil often comes up in their conversation as of 2018. 
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perceived the pathway to the factory as undesirable: “I’ve heard how it worked; I knew it’s not 
an easy thing”. However, when both the upwardly mobile return to Brazil and the upwardly 
mobile incorporation in Japan seemed unachievable to Stella, she came to see the haken labor 
inevitable. Stella increasingly lost motivation to study, dropped out of the school, and started 
working in a factory. 
The haken labor in the factory signaled Stella an ambiguity. First, Stella learned that the 
haken labor was not as unacceptable as she thought initially at least in terms of wage: “It’s good 
because I earned well, earned more than my mom because I worked on a four for two [4 team 12 
hours] shift. It’s quite tough though.” Stella enjoyed a relative economic independence from her 
parents. On weekends when she had a day off or two, she went to night clubs with her friends 
and partied all night. During this period, Stella was exposed to the haken subculture and 
embraced it, but only partly. 
Stella: “Everybody [Brazilian youths in the factory] initially think, like; let’s work hard, 
save money, and go back to Brazil. Everybody initially thinks in that way. But they turn 
to be like, ‘well, whatever, I can live with this way, I can earn money, go to a night club, 
drink booze, and buy a car…’ They end up being like that.” 
Author: “Did you think so too?” 
Stella: “I did… but not so much. I haven’t always gone out with my friends because I was 
tired [coming back from the factory].” 
As the citation above shows, second, the haken labor wore her out physically and mentally. The 
actual experience of the routinized haken labor made her strongly reaffirm its undesirability 
rather than fully embracing it: “I didn’t want to keep that life forever because I felt like I was 
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nobody in the factory. So, I told my dad, ‘I fed up with this, I want to study, I want to be 
someone.’” 
After working in the factory for a year, Stella grabbed a second chance option in the 
return pathway to Brazil. The weariness and the sense of stagnancy Stella felt in the routinized 
haken labor are certainly the major reason for such a decision. More importantly, she could 
choose the second-chance return option because she has once invested herself to develop her 
social belonging in transnational striver. 
The contrast with Steven, another Brazilian school graduate who works as a haken 
worker, makes this point clear. When Steven was in the final year of high school, he perceived 
the haken job in the factory as undesirable: “Earning money [in Japan] is easy if you work in a 
factory. But once you enter, and if you don’t have specific goals, time just passes. […] You earn 
money quick and spend them quick. […] You can’t develop your skills. I have seen my dad 
doing difficult.” Nevertheless, he anticipated that he would work in the factory upon the 
graduation: “I am not a good student. It’s obvious. Like, I don’t take note in class. I haven’t 
studied seriously.” This means neither that Steven saw the return to Brazil undesirable nor that 
he disregarded his parents’ investment in his education: “One day, I want to show my dad that 
the days he paid money to my school were not waste of time”. But he perceived that entering 
Brazilian university was unachievable. As of early 2019, almost two years after his graduation, 
Steven kept working as a haken worker in Japan. 
In contrast to Steven, Stella has made efforts to make the upwardly mobile return to 
Brazil possible by the high school period. Even though she once gave up such a pathway due to 
the dissonant migrant bargain, the actual haken experience reactivated her sense of transnational 
striver and made her perceive the return pathway to Brazil not only desirable but still achievable. 
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Stella went back to Brazil, got a high school graduation certificate, passed vestibulares 
(Brazilian university admission exams), and started studying pedagogy in a public university in 
the state of Paraná. Looking back from the current stage of her life, she appreciated her parents’ 
investment in her education in Brazilian school: “I took only public universities’ exams because 
my dad has paid my tuition since I was little child. If I was accepted to a private university, I’d 
burden him again. So, I studied really hard. And I made it.”10 
 
João: a bicultural shallow sloper 
João’s early school trajectory is similar to Stella’s halfway. João came to Japan when he 
was a little baby. He had been in a Japanese elementary school until the third grade. His parents 
put him in a Brazilian school to prepare him to go back to Brazil. Unlike Stella, João chose to 
stay in Japan after finishing Brazilian high school. Whereas Stella (and Taina as well) found a 
desirable future self in the upwardly mobile return to Brazil as compared to the haken worker’s 
life in Japan, João drew an opposite idea from a comparison of possible selves between Japan 
and Brazil. While João works in a factory in Japan now, his employment position is stabler than 
other Brazilian haken workers. In addition, João is now married with a Japanese woman and 
naturalized to Japanese citizenship recently. Like Gilberto, João makes a shallow slope mobility 
into the Japanese mainstream, developing his social belonging both in bicultural striver and 
Brazilian haken (see Figure 3-1 above). 
When João was transferred to the Brazilian school, his migrant bargain with the parents 
was not as consonant as Stella’s. “My parents asked me which school [either Japanese or 
 
10 In general, public universities are considered to offer higher quality education than private ones in Brazil. 
Additionally, public universities basically offer free education. For these reasons, it is more difficult to get accepted 
to public universities. 
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Brazilian] I preferred. But in practice I had no choice. They pressured me to say, ‘I want to go to 
Brazilian school.’” In contrast to his parents, João perceived the idea of returning to Brazil rather 
remote and odd. “I think I am Brazilian. I cheer for the Brazilian national football team. If I find 
a Brazilian flag on the street, I feel proud. But I have grown up in Japan. So, it was strange to me 
when my parents encouraged me to go back to my own country.” Unlike Stella (and Taina) 
whose social networks were enclosed in the Brazilian institutional exclave, João maintained the 
social networks extended to the Japanese society even after moving to the Brazilian school. 
Although the students were prohibited to speak Japanese at school, João found some classmates 
who were also fluent in Japanese and formed a peer group with them. “It was almost like a Japa 
[Japanese] community in the Brazilian community.” He recalled that they have often enjoyed 
talking in Japanese, hiding from teachers. Based on this peer group, João also extended his 
networks to Japanese friends outside the school through his basketball activity. 
This does not mean that João did not like his school life in the Brazilian school. 
Author: “So, did you want to go back to Japanese school?” 
João: “I’d admit that I’ve enjoyed my school life after all. It was okey.” 
João’s school story was centered on peer group friendship. On contrary, João had a distant 
feeling towards Brazilian school’s academic aspect: “When I was in elementary and middle 
school, I wasn’t conscious about what I was studying [such as Brazilian history and literature]. 
But as I moved up from to the high school, I wondered ‘is it helpful to study these stuff?’” João 
assessed that he was not an academically-motivated student: “I don’t like studying. I have never 
submitted homework at school.” While João’s own personality might play a part, it is the case 
that he failed to motivate himself to study because the study contents of Brazilian school did not 
correspond to his social belonging. 
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[In Brazil,] you can secure a decent job only if you graduate from university. My dad told 
me as such. So, my parents have always insisted me, ‘study hard and go to university.’ 
But I am in Japan. So, I wondered ‘do I have to go to university? I can feed myself even 
without a college degree [in Japan], can’t I?’ 
Unlike Stella, João did not keep the transnational migrant bargain despite his parents’ 
encouragement and has not developed the sense of transnational striver. 
João was certain that he would stay in Japan after the graduation. To him, the upwardly 
mobile return to Brazil was neither desirable nor achievable. However, at the same time, the 
upwardly mobile path to the Japanese higher education also appeared unachievable to him: “I 
can speak Japanese […], I can read to a large extent, but if I was asked to compose an essay in 
Japanese, I can’t. If someone suggested me a Japanese university, my reaction was like, ‘Wait! I 
haven’t studied in the Japanese curriculum at all!’” In contrast, João viewed the haken labor in 
Japan as an ambivalent path. On the one hand, it was undesirable compering to the desirable but 
unachievable upwardly mobile path to the Japanese mainstream: “I was thinking that those who 
enter factories were the losers. Anyone can do such an easy line work. […] My parents have 
repeatedly imprinted on my mind that haken is the loser’s job.” On the other hand, the haken 
labor in Japan was more desirable than going back to Brazil only with a high school diploma: “If 
you go to Brazil without a college degree, you can’t expect any employment opportunity. […] 
Sure, haken is unstable but you can feed yourself. […] After all, haken allows a good life even 
for the Brazilian school graduates.” Towards early adulthood, João was caught by this 
ambivalence of haken labor market as it was for Steven. 
Nevertheless, unlike Steven, João did not take the path to the haken labor market. A 
notable difference between them is that João was fluent in both in Portuguese and Japanese 
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whereas Steven was only in Portuguese. It does not mean that João could find a stable job easily. 
After the graduation, he has worked multiple part-time jobs for two years because he could not 
secure a regular employment. Yet, the part-time jobs were better than a haken job to João: “I was 
determined not to take a haken job even doing multiple part-time gigs.” However, due to the 
instability and anxiety for the future, João eventually gave up his part-time work life and started 
working in a factory not as a haken worker but as a directly employed part-time worker. He 
assessed that he could find a direct employment position because he could speak the two 
languages. “If you can’t speak Japanese, it is impossible to get a job other than a haken job. In 
the first place, you can’t have an interview.” While João felt ambivalent towards his Brazilian 
school, he appreciated it at least in terms of language. “I have a cousin. My family came to Japan 
with her family. She had attended Japanese schools all the way and now working in a Japanese 
company. But she cannot speak Portuguese. I don’t have a college degree, but I can speak both 
languages. Looking back from now, my Portuguese fluency helped me to get promoted as a 
translator in my workplace [and as a regular employee]. So, at least in this respect, I appreciated 
my experience in the Brazilian school.” João is now married with a Japanese woman whom he 
met at the workplace and naturalized to Japanese citizenship. “When we [João and his wife] got 
married, we found that it’d be bureaucratically troublesome if our nationalities were different. 
And I was sure that I would live in Japan forever. So, I naturalized.” He achieved a modest, but 
an upwardly mobile path compared to haken jobs that his parents and some of his former 
classmates took on. 
 
Stella and João’s Processual Agency in Contrast 
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Both Stella and João came to Japan when they were little. Their parents’ socioeconomic 
backgrounds are more or less similar. Both of them transferred from Japanese to Brazilian school 
in their childhood. Additionally, both of their parents offered the transnational migrant bargain. 
However, their pathways diverged: Stella entered university in Brazil whereas João took a 
modest but upwardly mobile shallow slope pathway in Japan. 
 Stella and João differed in three aspects. First, Stella’s ties with Japanese friends waned 
when she transferred to Brazilian school whereas João maintained relationships with Japanese 
friends. Second, Stella studied hard at Brazilian school, keeping the transnational migrant 
bargain whereas João did not find positive meaning in study at Brazilian school and broke the 
transnational migrant bargain with his parents despite their sustained encouragement to take an 
upwardly mobile return path to Brazil. And third, related to the first two points and more 
importantly, their side of the migrant bargain became inconsistent with the parents’ side at the 
different stages in their life course. When Stella was transferred to Brazilian school, she kept the 
transnational migrant bargain. It was in Stella’s adolescence that their future orientations became 
at odds with each other. In contrast, João did not keep the transnational migrant bargain when he 
was transferred to Brazilian school. João has not developed his social belonging in transnational 
striver while in the Brazilian school. 
The different timing of migrant bargain dissonance illustrates how they have developed 
different sets of social belongings within the same Brazilian school context. Table 3-4 shows the 
development of Stella’s and João’s social belonging in contrast. While Stella displayed the traits 
of bicultural striver and transnational striver during the childhood period, the former traits were 
attenuated as she made efforts to meet her parents’ expectation to return to Brazil. When Stella’s 
efforts were suddenly blocked when her parents decided to settle in Japan, her social belonging 
 145 
increasingly shifted to Brazilian haken. Nevertheless, her social belonging in transnational striver 
did not disappear altogether. Rather, it was reactivated as Stella actually experienced the limited 
prospect of haken worker’s life in Japan. 
 
Table 3-4: The Development of Stella’s and João’s Social Belonging at the Three Life Stages 
 
 
Like Stella, João displayed his social belonging in bicultural striver and transnational 
striver during his childhood period. In contrast to Stella, João did not keep the transnational 
bargain with the parents. His sense of transnational striver remained weak while in the Brazilian 
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school. On the contrary, he maintained the sense of bicultural striver when he advanced to 
adolescence. With such a configuration of social belonging, João found a relative advantage even 
in an unskilled or semi-skilled job in Japan comparing to the upwardly mobile return to Brazil, 
not to mention unskilled jobs there. In addition, his social belonging in bicultural striver helped 
him to find a modest but relatively stable job in Japanese labor market. Even though Stella and 
João shared the same school context and both of their parents offered the transnational bargain, 
they built different agency because the migrant bargain became dissonant at the different timing 
in their life course. 
 
Conclusion 
Brazilian Nikkei youths in Japan demonstrate a wide range of life pathways into early 
adulthood, including a shallow slope incorporation into the working-class life in Japan and an 
upwardly mobile return to Brazil, which has not been documented in the existent literature on the 
second-generation migrants. This chapter analyzed the process through which Nikkei youths’ life 
trajectories diverge widely. I examined three major approaches to the assimilation and 
transnationalism of children of migrants and showed that they cannot fully account for the 
variation among the four Nikkei youths’ life trajectories in this chapter. A shared shortcoming is 
the static understanding of migrant youths’ agency. Although all the causal factors claimed by 
the prior approaches, especially institution and culture, matter in divergence mechanism of 
Nikkei youths’ life trajectories in this chapter, they must be analyzed in relation to their changing 
agency through the life course. I elaborated the micro-agency side of the interactive process 
approach that draws sustained attention to the process through which the Nikkei youths develop 
varying agency, defined as the dynamic relationship between social belonging and possible 
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selves over time. The comparative analysis of four Nikkei youths’ life histories allowed me to 
examine both the shift of social belonging in each case over time and the divergence of their life 
trajectories across the cases. 
Nikkei youths’ social belonging is shaped in interaction with the school context and the 
migrant bargain. First, the comparison between Taina and Yukari examined how the different 
school context affects their agency and the consequential path choice. Both Taina and Yukari 
started their childhood in Brazilian childcare program. Whereas Taina continued Brazilian school 
up until high school, Yukari was transferred to Japanese school in early adolescence. Taina has 
developed the strong sense of transnational striver, continuously being enrolled in the Brazilian 
school. As a result, Taina found a more desirable and achievable pathway in the upward return 
path to Brazil in comparison to her limited prospect in Japan. In contrast, Yukari increasingly 
attenuated her sense of transnational striver as she successfully progressed in the Japanese school 
system. In addition, she developed the sense of bicultural striver with the help of extra-family 
mentorship despite the disadvantageous school context. As a result, she found the most desirable 
and achievable pathway in the Japanese college. 
However, the school context does not solely determine Nikkei youths’ pathways into 
early adulthood. Different types of migrant bargain intersect with the school context and yield 
wide variations in the agency. The comparison between Stella and João analyzed how the 
different migrant bargain, especially the different timing of the dissonant migrant bargain, makes 
a difference in their path choices into early adulthood within the same Brazilian school context. 
When Stella and João transferred to Brazilian schools, Stella has cultivated the sense of 
transnational striver by keeping the transnational migrant bargain with her parents whereas João 
did not because he broke the transnational migrant bargain earlier than Stella. As a result, they 
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found contrasting meanings to the haken labor market in Japan and the return pathway to Brazil 
respectively. Stella viewed a desirable and achievable prospect in the upward return pathway to 
Brazil comparing to the undesirable and avoidable haken labor market in Japan. In contrast, João 
saw neither the upward return to Brazil nor the upward path to Japanese university unachievable. 
He rather perceived that the shallow slope mobility in Japan was not only achievable but also 
more desirable than the downward return to Brazil and the haken labor market in Japan. 
Both the school context and the migrant bargain affect Nikkei youths’ social belonging 
and their consequent pathways to early adulthood. However, they do so not as independent 
factors but as interacting effects. Nikkei youths develop different social belonging over time and 
it provides a different decision framework for future possible selves. When they enter early 
adulthood, their pathways diverge significantly not only in terms of social mobility but also in 
terms of cross-border mobility. 
The Brazilian Nikkei youths in Japan are an uncommon case. Nevertheless, it brings up 
two broader implications. First, this chapter underscored the transnational context of social 
mobility. Most studies on migrant youths have predominantly focused on their social mobility in 
the host society. However, as the cases of Taina and Stella demonstrated, Brazilian schools as an 
exclave institution provide an attainable return option to the students that is inaccessible to those 
in the Japanese public schools. The close attention to migrant institutions, especially exclave 
institutions, sheds light on an alternative upward mobility pathway to the homeland and broadens 
our understanding of the life trajectories of migrant youths in the transnational framework. 
Second, I elaborated the micro-agency side of the interactive process approach that draws 
attention to processual nature of agency. Nikkei youths’ agency is not given as if being present 
from conception. Nor is it the random expression of pure volition. They develop varying social 
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belonging interacting with the school context and the migrant bargain over time. When they 
come of age, the meaning and weight of available choices vary depending on one’s social 
belonging. By paying sustained attention to the processual nature of migrant youths’ agency, we 








This dissertation sought to understand various transnational ties and lives, including their 
decline and absence, among Brazilian Nikkeis throughout their century-long history. Why did 
Japanese migrants show broader support to the homeland’s war efforts than Italian migrants in 
pre-World War II São Paulo? Why did Brazilian Nikkeis in Bastos undergo an escalation of 
intra-group conflicts whereas those in Registro did not in the aftermath of the Japanese defeat in 
WWII? Why did the life trajectories of four Brazilian Nikkei youths, Taina, Yukari, Stella, and 
João, widely diverge not only in terms of social mobility in the host society, but also in terms of 
cross-border mobility – including a presumably permanent return to Brazil despite the shared 
socioeconomic and family backgrounds? More generally, what mechanisms shape and reshape 
various patterns of migrants’ transnational lives? This dissertation sought to answer these 
questions by developing an interactive process approach to migrant transnationalism. I argued 
first that the varieties of migrants’ transnational ties are products of the interactive process 
between the diasporic bureaucracy of sending state, the incorporative capacity of the receiving 
state, and the mobilizing capacity of migrants’ networks within the international state system, 
and second that migrants’ agency, which changes over time by interacting with meso-level 
contexts such as the school contexts and the migrant bargain, generates further variations in their 
transnational lives even within a given configuration of macro-level contexts. 
By employing the interactive process approach, this dissertation underscored three major 
analytical implications that can be useful to advance our understandings of varying migrants’ 
transnational ties more generally. First, this approach developed an analytical framework that 
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considers the varying configuration between the diasporic bureaucracy of a sending state, the 
incorporative capacity of a receiving state, and the mobilizing capacity of migrants’ networks 
within the given international state system. Second, not just seeing a contextual configuration at 
a certain point, it puts a great emphasis on timing and sequential dynamics that bring about 
changes in migrants’ transnational ties. Third, related to the second, I addressed the processual 
nature of migrant youths’ agency. In the following space, I summarize the three analytical 
implications. 
 
Institutional Aspects of Migrant Transnational Lives 
This dissertation sought to further advance the institutional approaches to migrant 
transnationalism by elaborating an analytical framework that pays attention to the varying 
configuration between the diasporic bureaucracy of the sending state, the incorporative capacity 
of the receiving state, and the mobilizing capacity of migrants’ networks within the given 
international state system. 
In a globalizing world where a large amount of capital, goods, information, and, most 
importantly, people move across national borders, the power and legitimacy of modern nation-
states came under suspicion. Scholars have debated whether nation-states continue to be the valid 
framework to organize and understand our social life over last three decades or so. Against this 
backdrop, migrant transnationalism offered a new vocabulary to overcome the limitations of 
methodological nationalism prevalent in social science thinking that takes for granted the nation-
states as the unit of analysis (Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2002). 
Cross-border movements of people are by no means new phenomena. Migrant 
transnationalism added a research agenda in the studies of international migration that focuses on 
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migrants’ transnational ties with the homelands in addition to the traditional one that centers on 
their assimilation into the host societies. At the same time, it also directed researchers to seek 
factors to explain transnational or cross-border phenomena in either larger or smaller forces than 
nation-states, such as global capitalism, social networks, or individual choice. This may be part 
of the reason why early scholarship drew attention to “the agency of transmigrants” (Basch et al. 
1994: 22). However, it is tautological to say that migrants’ agency transcending the constraints of 
nation-states produce their transnational ties with the homelands in conflating the explanandum 
with the explanans. Even though migrants’ agency matters, the factors and mechanisms that 
make (and unmake) it transnational must be explained. In this respect, there is no reason to 
presume that transnational phenomena cannot be explained by factors residing in the nation-
state, since one of the salient features of methodological nationalism is to omit the significance 
of nationalism and nation-states in shaping our social life (Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2002, 
Amelia et al. 2012). 
Institutional approaches to migrant transnationalism emerged in this context. They are 
attentive to the effects of institutional contexts on migrants’ transnational ties. In particular, they 
redirected our attention to an aspect of the criticism of methodological nationalism once 
unlearned – that is, the importance of the nation-state as a variable factor, not merely a constant 
environment (Dahinden 2017: 1480-1481). A few but emerging literature started to see migrants’ 
transnational ties with the homelands in a triadic framework between a sending state, a receiving 
state, and a migrant population (Brubaker 1996, Smith 2003a, Cook-Martín 2013, Mylonas 2013, 
Kim 2016). 
Building on this emerging literature, this dissertation developed an interactive process 
approach that looks at varying configurations among the diasporic bureaucracy of sending state, 
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the incorporative power of receiving state, and the mobilizing capacity of migrants’ networks 
and associations within the international state system. I argued that migrants’ transnational ties 
with the homeland varies depending on the various configuration among these contexts. This 
framework helps us understand not only various patterns of migrants’ transnational ties with the 
homelands but also their incorporation into the host society in a cohesive way. International 
migration is inherently a transnational process. It starts when people go across national borders. 
Some maintain various types of connections with the homelands, including an eventual return to 
the homelands. Others are incorporated into the host societies without denouncing their ethnic 
salience. And others abandon the ties with the homelands completely and build social relations in 
the host societies anew. In this framework, assimilation can be understood as a variant of 
migrants’ transnational ties. The interactive process approach explored the dynamics that 
produces the varieties of migrants’ transnational ties and lives. 
Chapter 1 analyzed different forms and breadths of patriotic donation to the homelands 
by Italian and Japanese migrants in early 20th century São Paulo. The Italian patriotic campaign 
was divided between upper- and middle-class and working class migrants whereas Japanese one 
was broadly supported by Japanese migrants despite the social differentiation between 
landowners and sharecroppers and other lower status migrants. Upper- and middle-class Italians 
supported the patriotic donation campaign as they formed an integrated exclave where their 
intensive networks and associations was embraced both by the Italian diasporic bureaucracy and 
the Brazilian incorporative power whereas working-class Italians did not because their hitherto 
dispersive networks were incorporated into the corporatist labor regime by the Brazilian 
incorporative power with a weak penetration of Italy’s diasporic bureaucracy. In contrast, 
Japanese migrants broadly supported the patriotic campaign because they formed diasporic 
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exclaves where their intensive networks were deeply embraced by the Japanese diasporic 
bureaucracy with less penetration of Brazilian incorporative power. 
While it was less foregrounded, Chapters 2 and 3 also situated the cases in the contextual 
configuration framework. Chapter 2 examined the dissolution process of Japanese diasporic 
exclaves in the rural area. The dissolution started when the Japanese diasporic bureaucracy 
retreated from Brazil in the wake of the Pacific War. Without the effective embrace of Japanese 
diasporic bureaucracy, Japanese diasporic exclaves in the hinterlands of São Paulo shifted 
towards settlement enclaves and gradually Japanese migrants and their descendants assimilated 
into the mainstream of Brazilian society in the long run. Chapter 3 analyzed divergent life paths 
of Brazilian Nikkei youths in Japan. Most Brazilian Nikkeis come to Japan by making the most 
of legal opportunity offered by the Japanese government and are incorporated into the segmented 
unskilled labor sector. In this broader context, Brazilian schools in Japan are working as an 
institutionalized exclave. They are institutionalized as a product of interstate reciprocity in a 
globalizing world more than an utter nationalist project of Brazilian diasporic bureaucracy. The 
effect of this institutionalized exclave on Brazilian Nikkei youths’ life course is clear when 
comparing to those in Japanese public school system. While none of my informants in Japanese 
public schools did not consider a return pathway to Brazil, some informants in Brazilian schools 
envisioned and did realize an upwardly mobile return pathway. In each chapter, Brazilian 
Nikkei’s transnational ties and lives are largely affected by the varying configuration of 
institutional contexts. 
However, the interactive process approach does not just point to the snapshot 
configurations of contexts for migrants’ transnational ties with the homelands. In fact, the main 
analytical focus of Chapter 2 was not on the general dissolution process of Japanese diasporic 
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exclave but rather on two different courses — Bastos entailed intra-group violence and Registro 
did not — that eventually led to the dissolution and the mechanisms that produced the difference. 
Similarly, Chapter 3 not only illuminated the effect of institutional bifurcation between Brazilian 
and Japanese schools on Brazilian Nikkei youths’ life trajectories but also analyzed the 
divergence of their life trajectories much greater than the school bifurcation predicts: while some 
graduates of Brazilian schools return to Brazil, others stay in Japan even after graduating from 
the Brazilian schools. In other words, migrants’ transnational lives are not determined simply by 
the contextual configuration at a certain point but show more intricate and nuanced variations. In 
this respect, this dissertation highlighted temporal and sequential dimensions of configuration 
and the processual nature of migrants’ agency that next sections discuss. 
 
Timing and Sequential Dynamics of Migrant Transnational Ties 
In addition to various contextual configurations, the interactive process approach sheds 
light on timing and sequential aspects of migrants’ transnational ties. First, the timing of events 
happening in the migration process affects their subsequent development. Second, when a 
change happens in a contextual configuration, the impact of the change on migrants’ 
transnational ties varies depending on the precedent processes. These sequential interactions 
bring about more nuanced variations in migrants’ transnational ties. 
Literature on migrant assimilation and transnationalism has never failed to acknowledge 
the impact of contextual configurations on the patterns of assimilation and transnational ties. 
Most research, however, tends to view each different contextual configuration as if it was an 
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independent case. A common analytical strategy is to compare different contextual 
configurations with varying outcomes.1 
This does not mean that they are not attentive to the processual nature of international 
migration. As mentioned above, international migration is inherently a process. However, they 
tend to grasp the process in a linear fashion.2 Indeed, these two tendencies prevalent in the 
studies of international migration — a methodological tendency to separate each contextual 
configuration as a discrete case and a theoretical tendency to view the migration process in a 
linear fashion — complement each other. Researchers identify various relevant contextual 
configurations and study the linear stepwise process through which each configuration pushes 
migrants towards a certain outcome on the time horizon of “general linear reality” (Abbott 2001: 
ch.1). This analytical strategy works well when the configuration is relatively stable. However, 
even the macro context changes sometimes in a drastic manner such as a change in border 
control regime due to a war or a pandemic. More importantly, a contextual configuration often 
changes partly and sequentially. Each relevant context in a configuration moves with its own 
temporal rhythm and interacts with other relevant contexts (Haydu 1998, 2010). As a result, the 
configuration among them unfolds sequentially rather than instantly all at once. 
 
1 For instance, different modes of incorporation result in varying “segmented” assimilation patterns (Portes and 
Rumbaut 2001, 2014). Furthermore, different institutional and discursive structures between North American and 
European countries affect migrants’ incorporation and transnational ties (Faist 1995, Koopmans et al. 2005, 
Bloemraad 2006, Crul et al. 2012, Alba and Foner 2015). Even when studying historical cases, existing literature 
often divides the past and present into several periods and treats each period as a discrete case and compare them. In 
this vein, scholars compare the past immigrants in the industrializing periods with the present immigrants under an 
hourglass economy (Portes and Zhou 1993), or different incorporation patterns of Mexican immigrants between pre- 
and post-1986 U.S. immigration system (Massey et al. 2002). 
2 See, for instance, Park’s (1950) race relations cycle from contact through competition, accommodation, and to 
assimilation, Gordon’s (1964) seven stages of assimilation from acculturation to structural assimilation and beyond, 
Alba and Nee’s (2003) definition of assimilation as the decline of ethnic salience, and Waldinger’s (2015) 
conceptualization of the decline of migrants’ cross-border ties as a shift from intersocietal convergence to 
divergence. 
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In this respect, the interactive process approach highlights the development and 
transformation of migrants’ transnational ties over time and the timing and sequential dynamics 
that produce their divergence. This dissertation illustrated two such dynamics. First, the timing of 
events happening in a trajectory generates a branching point for the subsequent development of 
the contextual configuration. Second, when a change happens in a given configuration, its impact 
varies depending on the configuration preceding the change. They are closely related but two 
different dynamics: the first points to an upstream divergence dynamism whereas the second 
points to a downstream divergence dynamism.  
First, the timing of an event makes a difference in the pattern of migrants’ transnational 
ties by generating a branching point for the subsequent development of the patterns. Chapter 1 
(and a part of Chapter 2) demonstrated this type of upstream dynamism in two ways. First, 
different timings of entry of Italian and Japanese migrants to Brazil vis-à-vis the development of 
Brazilian national economy set the context for the different development patterns of their 
networks and associations: Italian class-divided networks and associations in the urban centers, 
Japanese intensive networks and associations in the rural areas. Second, the timing of which 
infrastructural power — the diasporic bureaucracy of sending state or the incorporative power of 
receiving state — reached out to migrants earlier affected the subsequent development of their 
transnational ties. A clear contrast lied between working-class Italian migrants and Japanese 
migrants. The Brazilian incorporative power incorporated the Italian working-class into the 
emerging national corporatist regime before the Italian Fascist government started extending its 
diasporic bureaucracy to them. The Italian diasporic bureaucracy was foreclosed to embrace the 
working-class Italians because of its late arrival. In contrast, the Japanese diasporic bureaucracy 
embraced Japanese migrants earlier than the Brazilian incorporative power arrived at the rural 
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areas where most Japanese migrants had settled. As a result, the Japanese diasporic exclaves 
endured as informal networks even after the Brazilian incorporative power restrained their 
formal organizations during the war period. These instances illustrated the timing and sequence 
dynamics that produce a branching point for the subsequent trajectory of migrants’ transnational 
ties. 
Second, the casual meaning of an event on migrants’ transnational ties varies depending 
on the contextual configuration preceding the event. Chapter 2 illustrated this downstream 
dynamism by comparing two Japanese communities in the state of São Paulo, Bastos and 
Registro. Until the outbreak of the Pacific War, both communities were organized as diasporic 
exclaves sustained by the Japanese diasporic bureaucracy, except a difference in socioeconomic 
conditions: Bastos with an export-oriented cotton industry and Registro with a variegated 
economy oriented towards the Brazilian domestic market. This difference was not salient in the 
pre-war period because the diasporic bureaucracy bolstered, though in different fashions, the two 
communities’ economy. However, when it suddenly retreated from Brazil, its impact varied 
significantly between the two communities: the legitimacy of community associations was 
weakened in Batsos but not in Registro. I argued that the interaction between the retreat of the 
diasporic bureaucracy and the different conditions of Bastos and Registro preceding the retreat 
largely shaped the ways in which the intra-group conflicts between deniers and accepters 
unfolded differently in the two communities after the war. This instance demonstrated a 
downstream dynamism by which the legacies of precedent contexts affect the causal meaning of 
an event and bring about divergence in the outcomes. 
The timing and sequential dynamics also matter in the individuals’ life trajectories and 
transnational lives. Chapter 3 also demonstrated both upstream and downstream divergence 
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dynamics in individual migrants’ life trajectories by comparing the four Brazilian Nikkei youths 
in Japan. The next section focuses on the processual nature of migrants’ agency. 
 
Processual Nature of Migrant Youths’ Agency 
The interactive process approach to migrant transnationalism also emphasizes timing and 
sequential dynamics at the micro-agency level. To grasp these temporal dynamics, I 
conceptualized the agency as the dynamic relationship between their social belonging and 
possible selves. Interacting with the relevant contexts over the life course, migrants cumulatively 
develop varying agency with which they navigate their life trajectories. Chapter 3 analyzed how 
Nikkei youths in contemporary Japan developed their agency interacting with the school contexts 
and the migrant bargain and how it navigates their choice on future pathways in the transition to 
early adulthood. While the macro-contextual configuration shapes the dominant pattern of 
transnational lives for the Nikkei youths, their agency generates broader variations of 
transnational lives at the micro-individual level. 
This dissertation employed a case-oriented comparative analytical strategy (Skocpol 
1984, Mahoney and Rueschemeyer 2003, Ragin 2014). It helped me to compare the cases over 
time and examine how varying configuration of relevant contexts forms and transforms Brazilian 
Nikkeis’ transnational ties. However, partly due to the data limitation on the micro level and 
partly due to the research strategy to highlight the dynamics of contextual configuration at the 
macro-institutional level, Chapters 1 and 2 treated their agency as a black box that constantly 
translate the relevant contexts into a certain outcome (Katznelson 2003). What acted in the 
explanation are, at best, collective role characters, whose goals are inferred from the contexts in 
which they are embedded, such as an Italian working-class migrant in the city of São Paulo or a 
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Japanese migrant in the countryside, but not an individual with his or her own biographical life. 
However, the contexts do not act by themselves. While the contexts can condition migrants’ 
agency, migrant’s agency is not overwhelmed by the contextual determination. Even when a 
certain type of transnational ties becomes dominant under a certain set of contexts, there are 
always cases divergent from the dominant tendency. 
As an actual participant in the social life, all we know that we grow (and decline) over 
time, our lives unfold as a sequence, and our goals change along the life. However, social science 
research has often unlearned these common-sense wisdoms and instead presumed a homunculus-
like agency such as the utilitarian calculator whose preferences are preformed and too immune to 
life course changes or the structural and cultural adherent who is too deeply embedded in the 
contexts and whose agency is fixed on them. In this respect, the interactive process approach 
viewed migrants’!agency as an evolving process with a biographical life (Heimer 2002). I argued 
that the agency of Brazilian Nikkei youths in Japan generates the further divergence in migrants’ 
transnational lives even under the same contextual constraints. I conceptualized the agency as the 
dynamic relationship between one’s social belonging that represents one’s sense of belonging to 
the relevant subcultures and possible selves that informs future pathways. Each individual has its 
own unique biographical life. In this respect, migrants presumably demonstrate almost infinite 
variations of transnational life, each one of which is singular.3 Yet, by identifying the four 
heuristic types of relevant subcultural groups inferred from the contexts, this dissertation 
articulated the variable but patterned relationships between social belonging and future possible 
 
3 Some scholars claim that social identities are essentially multiple, variable, in flux, contingent, fragmented, hybrid, 
and so on, but do not necessarily demonstrate to what extent, on what conditions, and how flexible, hybrid, 
fragmented and contingent they are (Hall 1990, Gupta and Ferguson 1992, Bhabha 1994, Papastergiadis 2000, Iyall 
Smith and Leavy 2008). The hybridity of social identity is claimed but not so much demonstrated. 
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selves that navigate Brazilian Nikkei youths’ choice of future pathways in the transition to early 
adulthood. 
Nikkei youths in contemporary Japan develop their agency, interacting with the school 
contexts and the migrant bargaining. The comparison between Taina and Yukari in Chapter 3 
showed the two different school systems and the consonant migrant bargaining respectively 
shaped their different agencies that eventually led them to upwardly mobile pathways but in 
different countries: Taina’s case in Brazil and Yukari’s case in Japan. However, the contextual 
conditions do not directly determine his or her transnational life because their social belonging is 
often multiple and it is always relational with future possible selves. At turning points in the life 
course where migrants have wider range of choices, one’s social belonging provides a decision 
framework for choosing a future pathway that is desirable and actionable (see, Abbott 2001: 
ch.8). 
The comparison between Stella and João in Chapter 3 illustrated this dynamic 
relationship between social belonging and possible selves. Both Stella and João started their 
school career in Japanese elementary school, then transferred to Brazilian school in late 
childhood, and have been there until adolescence. However, they choose different pathways in 
the transition to early adulthood: Stella pursued an upwardly mobile pathway in Brazil whereas 
João chose a modest pathway in Japan. In this light, both upstream and downstream divergence 
mechanisms at the micro-level shaped their agencies. 
First, the timing of migrant bargain dissonance happened in the different stage of the life 
course marked a significant branching point in the development of their agency. While their 
parents sustained the parent’s side of transnational bargain respectively, João broke his side of 
transnational bargain in childhood whereas Stella held it up until the adolescence. Resultantly, 
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their social belonging started diverging: João’s sense of transnational striver was attenuated since 
then whereas Stella sustained it. This interaction between the migrant bargain and their social 
belonging points to an upstream mechanism working at the micro-agency level. 
Second, when they faced the transition to early adulthood, the meanings and weights of 
possible selves that informs future pathways varied between Stella and João. For Stella, a 
pathway to the unskilled or semi-skilled job market in Japan, which was undesirable but difficult 
to avoid for João (and also for Steven), appeared undesirable and avoidable. For João, a pathway 
to go to a college in Brazil, which was achievable and desirable comparing to a pathway to the 
unskilled Brazilian haken labor market in Japan for Stella, appeared unachievable and not so 
much desirable comparing to the haken labor market. Stella and João assigned different 
meanings to available pathways ahead when both of them reached the coming of age because the 
development patterns of their social belonging preceding the transition period differed 
considerably. This interaction between their social belonging and possible selves at a significant 
life turning point indicates a downstream mechanism for the divergence of the migrants’ 
transnational lives including incorporation pathways in the host society. 
When social theories, both macro-structuralist and variable-centered ones alike, find the 
cases deviant from the theoretical prediction, they often treat the outliers as the manifestation of 
the volition of human agency that transcends social-contextual constraints or simply as an error 
(Abbott 2001: ch.4). When an explanation relegates theoretical residues to the free will of 
agency, the quest for social understanding ends there. Certainly, the interactive process approach 
did not solve the problem of volition. For instance, this dissertation could not account for why 
João broke the transnational bargain with his parents in his childhood (and why Stella kept it) 
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other than by his disposition and volition in the end.4 Nevertheless, the interactive process 
approach sought to understand micro-agency dynamics that generate the divergence in migrants’ 
transnational lives within the dominant contextual configuration by viewing human agency itself 
as a process without hastily reducing it to the pure volition.5 Migrants’ transnational lives 
diverge as relevant contextual conditions and their agency  interacts with one another over time. 
Finally, I mention some limitations of this dissertation, which are derived from the 
characteristic of the analytical framework itself. The analytical framework developed in this 
dissertation is a sensitizing framework, which indicates the directions along which to look, rather 
than the definitive theory, which designates what to exactly look (Blumer 1954). First, I 
conceptualized the diasporic bureaucracy of sending state and the incorporative power of 
receiving state in largely materialistic terms centered on the provision of collective goods such as 
subsidies to ethnic schools, agricultural orientations, and labor and welfare provisions. Other 
studies look at more symbolic aspects and more formal legal regimes such as passport, other 
identification systems, citizenship, and nationality laws (Cook-Martín 2013, Kim 2016). This 
dissertation did not explore how material and symbolic aspects of diasporic bureaucracy and 
incorporative power are related. Here again, it is highly likely that states’ materialistic incentive 
 
4 If I had attended João’s and other informants’ life stories, especially their early childhood stories, more intensively 
and more deeply, I could have found more intricate dynamics that made João break the transnational bargain with 
his parents. Notwithstanding, I also wonder if we would be able to expel human volition from the social explanation. 
5 Rational choice theorists presume the universal rationality at the core of human agency. However, the rational 
models usually do not specify any substantial qualities in human agency other than the universalized self-interest to 
maximize one’s utility (Sen 1977, Douglas and Nay 1998, Somers 1998). Some tried to incorporate social 
backgrounds that shape one’s interests and preferences by employing the notion of so-called situated rationality 
(North 1990, Hall and Taylor 1996, Levi 1997, Katznelson and Weingast 2007). I do not reject the notion of 
rationality in human agency. In fact, I employed the notions of sanction and reward induced by the provision of club 
goods to explain the formation of Japanese diasporic exclaves and the intra-group conflicts in Chapters 1 and 2. 
Even in Chapter 3, I posit desirability and achievability as crucial criterion for the future path choice for the 
Brazilian Nikkei youths in Japan. In my view, however, rational choice theories reduce the analytical leverage to the 
extent that they incorporate many contexts beyond the formal conception of rationality (see also, Smith 2009: ch.7). 
It seems more productive and promising to carefully attend to the social and biographical contexts, through 
interactions with which one’s processual agency is formed, than forcefully overextending the conceptual contour of 
rationality itself. 
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policies and their symbolic and legal regimes move with different rhythm and make their 
interactions processual.  
Second, the subculture types relevant to the migrant groups in question vary depending 
on particular contexts. For instance, I rejected rainbow underclass, which the American 
scholarship often employs as a subculture of inner-city migrant youths, as a relevant subculture 
to the case of Brazilian Nikkei youths in Japan. I did so because, based on my informants’ 
narratives, I judged that socioeconomic conditions that the notion of rainbow underclass implies, 
where work itself has gone (Wilson 1996, Waldinger and Feliciano 2004), is not (at least for 
now) prevalent in contemporary Japan. Instead, I created the Brazilian haken type to 
conceptually capture the dilemma my Nikkei informants confront in the face of the easily-
accessible but unstable labor market of temporary contracts in contemporary Japan. What 
subcultures become relevant depends on the particular case, i.e., the different configuration of 
contexts. 
Nonetheless, I believe that the interactive process approach to migrant transnationalism 
can stimulate further theory development without losing sight of each case’s particularities. This 
dissertation ends with an invitation for the theoretically informed comparative research sensitive 
to processual dynamics in the areas of international migration and migrant transnationalism.
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APPENDIX B: CHRONOLOGICAL EXPANSION OF COFFEE AGRICULTURE IN THE 
STATE OF SAO PAULO 
 
Source: Argollo. 2016: 172.
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APPENDIX C: MAP OF SAO PAULO AND ITS SUB-REGIONS 
 
Note: Regional names and borders are ones employed in Census Committee for the Japanese 
Immigrants in Brazil 1964. 
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APPENDIX D: PROCEDURE FOR THE ESTIMATION OF THE PROPORTION OF SHINDO 
RENMEI ASSOCIATES BY AND WITHIN REGION 
 
The proportion of Shindo Renmei associates within each region in the state of São Paulo 
presented in Table 2-1 was estimated by following procedures. 
First, actual numbers of Shindo Renmei associates by regions in 1945 are estimated as 
follows. The DEOPS-SP collection at Centro de Estudos Nipo-Brasileiros, which is a series of 
evidences and testimonies confiscated and filed by Departamento de Ordem Política e Social em 
São Paulo (DOEPS-SP, Department of Political and Social Order in São Paulo) concerning the 
Shindo Renmei incidents, includes a report titled “Relação de Representantes de Filiais da 
Sociedade ‘Shindo Renmmei’ (On Representatives and Branches of ‘Shindo Renmei’ Society).” 
It lists 52 local chapters in Brazil and registered number of associates in each chapter in circa 
1945. Among them, three chapters are located outside the state of São Paulo. I exempted these 
three chapters and organized the rest by the regional categories based on Map (Appendix C) and 
aggregated the number of the associates by the region (A in Table 2-1). Shindo Renmei counted 
all household members of an associate also as associates (Mita 1978: 41). Assuming that the 
male family head had the sole discretion over the entire household, I estimated actual numbers of 
Shindo-Renmei associates (B) by dividing (A) by then average household size of Japanese 
migrants (5.9, see Wago 1939: 14). B by region are: 7,517 in Alta Paulista, 6,695 in Noroeste, 
3,644 in Sorocabana, 1,000 in Araraquara and Borda do Planalto, 42 in São Paulo city and its 
environs, 186 in Vale do Paraíba, and 0 in Coastal. 
Second, Japanese migrant population by regions in 1945 is estimated as follows. A 1958-
59 survey was an inventory survey that covered practically entire Japanese migrant population in 
Brazil, including 438,719 individuals (Census Committee for the Japanese Immigrants in Brazil 
1964, vol.1: 3). It contains survey items that indicate surveyees’ residential location year by year. 
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The data, however, are based on number of family head, not each individual. I multiplied them 
by 5.9 (then average household size of Japanese migrants) and acquired the estimated numbers 
of Japanese migrants by region in 1946 (C): 30,816 in Alta Paulista, 34,226 in Noroeste, 18,219 
in Sorocabana, 12,809 in Araraquara and Borda do Planato, 27,347 in São Paulo city and its 
environs, 1,847 in Vale do Paraíba, 5,814 in Coastal, and 6,992 in other regions. Given (B) and 
(C), third, I estimated the proportion of Shindo Renmei associates within each region (D) by 
dividing (B) by (C) and multiplied by 100. 
Needless to say, the estimated proportion of Shindo Renmei associates within each region 
(D) is far from accurate. In the first place, the numbers of Shindo Renmei associates listed on the 
DEOPS collection data are those reported by Shindo Renmei itself and it is highly likely that 
they were exaggerated and inaccurate. Nevertheless, the estimation seems sufficient to infer the 
contrasting difference in Japanese migrants’ involvements in Shindo Renmei between three 
regions (Alta Paulista, Noroeste, and Sorocabana) and others. 
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APPENDIX E: BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF BRAZILIAN NIKKEI YOUTH INFORMANTS 
 













status at the 
first interview 
Social status as 




Fabio 29 Japanese 11 Evening high 
school graduate 
Freelance job in 
Japan 





school in Japan 
3 Gilberto 16 Japanese 10 Evening High 
School 
Regular manual 
job in Japan 
4 Lucia 26 Japanese 4 Evening high 
school graduate 
Regular job in 
Japan 



















8 Rafael 16 Japanese and 
Portuguese 
2 High school n/a 
9 Andrina 15 Japanese and 
Portuguese 









11* João 26 Japanese and 
Portuguese 
10 months Brazilian high 
school graduate 
Regular factory 
job in Japan 








14 Angelica 26 Portuguese 
and English 





15 Miki 16 Japanese and 
Portuguese 
6 months Brazilian high 
school 
Vocational 
school in Japan 




Haken job in 
Japan 
17 Alyson 15 Portuguese 6 Brazilian high 
school 
n/a 
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Paula 16 Portuguese 15 Brazilian high 
school 
n/a 










22 Wagner 15 Portuguese 7 Brazilian high 
school 
n/a 
23 Jose Luis 22 Portuguese 
and Japanese 














26 Augusto 17 Portuguese 13 Brazilian high 
school 
n/a 
27* Stella 20 Portuguese 
and Japanese 





28 Thais 26 Portuguese 
and Japanese 
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